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I. INTRODUCTION 
The police function in a democracy as a community agent 
working for and assisting the community in the task of 
policing. Since the nature of its function is extremely 
complex it necessarily derives a great deal of trust and 
power from the people. It is entrusted particularly, with 
the legitimate use of force - one of the basic monopolies of 
power that a citizen can confer on government, and a wide 
discretion. This discretion not only permits the police to 
select the method and style of policing but it also permits 
individual police officers a great deal of latitude in their 
manner of law enforcement . 
To function effectively, the police must operate with the 
educated acceptance, cooperation and approval of the 
community. Until recently, the faith and trust in the 
ability of the police to exercise its function with due 
diligence and 
unchallenged. 
accountability. 
professionalism 
There has been 
has 
a 
gone 
minimal 
relatively 
operational 
Institutionalised checks and safeguards 
which could have been relied upon to challenge and criticise 
police policies have not realised their potential. However, 
a growing knowledge of and sensitivity to civil rights 
generally, has highlighted frailties in the trust bestowed 
upon the police. Police discretion is perceived to be 
obscurely and i 11-def ined so that the 
adequate containment has become apparent. 
need for its more 
Similarly, fear of 
abuse of the 'legitimate' force exercised by the police has 
t.AW t lBAAA"f 
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caused a public demand for a more effective independent 
verification of the operation of the complaints process. The 
phrase 'sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes' (who will guard 
the guardians themselves) is a relevant question in light of 
these concerns. A succinct summary of the problem is 
provided by Morris: 
"Today it is clear that the Police wield the greatest 
power that the state has over the individual citizen. 
They have such far reaching power that we must have 
effective and exceptional processes to complain about 
those rare occasions when the power is abused." 1 
The present machinery for dealing with complaints regarding 
formulations of wider police policy issues or abuses of force 
is operated almost entirely by the police. Consequently, the 
design of the present complaints process encourages the 
reception of complaints which in the main relate to 
misconduct rather than complaints about policies, procedures 
or practices. Hence, these deficiencies have contributed to 
the overall public questioning of the need to make the police 
generally more accountable to society. 
In his report into the disturbances at Brixton, an eminent 
jurist, Lord Scarman stated:-
"A complaints procedure which is generally 
acknowledged to be fair and impartial - to the public 
and to the accused police officer is essential if 
• 
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the police are to enjoy the degree of public support 
they must have in order to discharge their onerous and 
necessary task. If public confidence in the 
complaints procedure is to be secured, the early 
introduction of an independent element in the 
investigation of complaints and the establishment of a 
conciliation process are vital". 2 
Police act i vi ties then have become very much a matter of 
public concern with the resultant call for them to be subject 
to open public scrutiny, a cal 1 to which the New Zealand 
Labour Government has responded in setting up an independent 
legislation monitoring of the police. The proposed 
demonstrates the Government commitment to the principle that 
the police is accountable to the community it serves. At the 
same time the legislation also recognises the difficulty 
faced by police 
investigation and 
management 
resolution 
alleged police misconduct. 
in satisfying assessment, 
of citizens complaints of 
The independent review entity 
will be imposed to ensure not only that the police act with 
the high degree of prudence, foresight and technical acumen 
worthy of the powers society has entrusted in it but also to 
ensure that public trust is preserved by insisting upon the 
expeditious, thorough and impartial processing of complaints . 
An effective police complaints procedure then is vitally 
important for the following interrelated reasons: 
(a) Mutual Aggrandisement There is a clear link between 
police effectiveness and the public confidence that 
I -, 
I 
I 
l 
( b) 
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comes with the faith that complaints will be fairly 
and efficiently dealt with. 
the police complaints system 
Low public confidence in 
means that the public 
tend to view complaining as 
pessimism 
police. 
may 
The 
eventually serve 
imposition of an 
unproductive. 
to undermine 
This 
the 
impartial complaints 
system will serve to augment confidence and trust in 
the community agent which in turn will likely increase 
the acceptability, status and authority of police. 
Congruent Values Barometer The general attitude of 
the community to the police can make for greater or 
lesser confrontation. A procedure which is acceptable 
to the public is an essential part of keeping the 
police in touch with the community it serves. It will 
act as an instrument to detect and forecast attitudes 
and values and thereby will enable the police to 
maintain values consistent with that of the community. 
For instance, the police wi 11 be quickly alerted to 
the unpopularity of the enforcement of the more out-
of-date or defective laws. They will also be 
encouraged more readily responsive to remedying 
discrepencies in police procedures and policies. 
(c) Policing by Consent Policing by consent relies very 
much upon good community/police relation and an 
effective complaints procedure will help cement this 
relationship. 
,. 
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(d) Public Perception : The public image of the police is 
an intangible yet vitally important factor influencing 
police work. Being subject to an effective complaints 
procedure will help dispel the perception that the 
police are a law unto themselves. 
Part I of the Police Complaints Authority and Miscellaneous 
Amendments Bill 1987 (the Bill) directly and convincingly 
addresses the concerns of fear of abuse of force; the 
inadequate complaints process and the need for effective 
accountability. The 
complaints system but 
position of the police 
establishment of a 
Bill not only remodels the existing 
also impacts on the constitutional 
in society. It achieves this by the 
Police Complaints Authority 
Authority) 
represents 
which 
the 
basically 
public and 
is an independent body 
monitors the police in 
(the 
that 
the 
important areas of public concern. 
Scope of Paper 
Firstly, although the focus of this paper is on the new 
complaints system, it is necessary that the existing system 
should be analysed and criticised so that one can gain a true 
appreciation of the reform measures of the Bill. The 
existing complaints system is to a certain extent a direct 
result of the somewhat dubious validity of concepts such as 
"constabulary independence" and "accountability to the law". 
These concepts are substantial topics in their own right and 
consequently they w i 11 only be superficially dea 1 t with in 
this paper. 
r 
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Secondly, the need for a shift to external vigilance is 
canvassed and then the Bi 11 is analysed in deta i 1, in a 
critical clause by clause with comments on the substance, and 
drafting style; and 
jurisdictions. The 
functions, duties 
comparisons drawn 
paper also focuses 
and powers of 
with 
on the 
the 
overseas 
specific 
principal 
actors/deciders, drawing together some pertinent points. An 
evaluation of the competing interests involved in the Bill 
follows as well as comments on the nature of the legislation 
itself. The paper then concludes with a summary of some of 
the features of the proposed system with some other general 
observations. 
II. THE FUNCTION OF POLICE IN SOCIETY 
Reducing it to its most elementary level, the police function 
as an agent of government to serve the community. Within 
this function, its work can be categorised into three broad 
roles which basically range from being in the vanguard of the 
administration of justice to the provision of social 
services. In the modern liberal democratic state its 
function has been described as being: 
II the instrument for enforcing the rule of law, 
they are the means by which civilised society 
maintains order, that people may live safely in their 
homes and go freely about their lawful business. 
Basically the task is the maintenance of the Queen's 
Peace - that is the preservation of law and order. 113 
But its function is perhaps more accurately and succinctly 
described in Sir Richard Mayne' s instructions to the "New 
Police of the 
being " [T] he 
and property, 
Metropolis" in 1829. There it was defined as 
prevention of crime .... , the protection of life 
and the preservation of public tranquillity 14 • 
r 
I 
I 
I 
1 
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The function of 
statutory form. 
Zealand constable 
has not 
Office 5 
been given 
of the New 
the New Zealand Police 
However, The Oath of 
records a function similar to that of the 
early English model. The constable swears to: 
II well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady the Queen 
in the Police, without favour or affection, malice or 
ill-will, until legally discharged; will see 
and cause Her Majesty's peace to be kept and 
preserved; will prevent to the best of [his or 
her] power all offences against the peace; ... , and 
that while continu[ing] to hold the said office 
will to the best of [his or her] skill and knowledge 
discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according 
t 1 ,,6 o aw •••• 
The Oath is complemented by regulation 11 ( 1) 
Regulations 1959 which provides in part that 
constable shall include being " ... on the 
of the Pol ice 
the duty of a 
alert for the 
prevention and detection of crime and the protection of the 
public .... " 
The general nature of these statements not only indicates the 
ext r aord inar i ly broad respons i bi 1 it ies upon the police 
collectively and individually but it also belies the complex 
and multifaceted roles of its function. Its activities 
include the following roles: 
(a) 
( b) 
Law enforcement and order maintenance: which involves, 
for example, preventing crime, detecting offenders, 
effecting arrests and prosecuting violators; 
The provision of social services: which includes, for 
example, assisting the mentally defective, supervising 
the young, caring for the frail, keeping the peace and 
generally creating and maintaining a feeling of 
security in the community; 
(c) Non law enforcement work load: this role includes, for 
example, at tending motor ace iden ts, performing search 
-I 
[ 
[ 
~ 
I 
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and rescue operations, rendering first aid, dealing 
with missing persons, abating nuisances, facilitating 
the movement of traffic, supervising crowds at public 
events, attending domestic disputes, administration of 
registration and licencing, taking reports on lost and 
found property. 
The interrelationship between these aspects of the police 
function is a cause for competition and conflict. For 
instance, in dealing 
enforcement workload) 
with domestic disputes (non law 
evidence of any assault by one of the 
participants will likely cause the law enforcement role to be 
invoked and an arrest and prosecution will ensue. In 
policing crowds at public events (non law enforcement 
workload) or just simply keeping the peace (social service), 
the police have access to 
measures ( law enforcement) 
tranquility. 
a variety 
to enable 
of control or coercive 
it to maintain public 
To be successful in the pursuit of these roles, the elements 
of "consent" and "balance" are essential. The police, if it 
is to secure the consent of the community, must strike an 
acceptable balance between the three roles of its function. 
Lord Scarman, summed up the balance required and tension 
between the roles as follows: 7 
"Crime and disorder are aberrations from 'normality' 
which it is the duty of the police to endeavour first 
to prevent and then, if need be, to correct. It 
follows that the police officer's first duty is to co-
operate with others in maintaining 'the normal state 
of society'. Since it is inevitable that there will 
be aberrations from normality, his second duty arises, 
which is, without endangering normality, to enforce 
the law. His priorities are clear; the maintenance of 
public tranquillity comes first. If law enforcement 
puts at risk public tranquillity, he will have to make 
a difficult decision. Inevitably there will be 
situations in which the public interest requires him 
• 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
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to test the wisdom of law enforcement by its likely 
effect on public order. Law enforcement, involving as 
it must, the possibility that force may have to be 
used, can cause acute friction and division in a 
community - particularly if the community is tense and 
the cause of the law breaker not without support. 
'Fiat justitia et ruant caeli 18 may be apt for a 
Judge: but it can lead a policeman into tactics 
disruptive of the very fabric of society." 
It is plain that with the limited resources available to the 
police, it can not hope to achieve the ambitious fulfillment 
of its function. Therefore, it is permitted a wide 
discretion in order for it to not only balance its roles and 
but also achieve an acceptable level of performance. 
It follows then that the nature of the police function 
involves "the formulation of policies, the setting of 
standards, the assessment of priorities and the efficient 
utilisation of limited resources 11 • 9 Hence it has been 
largely left to the police to deal with, for instance, the 
organising of policing methods, the juxtaposition in New 
Zealand of combining a rapid response crime control effort -
(a law enforcement role which may be in danger of fostering 
resentment with some segments of the community), with that of 
a caring, sensitive policing (ie community policing); the 
need to prevent crime versus the need to detect it; the need 
to respect civil liberties whilst at the same time infringing 
them; the decision to employ reative or proactive policing, 
patrol versus foot policing, the enforcement and prosecution 
of the criminal law in genera 1 and ind iv idua 1 cases; the 
manner in which demonstrations and industrial disputes will 
be handled or whether or not dawn raids or firearms amnesties 
should be conducted, and most importantly, for the purpose of 
this paper, the nature and design of the process by which 
citizens complain about police actions. 
The discretion in organising police policies, the assessment 
of priorities and the efficient use of resources is but one 
very important facet of the autonomy of policing. The other 
L 
[ 
[ 
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facet relates to the exercise by individual officers of the 
power conferred upon their office. To assist the attainment 
of the overall police effort, police officers exercise an 
array of controls and powers involving the coercion and 
repression of citizens in general or selective cases. For 
instance, important day to day decisions, reflecting the 
overall police devised policies, include making an arrest, 
using force or bringing a prosecution against a citizen. 
The width of this complex function underlines the need for 
effective control not only over individual members of the 
police, but also over the police generally. In the broad 
sense, there is need for an effective avenue by which the 
community can hold the police accountable for the exercise of 
its wide discretion and issue directions to it. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF POLICE 
Since the police are basically an agent of Government and 
thus of the community, one might expect that the community 
should to be able to make its own judgments as the manner of 
policing it wants and how the police conduct operations. But 
an operational autonomy by the police has developed which is 
reflected in its constitutional status. This status 
accommodates the doctrines of "constabluary independence" and 
"accountability to the law." Consequently effective citizen 
participation in policing matters is minimised, whether it 
relates to decisions about the style of policing or the 
investigation 
police. 
and resolution of complaints against the 
It is proposed to very briefly examine the notions of 
"constabulary independence" and "accountability to the law". 
( i ) Constabulary Independence and Political 
A b ·1· 11 ccounta 1 1ty 
. 
I 
[ 
[ 
L 
[ 
l 
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Support for the notion of constabulary independence stems 
from both statute law and common law. In the first place the 
Commissioner of Police is appointed by the Governor General 
to have the general control of the Police. 12 The bestowment 
of direct control of the police to the Commissioner is quite 
unique in a Wes tmins te r style par 1 i amen tary sys tern. Under 
this style of Government, the Minister in charge of the 
department or service invariably 
responsibility for its control and 
. h C A 13 . d instance, t e ustoms et prov1 es: 
"Subject to the control of 
has the particular 
administration. For 
the Minister, the 
Department shall be charged with the administration of 
the Customs Act." 
Similarly, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 
14 . d Act prov1 es: 
"Subject to the contol of the Minister, the functions 
of the New Zealand Intelligence Service shall be .... " 
and the Ministry of Transport Act 15 provides: 
(2)" ... the Ministry shall be under the control of the 
Minister of Transport. 
(3) The Ministry shall, in all matters relating the 
administration of the enactments specified in Part II 
of the First Schedule of this Act, be under the 
control of the Minister of Civil Aviation and 
Meterological Services." 
The deferment of control to the Commissioner then reflects 
the special functions the police have in society. However, 
the Minister does have the ability to hold the Commissioner 
accountable for matters of an administrative or operational 
nature. For instance, the duties of the Commissioner of 
Pol ice which are detailed in the Pol ice Regulations 19 5 9
16 
which record that: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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II ( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
12 
The Commissioner shall be responsible to the 
Minister for the general administration and 
control of the Police. 
He shall cause all members of the Police to 
discharge their duties to the Government and 
the public satisfactorily and efficiently." 
These regulations establish the rather clouded relationship 
between the police and the executive. The Commi ss ione r is 
clearly responsible to the Minister and Government as the 
unequivocal phrases, "shall be responsible to the Minister 
for the general administration and control" and "their duties 
to the Government" indicate. 
But the peculiar relationship between the police and the 
Government also takes account of the historical significance 
of the off ice of the English constable and the common law 
doctrine of constabulary independence. Various judicial 
observations, particularly in England and Australia, have 
been interpreted as substantiating this doctrine
17
. This 
view necessarily implies that individual members of the 
police are answerable to the law and the law alone. The 
powers of a constable are exercised by him by virtue of his 
off ice. They cannot be exe re i sed on the respons ibi 1 i ty of 
anyone but himself. Thus a constable is exercising an 
orig ina 1 not a delegated authority. 18 Together these 1 ines 
of argument provide the basis that since no person can 
instruct a constable to enforce the law. It has been assumed 
to follow that the Commissioner cannot be instructed on the 
organisation 
matters. 
of operational policing including policy 
Recent 
maintain 
commentators 19 have 
that the notions 
criticised the 
that the police 
doctrine 
rely upon 
and 
to 
support police autonomy are flawed, particularly in light of 
the statutory directions in the Police Regulations. But the 
doctrine does receive some support from the practice of 
ministerial control. Normally, Ministers are responsible for 
the general conduct of their departments and they are 
I 
I ~ 
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answerable in the exercise of that responsibility first to 
Parliament and ultimately to the electorate. That 
responsibility is less direct with the police but the 
Minister does have the ability to influence police policies 
and day-to-day operations. Ministerial responsibility has 
not been totally eroded. However, it is a very rare 
occurrence for the Minister to 
application of law enforcement in 
cases. 20 Although the Minister has in 
. d 1. . 21 some wi er po icy issues. 
get involved in the 
specific or general 
the past intervened in 
In summary, although the legislative declarations appear to 
have regularised the common law status of the police, this 
has in effect not occurred. The statute law operates in 
tandem with the common law which conventionally has seen the 
reluctance of the Minister to get involved with the 
operational side of policing. 
(ii) Accountability to the Law
22 
The not ion of legal accoun tabi 1 i ty of the police ref er s to 
the capacity of the courts to subject the activities of the 
Police to real scrutiny. The courts are regarded as an 
important institution of Government with a special 
responsibility to address misuse of police power and 
discretion. This perspective has provided a great deal of 
appeal to the police. It has also provided a basis for the 
rejection of other forms of accountability, for example, 
civilian oversight panels or an external complaints reviewer. 
This doctrine fosters the image of political independence and 
neutrality - the police are simply instruments to enforce the 
law. Further, "it provides what appears to be a democratic 
basis for police activities - the law which the police apply 
and to which they are answerable results from a democratic 
legislative process 1123 This perspective also ensures that 
the police in this process are "depersonalised" (it is the 
law which requires it etc), which provides reassurance to the 
public. Also the entire process engenders public 
acceptability for the Police. 
- I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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The cornerstone of the legal theory arises in the first 
Blackburn case
24 where Lord Denning asserted both the 
independence of the Commissioner from political intervention 
and the Commissioner's ultimate answerabil i ty to the courts 
for enforcing the law. 
"I have no hesitation in holding that, like every 
constable in the land he should be, and is, 
independent of the executive. He is not subject to 
the orders of the Secretary of State, save under the 
Police A.et 1964 ... I hold it to be the duty of the 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, as it is of 
every Chief Constable of the land, to enforce the law 
of the land. Be must take steps so to post his men 
that crimes may be detected; and that honest citizens 
may go about their affairs in peace. He must decide 
whether or not suspected persons are to be prosecuted; 
and, if need be, bring the prosecution or see that it 
is brought. But in all these things, he is not the 
servant of anyone, save the law itself. No Minister 
of the Crown can tell him that he must or must not 
keep observation on this place or that; or that he 
must or must not prosecute this man or that one. Nor 
can any police authority tell him so. The 
responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is 
answerable to the law and the law alone. That appears 
sufficiently from Fisher v Oldham Corporation and 
Attorney-General for New South Wales v Perpetual 
"25 
Trustee Co Ltd . 
This particular case, however, must be distinguished on its 
facts. It dealt with the complete non-enforcement of the law 
thus limiting the application of the doctrine that allegedly 
applies in respect of policy and command decisions. 
At the individual police officer level the scope of the 
court's review is also very limited. ~uch police activity is 
not governed by leg al r u 1 es and the capacity and open-ended 
nature of the law permits the individual officers a great 
deal of latitude. Most police work does not involve law 
r 
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I 
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enforcement. Therefore, the nature of day to day police work 
which involves a myriad of situations in which police 
officers and citizens confront each other is not capable of 
being controlled by the courts. 
In effect, the courts are simply not in a position to provide 
an effective and definitive role. "All the courts can do is 
ensure that officers have actually considered the particular 
case before them as opposed, for example, simply following a 
general policy directive or perhaps their own unthinking 
assumptions" 26 . They do not have the prerogative of picking 
and choosing cases and issues which they consider imp or tan t 
to address. 
The reality then of the legal accountability doctrine is that 
the police are rarely called upon by the courts to justify 
their actions. Most of the police "clientele" plead guilty, 
do not make complaints nor challenge police evidence or 
conduct at their hearings or trials. Further, since much of 
police work does not relate to law enforcement legal 
accountability by definition is limited. 
The courts, however, do have a number of means of effecting a 
control over police conduct when it is required. For 
instance, where a case comes before it involving the 
27 infringement of the due process principles or Judges Rules 
(ie detention of a suspect while enquiries are being made or 
the questioning of a suspect for an extra-ordinary long 
period), the 
other cases, 
court may simply 
whether there is 
dismiss the information. In 
a clear abuse of power or the 
case involves "bad faith" on the part of a police officer, 
the officer may be publicity censured. Yet, in other cases, 
the court may award costs against the police as an indication 
of what is not judically acceptable behaviour. 28 
Whilst the legal constitutional status may be technically 
certain, it has to a certain extent been subjugated by the 
doctrines of constabulary independence and accountability to 
the law. The assertion that the Commissioner is responsible 
only to the law as well as maintaining a substantial 
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operational autonomy from political 
effect of leaving him with a large 
policing policies. The failure then 
secure a process which would provide 
interference, has the 
discretion to decide 
by the community to 
an adequate degree of 
protection from the police as well as provide a means of 
detection of abuse of power, is not the result of a divided 
pluralistic community but the result of a tradition. 
Apart from the doctrine of ministerial responsibility the 
Commissioner is subject to two other forms of operational 
control. They include the Justice and Law Reform Committee 
(whose functions are set out on page 48) which has 
previously sought information from the Commissioner rather 
than having examined 
contemplated by its 
method of control 
policies of the police within the terms 
brief. Thus to a certain extent this 
by the Committee has limited value. 
Another control of limited value is the Annual Report to 
Parliament. 29 The purpose of the Annual Report is to provide 
an official source by which the Minister, Parliament and 
members of the public are informed about matters concerning 
the police. Theoretically the Report should be a document 
which not only informs the Minister and the Parliament of 
police activities and problems but also provides an important 
media for communication and self examination within the 
police itself. In reality Parliament rarely scrutinizes the 
very general and shallow contents of the report. At the time 
of preparation of this paper, the nature and structure of the 
~nnual Report was being reviewed by police officials. 
IV. THE CATEGORISATION AND NATURE OF COMPLAINTS 
The police have a dual role of not only investigating 
offences committed by members of the public but they also 
have a separate responsibility for investigating complaints 
made against its own members. Complaints made by members of 
the public against the police fall into three categories 30 . 
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Firstly, there are complaints arising from the actions of 
individual members of the police in their law enforcement and 
order maintenance roles. Complaints in this category 
primarily involve misconduct whether it comprises an 
allegation of breach of the police disciplinary code or of 
criminal offending. For 
maltreatment of prisoners, 
investigate an offence. 
instance, assaults on citizens, 
fabricating evidence or failing to 
This category also includes 
complaints arising from the exercise by police officers of 
the discretion to prosecute 
other complaints often are 
a per son for 
made on the 
an of fence. Many 
basis of what is 
perceived to be impoliteness, casualness or some other 
attitudinal inadequacy on the part of the police. 
Secondly, there are complaints arising from general police 
policy, practices and procedures which range from citizens 
objecting to the police use of soft nose bullets or the 
closing of rural oolice stations. Objectionable practices 
mightinclude the filing of burglary reports if they are under 
a certain monetary value particularly if no suspect is named 
fall into this category or the manner in which the team 
policing units operate . 
Lastly, there are complaints arising out administrative 
decisions. For instance, manpower and staffing of localities 
or the allocation of resources and their use are included in 
this category. 
As it is observed complaints are capable of covering a broad 
spectrum of grievances. It does not follow that the same 
procedure of investigation and resolution is equally suitable 
for dea 1 ing with them a 11 these ea tegor ies. In fact the 
existing complaints system has functioned primarily to deal 
with the first category of complaints to the almost exclusion 
of the others. This category is of course subject to an 
Ombudsmen's ex post facto review. In regard to the latter 
two categories the 
other government 
investigated by an 
police are in the same position as any 
department. These complaints are 
Ombudsman under the Ombudsmen Act 1975 
(although the policy category is subject to certain Ombudsmen 
jurisdicational limitations which will be traversed later). 
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v. THE EXISTING COMPLAINTS SYSTEM 
(i} Development 
Prior to 1982 there was no centralised repository within the 
police which recorded comp la in ts made against its members. 
There was however an annual return from districts of 
"complaints and praise" which was collated by the Public 
Affairs Directorate 31 of the police. In this earlier system 
police District Commanders were the final arbiter of most 
complaints. The only forms of "independent" scrutiny 
occurred if a complaint was to be the subject of disciplinary 
proceedings (in which case the Commissioner reviewed the 
file) or if a further complaint was made expressing 
dissatisfaction with the original police investigation 
(either the Commissioner or an Ombudsman reviewed the file). 
The number of 
publicised. 
provided for 
complaints made under this system was never 
Nor was there any internal mechanism which 
the analysis of the complaints in order to 
determine 
was also 
any patterns of misconduct. This earlier system 
characterised by the lack of a standardised 
investigative procedure 
from some very general 
for investigating 
guidelines contained 
officers (apart 
in the General 
Instruction Manual). Presumably, the Commissioner also found 
it difficult to provide quick and informative responses to 
questions on matters of public, media or ministerial 
attention. 
The earlier complaints system was subjected to severe 
criticism by the former Chief Ombudsman, Sir George Laking, 
in his report on the investigation of complaints arising out 
of the South African Rugby Tour of New Zealand in 1981. In 
his general conclusions he reported: 
"It appeared to me that in some instances the police 
inquiries were directed exclusively to the detection 
of an offender and to deciding what action should be 
taken against him. If identification of the offender 
was seen to be impracticable, investigation of the 
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complaint was carried no further. In situations where 
a complaint was directed against general misconduct by 
a group of members rather than that of a single 
member, investigation did not seem always to extend to 
an inquiry as to how that came about. 
Non-commissioned officers in charge of such groups 
were 
of 
not generally called 
those under their 
to account for 
command. 
the conduct 
Similarly, 
investigations did not generally extend to possible 
deficiencies in training or instructions. 
Consideration should be given to the adequacy of 
existing procedures for the effective investigation of 
claims of general misconduct to enable any 
short-comings in training programmes or in general or 
special instructions to be identified." 32 
Existing procedure of complaints 
The appointment of a Deputy Commissioner (Administration) in 
19 8 2 provided an opportunity to conduct a f ul 1 review of 
police procedures for receiving, investigating and 
determining complaints. The review was instituted primarily 
to counter the persistent calls by the media and sectors of 
the public generally for an independent overview of internal 
police investigations in the aftermath of the Springbok 
Tour. 33 The review confirmed what everybody knew - that in 
many respects, 
Principally, it 
the 
failed 
complaint 
to meet 
system was 
the demand 
inadequate. 
for fairness, 
effectiveness and independent review. 
On 1 January 1983, a new policy of dealing with internal 
investigations was introduced along with a central register 
for recording complaints against the police.
34 
The present scheme requires that as soon as a complaint is 
made to the police it must be taken down 
complainant is requested to sign it. 35 A 
in writing and the 
complaint does not 
necessarily have to be made at a 1 . . 36 d . po ice station nor oes it 
have to be made to a police ff . 37 C . . d o icer. A ommissione 
Officer then gives whatever directions considered appropriate 
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h la h 1 . . 1 . 3 8 f s ou t e comp aint require ear y attention. A copy o 
the complaint is promptly forwarded through the normal 
channels to the District Commander indicating what action has 
39 
already been taken. 
The District 
acknowledgement 
classifies the 
Commander after forwarding a written 
of the complaint to 
complaint as serious 
h 1 . 40 h t e comp ainant t en 
. 41 Th or non serious. e 
purpose of these classifications is to enable the recording 
of serious complaints in the central register. 42 A "serious 
allegation" is one which alleges a member of police has 
committed a crime or offence punishable by imprisonment
43 , or 
44 
unjustly arrested or mistreated a person; or displayed 
prejudice or discrimination whether racial 
45 
against any person or group of persons; 
or otherwise 
or any other case 
"non which a District Commander considers 
. 46 serious. A 
serious allegation" includes an 
police has been neglectful, 
otherwise acted improperly in 
allegation that a member of 
unreasonable, 
. 4 7 
a minor way. 
rude 
Only 
complaints are recorded in the central register. 
or has 
serious 
(See 
Appendix B which is a synopsis of serious complaints made 
against the police in recent years. 
If the complaint is of a serious nature
48 or one which the 
District Commander is of the view warrants 49 inclusion in the 
1 . t . 50 h comp ain s register, e shall within 48 hours forward a 
copy of the complaint to the Deputy Commissioner 
(Administration). 51 The District Commander then appoints or 
arranges the appointment of a member of the appropriate level 
to conduct or supervise the enquiry.
52 The District 
Commander has to ensure that the officer complained about is 
advised of the substance of the complaint as soon as possible 
unless there is good reason for not doing so
53 and throughout 
the enquiry he is required to take a personal interest and 
ensure that it is handled expeditiously. 54 
In advising the complainant of the outcome of the enquiry 
h D . · c d b 1 · · d 55 t e istrict omman er, y etter is require to: 
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identify each allegation which may amount to a 
criminal or disciplinary offence; 
summarise the factual findings of the enquiry; 
clearly present the conclusions and reasons for 
them; 
indicate the decision as to any further police 
action. 
Where proceedings could be instituted in open court, or by 
high 
been 
way of 
degree 
disciplinary proceedings, or there has been a 
of public interest, or media publicity has 
generated by the complaint, the District Commander must 
forward the complaint files to the Deputy Commissioner for a 
dee is ion. 5 6 On the other hand a frivolous, vexatious or 
groundless allegation can be quickly put to rest
57 but he is 
required to advise all parties affected by his decision. 
58 
The Deputy Commissioner though still reviews all of these 
files before filing.
59 
Complaints made 
warrant an extra 
referred to the 
through the Commissioner or 
effort for early completion. 
60 
61 
Police by an Ombudsman do not 
a Minister 
Complaints 
apparently 
rank in the same manner previously described - although every 
endeavour is made to complete the investigation early. Where 
a complainant is dissatisfied with the police investigation 
and the Ombudsman has been approached the complaint is once 
again referred to the police for further enquiry.
62 In these 
cases the complainant is not interviewed 
th . t f h C . . 63 d th au or1 y o t e omm1ss1oner an e 
completed within a six weeks time frame.
64 
VI. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF REDRESS 
except 
inquiry 
with 
should 
the 
be 
A variety of other forums exist for aggrieved complainants to 
pursue redress for alleged improper police policies or 
actions. These include: 
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( i ) Complaints to an Ombudsman 
In New Zealand external specialist control of the police is 
conducted by the Ombudsmen. The Ombudsmen Act 1975 includes 
the police among the agencies who are within the Ombudsmen's 
jurisdiction. 65 However, jurisdictional limitations weaken 
the oversight. For instance, section 13(7) of the Ombudsmen 
Act provides: 
"Nothing in this Act shall authorise an Ombudsman 
to investigate : 
(d) Any decision, recommendation, act, or omission 
of any member of the Police that may be subject 
of an inquiry under section 33 of the Police Act 
1958, unless a complaint in relation thereto has 
been made or conveyed to a member of the Police 
superior in rank to the member to whom the 
complaint relates; and 
( i) the complaint has not been investigated; 
or 
( i i ) the complaint has been investigated and 
the complainant is dissatisfied with the 
final result." 
The Ombudsmen, therefore, are precluded from investigating 
any complaint unless it has first been made to the police and 
only then if the complaint has not been investigated or the 
complainant is dissatisfied with the result. By the time the 
Ombudsmen review a police file all the definitive decisions 
have long been made and acted upon. The time delay between 
the police investigation and the Ombudsmen's enquiry makes it 
almost impossible for the reviewer to influence police 
investigations. As a result the complainant is provided with 
an ineffective means of redress or remedy. 
Another limitation arises because the Ombudsmen are not at 
liberty to institute an own motion investigation into matters 
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relating to police practices. This statutory officer as 
indicated above, can 
been investigated 
only act upon a complaint which has not 
by the police or where it has been 
investigated but the complainant is dissatisfied with the 
final result. The own initiative enquiry, 
respect of h . 66 h ot er government agencies, as 
available in respect of the police. 
available in 
never been 
Finally, the other statutory impediment arises out of the 
Ombudsman's principal function. The Ombudsmen Act 1975 
provides that "it shall be a function of the Ombudsmen to 
investigate any decision or recommendation ... relating to a 
matter of "administration 11 •
67 What 
defined. 
amounts to 
"administration" has never been "Successive 
Commissioners of Police have taken the view that some of the 
most vital decisions taken by the Police - decisions about 
whether or not to accept a complaint and as to whether or not 
to commence a c r imina 1 prose cut ion or not relate to matters 
of administration .... Th e view of the Commissioners was 
supported several years ago 
legal advisers which went 
by an opinion 
further. It 
from the Crown's 
advanced a wider 
contention that none of law enforcement operations of the 
Police relate to matters of administration 11 •
68 
Consequently, according to this reasoning most police 
decisions are of an operational nature and as a result the 
Commissioner contends that the Ombudsmen lack the 
jurisdiction to investigate such matters. The reality has 
been somewhat at variance to the rhetoric though because a 
high level of co-operation has been established with the 
Ombudsmen having gene rous access to police files and reports . 
The argument does, however, high 1 igh t the precarious 
oversight function the Ombudsmen has in relation to the 
police . 
( i i ) Criminal Proceedings 
Although a citizen could commence an action of this nature he 
or she would have to overcome a number of difficulties which 
relegates such an action to one of little practical value.69 
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There are two features which diminish the practicality of 
pursuing a private prosecution. Firstly, the achieving of 
credibility in the eyes of the Judge who in sitting in police 
courts might become immune to the allegations of misconduct 
against the police. Maintaining judicial objectivity and 
impartiality may be very difficult. The second feature 
relates to the production of evidence to the required 
standard of proof. This particular aspect makes it virtually 
impossible for an action to succeed without recourse to a 
number of respectable witnesses and independent evidence. 
(iii) Civil Proceedings 
An aggrieved complainant can always have recourse to the law 
of tort and pursue damages in respect to trespass against the 
person or against property, assault and false imprisonment. 
But the complainant is statutorily barred from bringing an 
action for damages in respect of injuries. 70 
Exemplary damages though for the tort of battery may be 
pursued. In order to succeed the plaintiff must allege and 
prove a high-handed trespass, whether to the person or 
property by a police officer. In order to overcome the 
statutory bar where personal injury has occurred the 
plaintiff must show "some additional feature ... an abuse of 
power or the invasion of other rights of the plaintiff". 
71 
Should the plaintiff succeed "the punitive element in the 
damages awarded to the victim might occasionally be found to 
satisfy the community's sense of justice 11 •
72 
( i V) Commissions, Committees of Inquiry and Ad Hoe 
E . 73 xam1ners 
The history of the police records that a number of important 
inquiries or investigations have been conducted to scrutinize 
police actions or decisions. Commissions, committees and 
individual examiners have been appointed from time to time to 
inquire into and report upon diverse matters of public 
interest involving both operational and administrative 
matters . For instance, questions relating to the discretion 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
. I 
r . I 
I 
- I 
25 
to prosecute citizens, investigations into fatal shootings by 
police officers have been conducted and the conduct of some 
individual police officers have all been enquired into. Some 
wider police policy issues also have been canvassed in 
relation to gangs and violence. With an array of inquiry 
facilities available, an aggrieved complainant mounting a 
sufficiently strong lobby could cause any one of the above 
inquiry mechanisms to be instituted. In reality, there are 
easier and less costly means to deal with an individual or 
public concern and it is not often any of these formal 
processes are instituted. 
Perhaps an aggrieved complainant might induce the Minister of 
Pol ice to appoint a Commit tee of Inquiry established under 
the Police Act 1958. Consisting of a Judge and one or more 
senior members of police, its purpose would be to investigate 
and report to the Commissioner on "any matter relating to the 
Police". In practice this provision has only been exercised 
in exceptional circumstances. 
( V) Coroners Court 
Depending on the nature of the evidence adduced a Coroner may 
find that a police act ion causing the death of any per son 
merits further investigation although that statutory officer 
cannot determine any matter. However, in the main, the 
Coroners enquiry is limited to determining only the manner of 
death. 74
 
(vi) Members of Parliament and News Media 
It is possible for an aggrieved person to complain to his or 
her Member of Parliament or to the news media. In the past, 
the police have displayed a keen sensitivity to public 
opinion and will quickly react to criticism mentioned in the 
House or reported in the media. 
The 1976 Overstayer issue is an example of a question being 
asked in the House. The Minister of Police initially denied 
that "checks" had been carried out on a random basis but the 
If 
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Opposition forced the issue and demanded an enquiry. The 
subsequent report by a police superintendent confirmed that 
the police did in fact carry out random checks in the initial 
period of the operation. 75 
On the other hand, for a particular complaint to be 
considered by the media, it must be worthy of the publicity. 
Consequently, unless the nature of the complaint is in some 
way unusual aggrieved citizens will normally be dissatisfied 
with this means of achieving redress. 
VII. FEATURES OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM 
The existing complaints system provides the police with an 
apparent monopolistic control. That body has the primary 
responsibility for investigating and determining the outcome 
of all complaints against police officers. But it would be 
wrong to conclude that the complaints system has not been 
devoid of effective Ombudsmen attention. The former Chief 
Ombudsman did campaign vigorously to bring about changes in 
the police complaints system. In the 1980 Annual Report to 
Parliament, he commented: 
"Following a series of discussions with the 
Commissioner of Police, the internal procedures 
for the investigation of complaints from members 
of the public have been considerably rnodified .... " 76 
Again, in 1983, following his investigation of complaints 
against the police arising out of the South African rugby 
tour of New Zealand in 1981, the then Chief Ombudsman drew 
the attention of the Commissioner to a number of general 
issues relating to the investigation of complaints which he 
. . d th . . . d 77 1nv1te e comm1ss1oners to cons1 er. 
Finally, in his valedictory report, Mr G Laking dwelt at 
length on the investigation of complaints against the police. 
After citing the deficiencies in the Ombudsmen Act fabric to 
I 
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effectively monitor the investigation of complaints, he 
canvassed the need for independent review of police act ion, 
criteria for the evaluation of complaints procedures and 
possible solutions. 
78 
However, in the main, the police are usually only answerable 
for the conduct, speed, and strategy of an investigation 
perhaps by way of an ex post facto Ombudsman's review. 
Whilst the system does provide a uniformity in the ranking of 
complaints, the closed nature of the internal system leaves 
it open to suspicion. Germane to the features of this system 
is the lack of public documentation and information 
concerning its functioning and procedure, as well as the lack 
of comprehensive and meaningful statistics about complaints. 
VIII CRITICISMS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM
79 
Some general 
already been 
criticisms about 
referred to but 
some more specific criticisms. 
( i) Lack of Credibility 
the complaints 
it is worthwhile 
system have 
considering 
There is a general perception that the internal investigation 
of complaints fails in the proper conduct and surveillance of 
justice. 
Even if the 
investigation 
perceived to 
Police are 
and resolution 
be acting 
rigorously impartial 
of complaints they 
with an attitude 
in 
are 
of 
the 
still 
over-
protectiveness of their own. Thus the integrity of the 
system fails because in the eyes of the public it is seen as 
less than credible. Police officers too must also have 
confidence in the system. A system which does not treat 
officers fairly by observing their rights and entertains 
groundless complaints will diminish its own legitimacy in the 
eyes of police officers. 
I 
.. I -
I -
I 
I 
I 
I -
I 
I 
I. I -
I --
r I , 
I , 
.. 
I 
.. 
• 
.. 
• 
28 
{ii) Lack of Impartiality 
One of the most prominent criticisms of the existing system 
is that the police are seen to be "judges in their own 
cause". By investigating and adjudicating on complaints made 
against its own members the police are seen to be less than 
objective. This lack of objectivity arises in a number of 
ways. 
often 
daily 
For instance, the investigation of a complaint is 
undertaken by 
contact with 
officers who are usually in 
those who are the subject 
constant 
of the 
complaint. Hence there may be a natural predisposition to 
seek out an explanation that reflects favourably on the 
police officer concerned or the police generally. Where 
there is a conflict of evidence between police officers and 
others the inconclusive nature of the complaint must in 
practice result in the benefit of the doubt being given to 
the police officer. 
The prejudging of complaints (a relatively rare occurrence 
these days) which attract widespread media attention is 
another concern. Understandably the police endeavour to 
maintain a high-profile untarnished image. 
preserving that image and maintaining 
For the sake of 
morale public 
allegations are occasionally challenged in the same public 
forum before the police investigation has been carried out or 
completed 79a. By taking such a public stance the police 
administration present the investigator with a conflict of 
roles. The investigator may feel obliged to justify that 
which was first asserted . 
{iii) Status and Credibility of Complainants 
The status and credibility of complainants may unduly 
influence the investigation and adjudication of complaints . 
There are a number of characteristics that tend to lessen the 
plausibility of complaints . For instance, the police may be 
very sceptical of a complaint received from a complainant who 
has been arrested, or lacks sobriety, or suffers from mental 
80 illness or is a gang member. The nature of the incident 
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the complaint arises 
weight particularly if 
charged situation. In these cases, 
may also be given 
it was an emotionally-
investigators and the 
decision makers may be inclined to diminish the value of the 
complaint. 
(iv) Difficulties in Lodging Complaints 
Even though the system provides for complaints to be made at 
places other than a police station ( eg via a solicitor, a 
Minister of Parliament or an Ombudsman) those who wish to 
complain usually do not have the wherewithal to use the other 
facilities. Their only real option is to make a complaint 
direct to the police. Yet, because of the potential 
prejudgements and use of discrediting characteristics that 
the police might employ, a complainant might be regarded with 
suspicion and antagonism. Fear of harassment and 
intimidation at a later time also deters many complainants 
from making their complaint directly to the police. 
(v) Failure 
Decisions 
to Scrutinize Policies and Management 
Part of the obligation of management of the police is to 
recognise dangers and opportunities of misconduct, to be 
alert to the signs of its existence and to devise measures to 
deal with it. 
However, the emphasis in the existing system is oriented 
toward individual misconduct and not bad policies or 
management decisions. By giving emphasis to eliminating the 
rotten apple other more Primary concerns of inadequate or bad 
police practices and procedures are not given the remedial 
attention which they rner it. The comp la in ts sys terns 
consequently fails to feed back effectively into the 
organisation so that defective policies, strategies and 
supervisory functions can be influenced and modified. 
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(vi) Unfairness to Police Officers 
Although this is a minoir point it is worthy of brief 
mention. The coercive nature of police powers may be brought 
to bear on individual officers who may be victimised or 
scapegoated. Because of the relationship of the officer to 
the police, the officer may feel obliged to co-operate on 
matters in order to protect his or her career. Consequently 
the system may not afford individual police officers suitable 
protection. 
In summary, as the preceding discussion discloses, the 
existing complaints system suffers from a number of serious 
deficiencies. As a result public confidence in the police is 
reduced, public co-operation with the police is diminished 
and public approval of the process is withdrawn. 
IX. THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
Usually reform of the nature proposed by the Bill rides on 
the waves of a scandal but New Zealand has not been treated 
to any cause celebre or cases of police corruption. Perhaps 
a number of events though over the last 10 years or so have 
served to challenge and question the integrity of complaint 
systems and the right of the police to devise policies for 
the community. Collectively they offer an indication as to 
what might have prompted the reformers. (The following 
examples are referenced in Appendix C). Consider for 
instance the long public saga of the Arthur Allan Thomas 
affair which culminated in a Royal Commission in 1980, and 
which criticised some police practices as well as the partial 
manner in which the evidence was presented. Consider also the 
many complaints which were lodged with the Chief Ombudsman -
a legacy of the Springbok Tour in 1981 which were 
substantiated but no police officer was ever charged in 
relation to them81 . This heightened public cynicism of the 
complaints procedure. Consider also the criticism of the 
former Chief Ombudsman Mr G Laking, who in his 1984 
31 
valedictory report, criticised aspects of the law which 
inhibited the Ombudsmen's office from monitoring, in an 
ff . f h. 1 . . h 1. 82 Th e ective as ion comp aints against t e po ice. en 
there was the Committee of Inquiry into the Queen Street 
riots which criticised some aspects of police procedures; 83 
and finally one needs to also consider the recommendations of 
independent investigators into several fatal shootings by the 
police. All three ad hoe examiners recommended changes to 
police procedures in one form or another. Perhaps the most 
significant recommendation was 
his report on the shooting of 
made by Mr Nicholson Q C in 
Paul Chase. He recommended 
that an independent examiner be appointed in every case where 
a person was shot by a member of the police (See Appendix C, 
paragraph E). 
Perhaps too the reformers were mindful of Lord Scarman' s 
findings on the Brixton Riots. According to the Law Lord if 
public confidence in the United Kingdom complaints system was 
to be secured "the early introduction of an independent 
element in the investigation . . . was 't l" 84 vi a • He also found 
that "any solution falling short of a system of independent 
investigation for all complaints was unlikely to be 
successful in achieving public confidence". 
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These episodic but well 
collectively contributed to 
publicised 
focus on 
events may 
deficiencies in 
have 
the 
current 
public 
complaints 
pressure to 
procedure. 
change the 
Consequently the 
process and the 
mounting 
persistent 
defence of the status quo by the police having become 
increasingly untenable has lead to an environment ripe for 
change. 
Part I of the Bill which relates to the Police Complaints 
Authority formed part of the Labour Government's 
election manifesto. Upon being elected to power 
1984 
the 
Government has since endeavoured to give substance to the 
policy. In February 1985 the Minister of Police circulated 
700 copies of a discussion paper entitled "Complaints Against 
Police" throughout New Zealand. Heralded by wide news media 
coverage the discussion paper outlined the concept of an 
l 
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independent non police Authority with jurisdiction over 
complaints against the police as well as an own motion 
ability to carry out investigations. The concept was drafted 
against the existing system of the investigation of 
complaints and the paper was cautious to point out that the 
ultimate statutory responsibility for the discipline of the 
1 d 1 . . . h h C . . 86 New Zea an po ice must remain wit t e ommissioner . 
The discussion paper offered a number of alternatives to the 
existing system which included: 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
Ad Hoe ~ppointees: Where a complaint is of sufficient 
significance an experienced legal practitioner could 
be appointed on an ad hoe basis to undertake the 
enquiry. However, this concept was negated because it 
was considered that the appointee should have a 
permanent ongoing responsibility. 
Ombudsmen's Office: Utilising 
was discussed but challenged. 
primarily relates to matters 
the Ombudsmen' s Off ice 
The Ombudsmen' s role 
of "administration". 87 
The importance of the proposed statutory officer and 
its function, it was suggested required a greater 
degree of specialisation that could be provided by 
being an affiliate to the Ombudsman's Office. 
(iii) Panel: The concept of using three or more persons as a 
panel was considered. One or more of the panel 
members could review or investigate matters corning 
within their jurisdiction and if necessary the entire 
panel could convene to reach a conclusion. But such a 
system was considered to be potentially unwieldy and 
consequently negated. 
( i V) Sole Appointee: This alternative was offered as the 
preferred alternative. A respected and eminent 
person, possessing wide experience in practical and 
legal matters, would be appointed solely for the 
specialised function of over seeing the investigation 
of serious complaints. The paper recorded the police 
administration's endorsement of this option. 
VUW Law Research Papers: 
There is no PAGE 33 
in this document 
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After Cabinet had considered the response, which in the main 
supported the general concept but with some variation of 
detail, an Officials Committee was appointed to consider the 
proposed legislation in detail. Chaired by Sir David Beattie 
the committee also comprised members from the Police 
Department, the Department of Maori Affairs, the Department 
of Justice and the Crown Law Office. The committee in its 
deliberations 88 considered existing overseas legislation on 
the topic, commentaries relevant to the proposed legislation, 
the views of individuals and groups and to a certain degree 
relied on the commit tee members' own experience and 
expertise. 
The Committee considered the notion of a specially appointed 
Police Ombudsman subject to the control of the Chief 
Ombudsman. The notion had a certain amount of appeal. Since 
there are Ombudsmen off ices in the main centres of 
New Zealand the office is readily accessible. Further, the 
Ombudsmen have already developed a considerable 
specialisation in administrative investigations which is 
analogous to aspects of the Authority's functions. 
Notwithstanding the cogent arguments in favour of the 
extension of the Ombudsman's office, some acknowledgement was 
given to the police opposition to such a move. For some time 
the Police Administration has endeavoured to keep the Chief 
Ombudsman at arms length in respect of operational matters 
and it has been critical of what it sees as that office's 
academic approach to investigations. As well, the Police 
Administration had expressed to the Committee doubts as to 
the quality of the Ombudsmen' s staff to handle an enlarged 
investigative role. Should the Ombudsmen's Office expand its 
functions it would result in a lessening of morale according 
to the police. In choosing not to extend the Ombudmen's 
office, the Committee were more likely swayed by the fact 
that the investigation of police misconduct is of sufficient 
public importance to warrant a special appointment. The 
nature of the Authority's activities, tending to be quasi-
judicial, favoured the appointment of a separate authority. 
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The trend overseas of moving to a special 
distanced from the Ombudsman's Office seems 
another factor that influenced the Committee. 
jurisdiction 
to have been 
The Officials Committee then prepared a draft piece of 
legislation which is the basis of the current Bill. Some 
amendments were made by the Government. Following its first 
reading on 3 February 1987 it was referred to the Justice and 
Law Reform Select Committee for further inquiry. The 
Committee called for and received 38 submissions to the Bill 
from individuals and groups. 
It is interesting to note that the Police Administration also 
made a submission to the Bill. This is a very unusual step 
in the New Zealand constitutional system. Normally it is 
expected that a Bill proposed by a Minister will have 
automatic Departmental backing. However, in a remarkable 
move the Police Administration's submission was made with the 
concurrence of the Minister of the Police. 
x. THE BILL (See Appendix A) 
The Police Complaints Authority is discussed in Part I of the 
Police Complaints Authority and Miscellaneous Amendments 
Bill. It was formally admitted to Parliament on 3 February 
1987 by the Minister of Police, the Honourable A Hercus. 
Comprising 41 clauses, it is of comparable length to the 
legislation of overseas jurisdictions which have established 
similar police monitors. Part I of the Bill will in due 
course become a separate Act which will be administered by 
the Justice Department. 
The complaints process contemplated by the Bill is divided up 
into four discernible parts although there is some 
fragmentation. In the first part, the Bill provides the 
necessary constitutional and housekeeping clauses 
establishing the office of the Authority. These clauses can 
36 
be found at both the front and rear of the Bill. Located in 
the middle of the Bill the drafters have recorded three other 
separate parts of the complaints process. These include the 
reception and categorisation of complaints, the handling and 
investigation procedures and then, finally, the determination 
of the complaints. 
The long title records that the Bill will be: 
"An Act to make better provision for the investigation 
and resolution of complaints against the Police by 
establishing 
Authority, 
an 
" 
independent Police Complaints 
Whilst the title of the Bill indicates that it is a reform 
measure, perhaps 
title which at 
the reader may 
first glance 
in fact be mislead by the 
may likely foster false 
expectations. It conveys the notion that all complaints will 
be investigated by an independent Police Complaints 
Authority. The reader of the Bi 11 might have been more 
accurately informed if a purpose clause had been incorporated 
in the Bill, constructed in the following fashion: 
The purposes of this Act are: 
(a) to ensure that all complaints made about the 
activities of the Police members and Police 
policies, procedures and practices are 
investigated in a quick and thorough manner; 
(b) to act as a determinent to illegal, improper and 
inappropriate conduct by members of the Police; 
(c) to facilitate improvements in the complaints 
procedures and practices of the Police; 
( d) to promote public trust and confidence in the 
Police; 
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to provide for police accountability to the 
community; 
( f) to make consequential amendments to the Pol ice 
Act 1958. 
A purpose clause would serve as a complement to a remodelled 
title which would only record the fact that the Act makes 
provision for the establishment of a Police Complaints 
Authority. 
Police Complaints Authority - Clause 4 
The first substantive clause of the Bill is Clause 4 which 
establishes the Police Complaints ~uthority, who shall be 
appointed 
the House 
by the Governor-General 
f R . 89 o epresentat1ves. 
on the recommendation of 
The appointment process is 
significant in that all the parties in the House of 
Representatives must agree on a nomination. The Government 
can not use its majority to pass a resolution recommending an 
appointment to the Governor-General. This process reflects 
the need for the appointee to be acceptable to al 1 parties. 
Whether in Opposition or Government, it is essential that any 
party in Parliament has confidence in the judgement and 
ability of the Authority. 
(i) Nomenclature 
The Beattie Committee considered a number of alternative 
titles for this statutory office,eg Police Complaints 
Examiner, Pol ice Ombudsman, Pol ice Examiner of Comp la in ts, 
Police Complaints Authority, Independent Examiner for Police 
Complaints, Police Complaints Ombudsman and Examiner of 
Comp la in ts against Pol ice. ~l though the Commit tee confessed 
it was not enthusiastic about its choice it settled on this 
cumbersome title basically because it was used in the 
comparative United Kingdom Act. 90 The term is also used in 
h . . 
91 d S h A 1. 92 1 . 1 . t e V1ctor1an an out ustra 1an eg1s at1on. 
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The name does accurately reflect aspects of the monitors 
function. For instance, the word "Police" not only 
identifies the specialist area of concern but also defines 
the parameters of the application of the Act. The word 
"Complaints" indicates the type of interest that the monitor 
is to have regard to. In other words, it has a reactive role 
in a particular area rather than a general superintendence 
role over the police. Finally, the word "Authority" 
highlights the ranking or level this body will have compared 
to the Commissioner or the Ombudsmen. It is also an 
appropriate choice of word since it suggests that the monitor 
has the power and abi 1 i ty to enforce obedience, which it 
does, in its limited sphere of operations. 
Legal Background 
The quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the Office precludes the 
appointment of a lay person. So the Authority must be a 
qualified barrister or solicitor of the High Court who 
possesses suitable legal experience for the task. Since some 
complaints will involve allegations of criminal behaviour, 
the Authority will have to assess the quality of the evidence 
assembled, the credibility of witnesses and be familiar with 
the criminal standard of proof in order to make consistent 
and jurisprudential dee is ions. The use of the word 
"qualified" is odd drafting. Possessors of a law degree who 
have not been admitted to the bar but nevertheless possess 
suitable legal experience seem to be disqualified. There 
appears to be a strong emphasis on limiting the choice of 
appointees to practitioners rather than academics. Hence it 
is likely that the appointee will possess extensive legal and 
practical experience as a legal practitioner. 
The appointment of a Judge as the Authority has been 
considered. Should such an occasion arise the appointment 
would not affect the Judge's tenure of judicial office, rank, 
title, status, precedence, salary, annual or other 
allowances, or other rights or privileges as a Judge 
(including matters relating to superannuation), and for all 
I 
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purposes, service by a Judge as the Authority shall be taken 
to be service as a Judge.
93 
The Authority therefore needs to be nor only suitably 
qualified but also possess proven experience. Normally, this 
latter element is translated into a time frame of 5 to 7 
years experience, but such a requirement might 
constrain the flexibility of an already narrow 
which selections will be made.
94 
potentially 
field from 
The Minister of Police, has sought to abate fears that it 
will become a monocultural institution with a recent 
announcement that it is intended that either the Authority or 
the Deputy will be "on merit" a Maori.
95 
There is no specific restrictions on who cannot be appointed 
to be an Authority. For instance a number of appropriately 
qualified serving police officers may seek appointment. What 
too if the appointee is a Member of Par 1 iamen t? Should 
persons in these two categories be prevented from attaining 
that Office? The Electoral Act 1986 in prescribing who can 
be members of the Representation Commission also prescribes 
who can not be a member. For instance, the Act provides: 
" ( b) two persons (not being public servants 
directly concerned with the administration of 
this Act or members of the House of Representatives) 
" 96 (emphasis mine). 
A provision in the Bill, preventing a serving police officer 
or Member of Parliament being appointed as the ~uthority or 
Deputy Authority, might demonstrate the commitment to 
independence and importiality sought to be attained by the 
Bill. 
How busy will the Authority be? The number of serious 
complaints recorded by the Police over the last five years 
seems to be static - around 300 complaints (See Appendix B). 
This figure does not take account of the non serious 
.. 
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complaints of which no national statistics are currently 
recorded. When the Office is fully staffed and functioning 
could the Authority, if it desired to do so, engage in other 
remunerative employment? The Bill's silence in this respect 
might be taken that it is implied that the Authority should 
not engage in other outside activities. However, consider 
for example section 4 of the Ombudsmen Act 1975, which 
provides that: 
"An Ombudsman shall not be capable of being a member 
of Parliament or of a local authority, and shall not 
without the approval of the Prime Minister, in each 
particular case hold any office of trust or profit, 
other than his office as an Ombudsman, or engage in 
any occupation for reward outside the duties of his 
office." 
A similar provision in this Bill might have been overlooked. 
Term of Office - Clause 5 
The tenure of the Authority may be of a variable length of 
between 2 to 5 years 97 although there is provision for the 
Authority to be reappointed. Whilst a new perspective 
regularly introduced has some appealing aspects there is a 
fundamental problem with a variable tenure. Normally an 
appointment to any semi-adjudicating body or position is for 
a fixed term. The term is usually of sufficient duration for 
that officer to develop expertise in the field of operations. 
The Ombudsmen for instance shall hold office for a term of 5 
years. 98 The length of this term provides a valuable 
constitutional check in that it rarely coincides with the 3 
year parliamentary term. The Ombudsmen's independence is 
guaranteed from any political manipulation. This may not be 
the case with an Authority whose independence is likely to be 
compromised by the appointment for shorter terms with the 
possibility of reappointment, particularly if its decisions 
consistently displease the police, the public or the 
Government. Not only would its independence be compromised 
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but so would its ability to 
periods of appointment would 
. 99 experience. 
develop 
inhibit 
expertise. Shorter 
the capitalisation of 
f . . . h v· . 100 By way o contrast, comparative monitors 1n t e ictor1an 
and the Western Australian1 jurisdictions are appointed for 5 
years. The South Australian 2 counterpart is appointed for 7 
years. 
The Authority is required to continue to hold office 
notwi ths tand ing the expiry of the term of appointment un t i 1 
that person is reappointed3 as the Authority or a successor 
is appointed. 4 The Authority may also be informed in writing 
by the Minister of Justice that whilst he or she will not be 
reappointed that person is not to hold office until a 
successor is appointed. 5 This latter provision is 
interesting in that it anticipates tension between the House 
of Representatives and the Authority. The House is 
prepared, it seems, to allow the statutory office to operate 
without a nominated appointee (although its duties would be 
assumed by the Deputy Authority). 6 This provision to some 
extent may hold sinister connotations in that it has the 
potential of political manipulation. If, for instance, 
during this transition period, the Authority makes 
recommendations which are not favoured by the government, it 
could be simply served with notice that its tenure is at an 
end. There is no comparable provision in the Ombudsmen Act 
and it is difficult to see why the Authority should be placed 
in this invidious position. 
The Authority must however resign the office on attaining the 
age of 72 years. That is the retirement age for members of 
the judiciary appointed to office before the 1 January 1980 
and is in keeping with clause 4(4) of the Bill. 
7 
Other Housekeeping Constitutional Clauses 
It is pertinent to observe at this point that a reader of 
this Bill has to traverse a further seven housekeeping 
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clauses before getting to the essential provisions of the 
Bill - that of the functions of the Authority. It seems an 
unfortunate feature of much of the New Zealand drafting style 
that access to the law is unnecessarily impeded. 
Consequently the communication of the law is hindered and 
this Bill is another example of this unfortunate style. 
Whilst much of the contents of this Bill is fashioned on the 
provisions of the Ombudsmen Act 1975 there is no reason why 
its design could not have been styled on the Law Commission 
Act 1985. The Law Commission Act permits the reader to 
within the space of five consecutive sections at the 
beginning of the Act to note the purpose, establishment, 
functions, 
C . . 8 omrn1ss1on. 
powers 
If 
and responsibilities 
the Bill was similarly 
of the 
designed, 
Law 
the 
housekeeping clauses, which relate to the power to remove or 
suspend the Authority, 9 the filling of the Authority's 
vacancy, 10 the establishment of the Deputy Police Complaints 
Authority, 11 the oath to be taken by both the statutory 
ff · · 1 12 1 · d 11 13 ff 14 d th o 1c1a s, sa ar1es an a owances, sta an e 
15 superannuation and retiring allowances, could be more 
conveniently be located in a schedule appended to the Bill -
like the contents of the first schedule to the Law Commission 
Act 1985. 
Clause 6 deals with the power of removal or suspension of the 
Authority. It is similar to the traditional formula found in 
a number of Acts 
off ice holders. 16 
dealing 
A Judge 
with judical and 
of the High Court 
parliamentary 
can only be 
removed though on the grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity 
to discharge the functions of that Judge's office.
17 
Clause 7 deals with the filling of the vacancy for an 
Authority. 
1975. 
It is similar to Section 7 of the Ombudsmen Act 
Clause 8 deals with the Deputy Police Complaints Authority. 
The Deputy Authority may exercise all the powers, duties and 
f . f h A h . 18 h f h h . unct1ons o t e ut or1ty. T e powers o t e Aut or1ty 
are not affected by the vacancy in its membership because 
... 
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. h b h h · 19 they are 1n sue case assumed y t e Deputy Aut or 1 ty. 
Subclause ( 2) is drafted in an unusual style and is subject 
to reoetition. Firstly, it states that the Deputy Authority 
shall be appointed in the same manner as the Authority and 
then it provides that "sections 4 to 7 of this Act shall 
apply ..... " In fact section 4 does relate to the appointment 
of the Authority. 
Clause 9 deals with the oath to be taken by the Authority and 
Deputy Authority. The most notable point in relation to this 
clause in comparison to Section 10 of the Ombudsmen Act is 
that rather than adopting sexually di scr imina tory language 
(ie his a feature of the Ombudsmen Act) or sex neutral 
language, the phrase "he or she" has been implanted in it. 
This is the only clause which adopts this particular language 
style and as a result it is inconsistent with the rest of the 
style adopted in the Bill. 
Clauses 10 and 12 deal with salaries, superannuation and 
retiring allowances and have little relevance to the general 
reader. 
Clause 11 deals with staff and merits further comment. 
Subclause (1) permits the Authority to appoint such officers 
and employees that are necessary to carry out efficiently the 
functions, powers and duties contemplated by the A.et. The 
number of persons appointed shall be determined by the 
Minister of Justice. The selection of staff is extremely 
important because the appointees must have credibility with 
both the police and the public. They would need to be 
clearly beyond reproach. Apart from clerical staff it is 
envisaged that the infrastructure of the Authority's Off ice 
would include investigators, legal personnel and a collator 
of statistics/research officer. In respect to non police 
investigators it might be that they are 
disadvantaged. Police officers who are 
to 
the 
some extent 
subject of 
complaints are in a very strong position to frustrate an 
investigation unless there is strong corroborating evidence. 
An investigator who is unfamiliar with the police system may 
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be inhibited by police solidarity and non-cooperation and the 
investigator may be easily diverted from the issues. 
Although the overseas literature discloses that there is no 
insurmountable difficulty in building a competent civilian 
investigatory body former police officers may be considered 
essential in this function. If former police officers are 
selected in this capacity perhaps a suitable gap in service 
between service in the two bodies might be considered 
necessary. When selecting legal personnel the Authority 
might seek lawyers well versed in the criminal, 
administrative, labour and civil laws and who have a broad 
knowledge of the justice system and a sound grounding in the 
principles of justice. Their duties might likely include 
research, and the addressing of broader policy issues within 
the realm of the Authority. Finally it is envisaged a 
sophisticated statistics system will need to be devised to 
allow the review agency to gain insight into a variety of 
issues. A statistics system will ensure the Authority will 
make informed decisions and provide valuable recommendations 
for the improvement or reform of police policy, practices, or 
procedures. 
In essence, it is incumbent upon the Authority to establish 
and cultivate an efficient team drawn from a variety of 
professions who possess the analytical and investigative 
skills to competently deal with the functions of the office • 
Functions of the Authority - Clause 13 
Like the Ombudsmen Act 197 5, the 
Clause 13 before coming upon 
substantive provision of the Bill. 
reader has 
the first 
to wait until 
pertinent and 
In the original discussion paper it was envisaged that the 
monitor would only deal with "serious complaints 11 • 20 That 
ea tegory of comp la in ts would inc 1 ude any comp la in t where it 
is alleged that a member of police had either been 
responsible for the death or injury to any person, had 
committed a crime or had committed any other act of 
l 
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misconduct which the 'examiner' deems to be serious. The 
refinements proposed by the drafters of the Bill have 
considerably advanced the parameters of the monitors role. 
Clause (1) records that it is the Authority's function: 
(a) To receive complaints: 
( i) Alleging any misconduct or neglect of duty by a 
member of Police; 
Every complaint made against the police, no matter how 
serious or trivial, will come to the notice of the Authority. 
The formula "misconduct or neglect of duty" is the same found 
in Part III of the Police Act 1985 and Regulation 46 Police 
Regulations 1959 which tabulates 62 offences of "misconduct 
or neglect of duty." From the stand point of consistency 
this formula is attractive. But there is a problem in that 
Regulation 46 is long overdue for a review. It includes 
offences which the member can commit whilst not involved in 
carrying out his duty, ie "offences" committed in his 
personal time. For example: 
" ( 15) borrowing money from .... a person directly 
interested in the liquor trade" 
"(24) failing without reasonable cause to pay a lawful 
debt." 
Except that these matters have been determined 
"misconduct or neglect of duty", it is difficult to 
such dealings should be of interest to the police. 
It also includes the absurd: 
to be 
see why 
"30 Without reasonable excuse gossiping ... on duty." 
Regulation 46 also replicates a number of criminal offences; 
"(6) assaulting another member" 
I 
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"(9) treating any person or prisoner ... with 
unnecessary violence" 
"(17) betting with a bookmaker" 
"(50) altering any official document" 
As indicated earlier, there is a need to overhaul the 
offences which amount to "misconduct or neglect of duty. In 
the meantime, the Authority might not be constrained by 
regulation 46 and perhaps one of its first tasks will include 
a review of this provision. 
It is interesting to note that section 13(1) of the Ombudsmen 
Act 1975 permits an Ombudsman to " ... investigate any decision 
or recommendation made, or any act done or omitted .... " This 
language contrasts with the limiting phrase "misconduct or 
neglect of duty". Comparative overseas statutes also have a 
wider focus about the matters which the monitor can 
investigate. For instance, the Victorian and the South 
Australian legislation permit the respective Police 
Complaints .l\uthority to receive complaints about the 
"conduct" of a member of the police force. 21 That term is 
defined as: 
" (a) an act or decision of a member of the police 
force; 
(b) failure or refusal by a member of the police 
force to act or make a decision in the exercise, 
performance or discharge or purported exercise 
performance or discharge, whether within or 
outside the state, of a power function or duty, 
that he has or by virtue of being a member of 
Police". 
This provision permits a wider range of complaints to be 
received beyond that which only alleges misconduct. The 
Ombudsman in New South Wales similarly can receive 
1 . 2 2 • 11 d II b h h • comp a1nts concerning con uct ut t e term t ere 1s 
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defined slightly differently. 23 In respect to the Australian 
Federal Police, the Ombudsman receives complaints "concerning 
action taken by a member"
24 and this same expression also 
entitles the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrative 
Investigations of Western Australia to receive complaints but 
in that jurisdiction the expression is not defined more 
narrowily. 25 By Section 6(1) of the Metropolitan Police 
Force Complaints Act 1984, Ontario's Public Complaints 
Commissioner can receive a "complaint". Since that word has 
not been defined it appears the Commissioner can receive 
complaints about any matter. 
This particular aspect of clause 13 is unnecessarily narrow 
in scope and it may even act as a f i 1 ter. For instance an 
aggrieved person reading the Bill might determine that his or 
her complaint falls outside the parameters of "misconduct or 
neglect of duty" particularly since the phrase itself is not 
defined. Greater consideration should have been given to the 
language contained in the Ombudsmen Act. Regard should also 
been given to the Victorian and South Australian legislation 
which invites any type of complaint but allows the respective 
monitors to categorise it and determine any future action. 
The second arm of the subparagraph, raises some interesting 
points for example who is "a member of police"? Does it 
include, for example, any former memb e r of police. It would 
appear that a former constable could not escape the 
j ur i sd ict ion of the Authority if misconduct or neg lee t of 
duty was committed while the constable was a member of the 
police. A change of status would not p reclude the Authority 
from investigating misconduct during service with the police . 
A "member of police" includes only those person who have been 
appointed to the police pursuant to either section 10 or 12 
of the Police Act 1958. Every membe r of the police is a 
constable but some members can also be promoted to prescribed 
ranks. The Police Department (the Commissioner is a 
Departmental Head as we ll as the Commissioner of Police) also 
has a large contingent of c iv i 1 ian employees who act in a 
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variety of capacities to provide technical, administrative 
and professional support to the police effort. Although the 
856 civilian staff are employed under the State Services Act 
1962 and the State Services Conditions of Employment Act 
1977, they are an integral part of the overall police 
operational scheme. 
of their employment, 
A number of this body, during the course 
come into contact with members of the 
public. For instance, many of the watchhouse computer 
operators attend the public counters. The armourers give 
expert evidence in court relating to the examination of a 
firearm following the commission of a 
employees deal with lost and found 
serious crime. Other 
property or assist in 
transporting of prisoners. Potentially the conduct of some 
of these Public Service employees may be the subject of a 
complaint of misconduct but they are not within the purview 
of the Authority by reason of the limiting jurisdiction. Any 
complaints or allegation of impropriety by Public Service 
employees are investigated by the Ombudsmen. The West 
Australian legislation26 overcomes this needless 
jurisdictional split by permitting the monitor under that Act 
to oversee both groups of employees. 
The Authority can also receive complaints: 
( i i ) "Concerning any practice, policy or procedure of 
the Police affecting the body of persons making 
the complaint in a personal capacity." 
The subparagraph is 
Ombudsmen Act 1975, 
modelled on 
but provides 
Section 13(1) of the 
a more restrictive 
jurisdiction. The ~uthority cannot automatically receive any 
complaint "concerning any practice, policy or procedure" from 
just any person. It must affect the person or body of 
per sons making the complaint in a personal capacity. The 
Ombudsmen on the other hand can receive any complaint which 
affects any person or body of persons whether or not that 
person or body of persons is the comolainant. 
This particular provision has not attracted any visible 
concern from the Police Administration. Its attitude in this 
... 
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particular 
capabilities 
respect 
of the 
may have 
Justice 
been 
and Law 
influenced 
Reform 
by the 
Committee. 
Policies of the police can be examined by this Committee 
whose third term of reference provides that it is: 
"To examine the policy, administration and expenditure 
of departments and associated non-departmental 
government bodies related to justice, police and 
security intelligence."
27 
It has recently sought explanations from the Commissioner 
about certain incidents. From all accounts the Committee 
purported to hold the police accountable in terms of isolated 
operational headline events rather than in terms of 
scrutinizing policy or administrative matters in the wider 
sense. For instance it made "enquiries" through the 
Commissioner and the Minister of Police and were supplied 
with reports concerning events such as; "the long baton 
incident at Coromandel, the Dargaville shooting, the filing 
cabinet auctioned in Christchurch still containing some 
confidential cards, the diplomatic file lost off the roof of 
a car and the drink-drive blitz organised in Christchurch 
that the press suggested had not had the support of the local 
commander". 28 The method by which the Cornmi ttee sought to 
hold the Commissioner accountable ie "enquiries" and 
"reports" also seems to be at variance with its brief, where 
the operative word is "examine". However, the nature of this 
accountability has perhaps served to make this provision more 
palatable to the police. 
Perhaps the Commit tee, because of its heavy work load, may 
never choose to exercise its powers in relation to policy and 
administration matters preferring to leave that to either the 
Authority or the Ombudsmen. 
This provision in the Bill then has potentially far reaching 
ramifications. It firmly implants effective accountability 
procedures upon the police in respect of policy and 
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operational matters. Further an astute Authority could 
solicit complaints from aggrieved parties (without 
necessarily disturbing the delicate balance espoused by the 
Bill) and thus achieve a greater executive control of the 
police. Notwithstanding this, the Authority is still in a 
strategic position 
are inconsistent 
to identify those police practices which 
with public expectations and it can 
recommend appropriate remedial action even when the remedial 
action is peripheral to an investigation. 
A statutory original jurisdictional function is also placed 
upon the Authority by clause 13(1) who is: 
(b) "to investigate of its own motion, where it is 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to 
carry out an investigation in the public 
interest, any incident involving death or serious 
injury notified to the Authority under Section 14 
of this Act" 
This provision regularises the current practice of appointing 
on an ad hoe basis senior legal practitioners as independent 
examiners into fatal shootings by the police. A sole 
permanent body will assume this role which will at the same 
time save confusion on the method of appointment. For 
instance, one of the independent examiners was appointed by 
the Attorney-General 
authority; another 
without reference to a statutory 
was 
Commissioner's prerogative 
appointed 
power of 
by 
general 
virtue of the 
control of the 
police; and yet another examiner was appointed without 
specific reference to the powers under which he was 
appointed. (See Appendix C paragraph E) 
The Officials Committee initially proposed that the Authority 
would "investigate of its own motion any practice policy 
or procedure of the Police likely to give rise to any 
complaint under this Act". This originally contemplated 
function would have established a proactive process that 
might have prevented abuses before they occurred. In this 
respect, it would have complemented the important function in 
~I 
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subparagraph (a)(i) above. 
regarded as a mechanism to 
complaint had been received.
29 
The original provision was 
forestall trouble where no 
The Authority could have also 
carried out an own 
relating to policy 
Administration. 
initiative investigation 
and management within 
into 
the 
matters 
Police 
But the drafters of the Bill have severely curtailed the 
originally envisaged own motion investigation. It 
1 imi ted to the occasions where the Authority 
is 
is 
now 
(a) 
"satisfied on reasonable grounds", that an investigation is 
in the public interest and (b) the incident involves death or 
serious injury notified to the Authority under Section 14 of 
the Act. Cases alleging corruption or assaults not involving 
death or serious injury but which nevertheless result in 
actual bodily harm or other cases which reflect adversely 
upon the police are, thus, outside the immediate purview of 
the Authority. Similarly, matters indicating that an officer 
has committed a criminal or disciplinary offence not 
contained in a complaint are outside the jurisdiction of the 
Authority. 
The term "serious injury" attracted criticism from the Police 
Administration and the Pol ice Association. In its ordinary 
sense, "serious" obvious 1 y is by degree something more than 
minor. In order to elucidate this term the Officials 
Committee, relying on the Oxford Dictionary defined it as a 
injury that "in the opinion of a reasonable person it would 
give cause for anxiety or was an injury attended with 
30 danger". 
Both the Police Administration and Police Association 
indicated their concern at the potential width of this 
by its very nature frequently definition. Police work 
requires the application of legitimate reasonable force for a 
variety of reasons. Consequently injuries caused by the 
police range from bruising, abrasions and cuts to fractures. 
Some injuries even require the victim to be hospitalised. 
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Since the wide definition encapsulates a great number of the 
injuries caused by the Police in the normal course of their 
· 1 · · · 31 d h 1 · duties both the Po ice Association an t e Po ice 
A.dministration32 made submissions to the Select Committee 
seeking the substitution of the term 'serious injury' with 
the term 'grievous bodily harm' as it is used in sl88(1) of 
the Crimes A.et. The Police Administration was particularly 
concerned since the Commissioner is obliged by Clause 14 to 
advise the Authority in writing setting out particulars of 
the incident in which the serious injury was caused. 
Presumably then, the Commissioner sought to avoid 
administrative problems 33 in the recording of all incidents 
of injuries and then notifying them to the Authority, as well 
as ensuring the continued quality application of law 
enforcement and order maintenance duties is not disrupted by 
a reduced effectiveness for fear that the Authority may 
review any injury incident. The Police Association even went 
so far as to allude to the phrase contained in the United 
Kingdom's Police and Criminal Evidence A.et 1984 34 but then 
shied away from it "because the provision could be open for 
argument in the New Zealand context 11 •
35 
It has been assumed by both police bodies that the injury may 
only be of a physical nature. Perhaps it could just as well 
include any psychological or emotional injury. Therefore to 
substitute the term with "grievous bodily harm" might be 
unnecessarily restrictive • 
There are two other matters which the Police Administration 
and the Police Association have overlooked. 
Beattie Committee's definition of serious 
Firstly the 
injury is at 
variance with what really amounts to a serious injury in 
selecting, for example, an app ropriate assault charge. 
Consider for instance the differences between charges of 
assault under section 9 of the Summary Offences Act 1981 and 
section 196 if the Crimes Act 1961 which reflect degrees 
between technical or very minor assaults and serious 
assaults. The seriousness of the assault requires a judgment 
as the determination of the appropriate charge. The police 
make these type of j udgmen t dee is ions daily and, there fore, 
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there is little need for it to feel constrained by the 
Official's Committee definition. The second matter is that 
the Authority can only instigate an own motion investigation 
if there are reasonable grounds to do so in the public 
interest. Obviously the majority of injuries will not fall 
into this category since the public have already provided the 
police with ability to use reasonable force in the first 
place • 
The initial own motion investigation provided by the Bill 
represents a considerable advancement on that offered the 
Public Complaints Commissioner in Ontario who may investigate 
the allegations of a complaint only after it has received the 
first interim report of the investigation or at the 
expiration of 30 days. 3
6 There is also provision for the 
Public Complaints Commissioner to carry out an investigation 
at the request of the Chief of Police or where the 
Commissioner believes there has b e en undue delay or 
exceptional circumstances in the conduct of the 
. . . 3 7 1nvest1gat1on • 
The Victorian legislation provides that the Authority must 
investigate a complaint if it relates to the conduct of the 
Chief Commissioner or the Deputy or Assistant Commissioners. 
On the other hand, the Authority may investigate if the 
conduct is of a nature that an investigation is in the public 
interest or the conduct was carried out in accordance with 
established practices and procedures which the Authority 
considers ought to the reviewed.
38 The Federal Police 
legislation provides that if the complaint is in substance 
about the practices and procedures of the Australian Federal 
Police, the Ombudsman shall investigate the complaint.
39 In 
the United Kingdom the Authority cannot carry out an own 
motion investigation. In comparative terms, the proposed 
Authority has a restrictive own motion 
capability. 
investigatory 
In providing the list of 
drafters have omitted 
functions set out 
to include the 
in Clause 13 the 
function of the 
l\u thor i ty to carry out an investigation into any complaint 
t~W l lB~Alff 
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incident or other matter at the specific request of the 
Commissioner in accordance with Clause 23(2). 
The final "function" listed in Clause 13(1) provides that the 
Authority is: 
(c) To take such action in respect of complaints 
incidents and other matters as is contemplated by 
this Act 
In the list of functions this particular paragraph is out of 
place. It addresses itself to methods rather than functions. 
The use of the word "matter" and its recurrent use is an 
interesting feature. It appears to be either a shorthand 
phrase for "practise, policy or procedure", or more 
significantly, a shortened version of the phrase "matter of 
administration"". That latter phrase is the foundation of 
the Ombudsmen function which permits the investigation into 
any decision, recommendation, act or omission. Potentially, 
the use of the word "matter" might be used to explore more 
than just a complaint concerning any formulated policy . 
Subclause (2) of Clause 13 provides that the Authority shall 
not investigate any matter relating to the terms and 
conditions of service of any person as a member of police. 
This restriction has been imposed upon the Authority's 
function because complaints of industrial matters are 
primarily matters of administration which are wholly within 
the Ombudsmen' s jurisdiction. Vide Clause 40 of the Bill 
which reaffirms the parameters of the Ombudsmen. Matters 
within the Ombudsmen' s realm include complaints relating to 
matters of promotion, salary, allowances, discipline, 
dismissal or employment of police members generally. 
Although there is no commencement provision, one presumes 
that the Authority's jurisdiction will extend to all matters 
occurring before as well as after the commencement of the 
Act. The question of retroactivity is dealt with in section 
13(1) of the Ombudsmen Act. There, the Ombudsmen are 
I 
I 
I 
• 1 
• I 
.. ' 
55 
empowered to "investigate any decision or recommendation made 
or any act done or omitted, before or after the passing of 
this Act .... " Thus, the question relating to the application 
of the Bill could be made more certain. 
It should also be noted that it is not intended that the 
Authority investigate the exercise by the police of its 
discretion to prosecute, as that remains a function of the 
High Court 11 • 40 Perhaps that intention might have been put on 
a statutory footing to officially record the parameters of 
the Authority's functions. 
Duty of Commissioner to notify the Authority of certain 
incidents involving death or serious injury - Clause 14 
The clause commences "where a member of the Police acting in 
the execution of the member's duty causes .... " Therefore it 
is evident that the own motion investigation of the Authority 
(discussed earlier) pursuant to clause 13(l)(b) would be 
further restricted. Whereas clause 13(l)(a)(i) by reason of 
its link to Regulation 46 includes offences which occur 
during duty time as well as personal time, this clause is not 
so encompassing. 
On the face of it, it covers those situations where the 
officer is acting lawfully when the death or serious injury 
occurs. But consider, for example, where an officer wilfully 
fractures the jaw of a suspect during an interview. Since 
the nature of the assault is unlawful, the officer at the 
time was technically not acting in the execution of duty. 
"Duty" applies only to the lawful conduct of the office of 
constable. 
phrase that 
execution of 
Perhaps it would be necessary to insert some 
goes further 
a member's 
than 
duty. 
simply "acting" 
Consider the 
formulation by way of textual amendment: 
in the 
following 
" ... or purporting to act in the exercise of or in 
connection with or incidental to the exercise of that 
members powers, functions or duties as a member of the 
police causes ... " 
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The words "causes or appears to have caused" are quite 
different to the word "involving" which is used in clause 
13(l)(b). Since clause 13(l)(b) and clause 14 are so 
inextricably linked it is unfortunate that there is a lack of 
consistent phraseology. The words "causes or appears to have 
caused" connotes an active liability whereas "involved" 
connotes something less. 
What does "appear" mean? Does it mean "prima facie", or 
"good cause to suspect" or does it mean "on reasonable 
grounds"? The term is somewhat problematical but if regarded 
in the texture of the over al 1 legislation it is concluded 
that it means "prima facie" - at first glance. It is in the 
interests of all parties to avoid bad publicity and rumour by 
the early investigation of an incident by the Authority . 
Death or serious injury could occur not only in the unlawful 
application of force but also as a result of a motor accident 
involving a police vehicle. Prisoners who die in police 
cells (eg commit suicide or naturally expire) are outside the 
jurisdictional scrutiny of the Authority but not the 
Coroner. 41 
It is evident that the Authority is only concerned with cases 
that involve death or serious injury to a person. Death or 
injury to animals and property would not attract an own 
motion investigation but it might be the subject of a 
complaint under clause 13(a)(i). 
The Commissioner is required to, as soon as practicable give 
to the Authority a written notice setting out the particulars 
of the incident in which the death or serious injury was 
caused. 
of time 
The Commissioner, 
before informing 
it seems might have some latitude 
the Authority. Therefore, the 
Commissioner could wait until the preliminary enquiries of an 
investigation confirm one way or another whether all the 
ingredients of the clause are met. However, the word 
"appears" indicates that the Commissioner must act more 
promptly to enable the Authority to be effective. 
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There is no provision for the Authority to be advised orally 
of such an incident. It must receive written notice of the 
particulars of the incident before it initiates an own motion 
investigation, if one is necessary. 
Mode of Complaint - Clause 15 
Subclause (1) provides that a complaint may be made orally or 
in writing. (The Bill is silent as to which language the 
complainant may use.) Should the complaint be made orally it 
must be reduced to writing as soon as practicable. 42 There 
is no such prescribed form on which complaints are made. It 
seems that an oral "complaint" will lapse after a period of 
time, if it is not reduced to writing. 
The Bill is silent as to what the complainant might expect at 
the conclusion of making a complaint. For instance the 
Ontario statute requires that the complainant be furnished 
with a prescribed statement which sets out the procedures in 
respect to the complaint and the complainant's rights under 
that Act. The complainant is also statutorily entitled to a 
copy of the statement of complaint provided. 
One measure that will not be employed by those recording 
complaints is to advise the complainant that they may be the 
subject of a charge of making a false complaint should the 
matter prove to be unfounded. If the complaint is made at 
the police station a statement is always taken but there is 
no statutory requirement for the complainant to sign it. The 
present complaints process requires the complainant to sign 
their written complaint. In the normal course of events, 
complainants invariably do sign and confirm their commitment 
to seek appropriate redress. 
When is a complaint not a complaint? For instance, consider 
the occasion where a complainant holds an honest but 
erroneous belief that an offence has taken place or it 
subsequently transpires that the misconduct was, in fact, not 
committed a police officer, but by, for example, a security 
guard or a traffic officer. What is the nature of this 
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grievance then? Should it continue to be regarded as a 
complaint against a police officer and reduced to writing or 
should the police be permitted a discretion to discontinue 
action? The matter is not clear but since the tenor of the 
legislation indicates that every written complaint shall be 
notified to the Authority. Therefore, brief details of the 
"complaint" should be recorded. To do otherwise might be 
misconstrued as trying to discourage the complainant from 
registering a complaint. Even a withdrawal of a complaint, 
later attributed to an admission of error by a complainant, 
should be recorded. So should trivial complaints capable of 
early resolution. There are sound reasons for recording 
every complaint. In the first place they provide useful 
statistics. Secondly with regard to trivial complaints, a 
number of complaints of a minor nature against a particular 
officer is a useful early warning device. These type of 
"complaints" should then be forwarded to the District 
Commander accompanied by a report outlining the reasons why 
they should not be proceeded with. 
The Bi 11 provides that the comp la in t may be made to any 
member of police. However, it is silent as to the procedure 
that should be adopted where a complainant insists on making 
a complaint to a member of police who is also the subject of 
the complaint. If the member does not record the complaint 
it is possible that failure to do so may attract liability 
under clause 38. The Bill, in these instances, fails to 
provide some form of indemnity for the subject member. It 
should for instance contain a provision to the effect that 
where a person complains to a member of police about that 
member's own conduct that member shall advise the complainant 
to make the complaint to some other specified person. 
The proposed legislation makes it clear that it is not 
necessary for the comp la inan t to register their grievance 
with the police alone. Complainants who are otherwise 
intimidated by making a complaint at a police station or are 
afraid of reprisal or rebuff by a member of police, have a 
number of options in lodging a complaint on neutral territory 
with other individuals or agencies. There is now provision 
-
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for the Authority or an 
complaints. 43 The Registrar 
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Ombudsman to receive written 
or the Deputy Registrar of any 
District 
written 
Court may 
44 form. 
Registrar must then 
'bl 45 soon as possi e. 
also receive a complaint but only in 
The Ombudsman or Registrar or Deputy 
forward the complaint to the Authority as 
It is arguable that these venues are too 
restrictive. Perhaps complaints could be received by 
citizens advice bureaux or by consultative or liaison 
committees, eg Prisoners Aid groups. 
Subclause (5) provides a statutory safeguard for persons who 
are in custody on a charge or following conviction for an 
offence or a patient of any hospital within the meaning of 
the Mental Health Act 1969. Their mail, if it is addressed 
to the Authority, shall 
institutional 
46 
unopened. 
authorities 
not 
but 
be intercepted by the 
forwarded immediately 
It is interesting to observe that some overseas jurisdictions 
have a number of mechanisms to reject complaints or declare 
some comp la in ts not to be comola in ts ab in it io. The New 
S th W 1 1 · 1 · 4 7 f . h 1 b t ou a es egis ation, or instance, as an e a ora e 
scheme of f i 1 te ring out comp la in ts at the reception stage. 
The Victorian legislation prohibits the making of a complaint 
about the conduct of a member of the force to the Authority 
by another member of the force. A similar provision exists 
in the South Australian legislation. 48 
The New Zealand legislation it seems presumes that the 
principal users will apply common sense to the determination 
of the status of a complaint. For instance if a person dies 
or is unable or incapable of acting for himself, a complaint 
should be received 
representative or by 
complainant's behalf. 
if it is 
a member 
made 
of his 
by his 
family 
personal 
on the 
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Duty of Commissioner to notify Authority of Complaints 
Clause 16 
Every complaint 
the Authority. 
received by the police must be notified to 
Since the clause is silent as to forwarding 
to the Authority "notify" (on a narrow 
that it may be sufficient for the 
every complaint 
reading) implies 
Commissioner to forward a schedule to the Authority outlining 
the complaints received, for example, every week. As a 
consequence the Authority will have a record of all 
complaints and of their general nature. However, it is 
anticipated that "notify" would receive a wider reading and 
include the actual forwarding of the complaint and any other 
materials arising out of a preliminary investigation. Two 
reasons support this view. Firstly, the Authority has a 
reciprocal duty to "notify" the Commissioner (Clause 17) and 
it would be expected that it would forward all details in its 
possession to enable the police to carry out an 
investigation. Secondly, the Authority must be in possession 
of sufficient particulars to determine appropriate action 
under Clause 18. 
Since the Authority will receive or be notified of all 
complaints it should be able to develop a reasonably accurate 
picture of the police image 
analysis of the statistics 
and co-ordinate 
gleaned from 
a comprehensive 
the complaints. 
Information is not only a great deterrent but it is also a 
valuable device in the direction of police policy. For 
instance the Authority can build up a dossier to give a 
composite picture not only of the police behaviour but also 
the general behaviour of the community by analysing the 
pattern which emerges from the following: 
(a) 
( b) 
Characteristics of complainants: 
ie sex, age, whether drink or drugs involved at time 
of incident. 
Environment of complaint: 
ie region, locality, exact place of occurrence. 
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(c) When and where complaint filed: 
ie method, day of/day ( s) after incident, aver age time 
lapse, longest interval. 
(d) Particulars of police officers involved: 
ie rank, age, length of service, numbers involved. 
(e) Method of disposition of the complaint by the police. 
(f) Time taken by the police investigation/review process. 
( g) Length of time the Authority's investigation/review 
process takes. 
All these matters are questions of public interest and are 
not available under the existing system. 
It is 
imposed 
noteworthy 
upon the 
to record that 
Commissioner to 
there is 
advise 
no 
the 
time frame 
Authority. 
Consider for instance the Victorian legislation which 
requires the Chief Commissioner to advise the Authority "as 
soon as possible ... in writing the prescribed details of the 
complaint 11 •
49 
Duty of Authority to Notify the Commissioner of Complaints -
Clause 17 
This is the corresponding duty of the Authority to notify the 
Commissioner of every complaint received by it. 
The effect of Clause 17 and Clause 13(l)(b) is that the 
Commissioner's responsibility for discipline and control of 
members of the police is not subverted by an unpublicised 
investigation by the external reviewer. 
Action Upon Receipt of Complaint - Clause 18 
Upon receipt or notification of a complaint the Authority has 
several options of action. This flexibility permits the 
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Authority to concentrate on the more serious comp la in ts or 
incidents whilst still maintaining a watchful eye over other 
complaints. 
The Authority "may do all or any of the following": 
(a) investigate the complaint itself whether or not 
the Police have commenced a Police 
investigation: 
In this situation, the Authority has a "de novo" power to 
investigate any complaint. Such a power stands in marked 
contrast to the relatively ineffectual "ex post facto" power 
of the Ombudsman. 50 The provision also anticipates that both 
the Authority and the police might conduct simultaneous 
investigations. 
(b) Defer action until the receipt of a Police 
report on a Police investigation of the 
comp la in t. 
This discretionary option might be treated with a great deal 
of caution by the Authority particularly in relation to 
serious complaints or alleged criminal offending. It 
potentially amounts to an "ex post facto" review. 
( C) Oversee a police investigation of the complaint. 
This power provides the Authority with the ability to ensure 
an investigation is carried out expeditiously, thoroughly and 
impartially. 
The choice of the word "oversee" as opposed to the use of 
"supervise" might raise interesting questions as to what does 
"oversee" exactly mean. To some extent both words are 
synonyms. However, implicit in the word "supervise", is the 
ability of the Authority to require the investigating 
officers 
strategy 
to account for their actions, 
and tactics of the investigation 
to explain their 
or to justify the 
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particular lines and depth of questioning. The term 
"oversee" does not convey the same meaning of purpose 
although it may have the same effect. 
It is of interest to note that the Authority's English 
counterpart is required to undertake mandatory supervision 
where the complaint alleges death or serious injury, or is a 
particular type of complaint specified in the regulations by 
the Home Secretary ie corruption. In every other matter the 
Authority has a discretion to supervise the police 
investigation. 
(d) Decide in accordance with section 19 of this Act 
to take no action on the complaint. 
This aspect will be discussed in relation to clause 19 
itself. 
Having decided a course of action, the Authority is then 
required to, as soon as practicable, advise the Commissioner 
and the complainant, the procedure it proposes to adopt under 
subsection (1) of section 18.
51 
The Authority may upon the receipt or notification of a 
complaint decide that it is capable of conciliation in 
accordance with any general instructions issued under section 
30 of the Police A.et 1958. If the Authority is of that 
opinion it may indicate that view to the Commissioner.
52 It 
is apparent that the Authority has no role in the formal 
sense with regard to the informal resolution of complaints. 
The system of conciliation or informal resolution is directed 
at minor complaints which form the great bulk of complaints. 
It would probably incorporate the very minor complaint or 
irritations of the police disciplinary code even though 
technically they might ordinarily lead to a disciplinary 
charge. Such resolution would require consent from both the 
complainant and the member of police concerned. The Beattie 
Committee remarked that a serious complaint 
1 . 1 f h · f d. · 
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would leave 
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that which is 
Conciliation 
trivial 
is a 
in nature 
feature of 
can 
a 
be speedily 
number of 
resolved. 
overseas 
1 . l . 54 eg1.s at1.on. 
The use of the phrase, "it may indicate that view to the 
Commissioner", highlights the Authority's position in 
relation to the Commissioner. It confirms that the 
Commissioner maintains the general administration and control 
of the Police. 55 
Authority May Decide to Take No Action On Complaint 
Clause 19 
The Authority has a discretion to terminate complaints in 
accordance with statutory criteria. These powers are similar 
to those contained in the Ombudsmen Act 1975
56 • The 
Authority may dee ide to take no act ion or further act ion on 
any complaint if the complaint relates to a matter which the 
aggrieved person had knowledge of more than 12 months before 
the complaint was made. 57 One would presume that an 
aggrieved person would make a complaint as soon as 
. bl Th S h A 1. 1 . 1 . SB 1 . . h pract1.ca e. e out . ustra 1.an eg1.s at1.on 1.m1.ts t e 
period to six months. 
The reasons for refusing to take action or discontinuing 
action include: 
(i) the subject matter of the complaint is trivial; or 
This is the same formula found in the Ombudsmen Act, and so 
is the following subparagraph. 
(ii) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made 
in good faith; or 
(iii) the per son alleged to be aggrieved does not desire 
that action be taken, or as the case may be continued; 
or 
65 
One presumes that it is implicit that the Authority would 
a 1 so consider the wider oubl ic issues before terminating a 
complaint under this heading. 
It is interesting to note that the Ontario legislation 
provides that a complaint can only be withdrawn in accordance 
with the Act. 59 That is by giving notice on the prescribed 
form to the person in charge of the Public Complaints 
Investigation Bureau. However, if the Public Complaints 
Commissioner is of the opinion that the complaint was 
withdrawn because of a misunderstanding on the part of the 
complainant or as a result of a threat or improper pressure 
the complaint shall continue. 
( i V) the identity 
investigation 
of 
of 
the 
the 
substantially impeded; or 
complainant is unknown and 
complaint would thereby be 
Thus, a complaint can be rejected if it is made without 
disclosure of identity of the comp la inan t, unless the re are 
special reasons for continuing the investigation. 
( v) that in a 11 the circumstances an adequate remedy or 
right of appeal exists ... which it would be reasonable 
for the person alleged to be aggrieved to exercise. 
This provision makes it clear that these procedures do not 
affect a citizens right to pursue alternative avenues of 
action. In some circumstances then the Authority may decline 
or discontinue an investigation into a complaint. 
The Authority may al so decline to take further act ion if 
during the course of an Authority or police investigation it 
is apparent in all the circumstances that further action is 
unnecessary or inappropriate. 60 In which case the Authority 
is obliged to inform the comp la inan t of the dee is ion and 
reasons for it. 61 There is no obligation upon the Authority 
to advise the complainant in writing and therefore advice 
might be given over the telephone. This feature seems to be 
66 
inconsistent with the requirement that all complaints must be 
reduced to writing 62 although it is consistent with Clause 
32(c) of the Bill. 
Subsequent Powers in Relation to a Complaint - Clause 20 
The Authority has a number of powers in relation to a 
complaint. For instance, it may at 
1 . . . . f 1 . 63 po ice investigation o a comp aint. 
any time review the 
A review is a time 
consuming business but an unavoidable feature. It may entail 
monitoring ongoing or pending trials in which relevant 
evidence may be uncovered or there may be delays for want of 
forensic analysis. The Authority might elect to investigate 
a complaint itself. 64 This latter power duplicates 
unnecessarily the power contained in Clause 18 ( 1) (a). There 
it is provided that the Authority can "investigate the 
complaint whether or not the police have commenced an 
investigation". 
A third power arises when the Authority elects to oversee a 
police investigation whereupon it can give any direction to 
the police concerning the investigation as it thinks fit. A 
direction might include, for instance, weekly progress 
reports. Perhaps the Authority could veto or require the 
appointment of a particular investigator where it thinks fit 
or it might require or recommend that the investigators be 
appointed from other districts in certain investigations. 
The Authority also has the power to direct the police to 
re-open an investigation and the rea f te r over see it. 6 5 An 
occasion might arise when acting upon the contents of the 
police reports the Authority decides to take no further 
action. That decision, however, might have been based upon 
erroneous information supplied by the police. Therefore the 
Authority needs a mechanism to re-open an investigation. 
can direct the police 
. l . 66 action on a comp aint. 
to reconsider its 
In this regard the 
The Authority 
proposals for 
Authority can require the police beforehand to set out their 
methods of approach to an investigation. 
• 
• 
J 
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The Authority may also decide that no further 
required because the police investigation has 
satisfactory outcome. 67 This power is vital 
majority of complaints are trivial and are 
resolved as a result of a police investigation. 
action is 
produced a 
since the 
effectively 
The legislation does not address the occasion where criminal 
charges are outstanding or pending against either the 
complainant or the police officer. However, it is unlikely 
that the investigation of a complaint would be deferred or 
suspended until the result of the court case is known. Nor 
is it likely that the Authority would usurp or interfere with 
a proceeding within the jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore 
a matter which is currently the subject of a prosecution or 
civil litigation could not be delayed by the Authority. 
Duty of Police to Report to Authority on Police Investigation 
of Complaint - Clause 21 
The Officials Committee recognised that the greater majority 
of complaints would be continued to be investigated by the 
police themselves without any direction from the Authority. 68 
It has been said that this clause is the key to the Bill in 
that it represents the balance between preserving the 
Commissioner's responsibility for investigating complaints 
and taking action versus the public interest role of the 
h . 69 I Aut or1ty. t is anticipated that the 
most occasions defer from taking action 
report of the investigation is received.
70 
Authority will on 
until the police 
The police are obliged to as soon as practicable and in no 
case later than 3 months after the completion of a police 
. . f 1 . h A h . 71 invest1gat1on o a comp a1nt to report to t e ut or1ty. 
The Bill is silent as to the time frame for the police report 
to the Authority upon a police investigation of an incident 
or other matter where no complaint has been received. A 
feature of the drafting in this clause is the transposition 
of the word 'police' for "Commissioner". For instance, note 
clauses 22 and 23 where the specified duty falls upon the 
"Commissioner". 
• 
• 
68 
Whilst the Officials carefully chose the word "practicable" 
in order to give the police time to assess the results of the 
. . . b f . 72 h . f h investigation e ore reporting, t e question o ow one 
determines when an investigation is complete was not 
addressed. An investigator could always need to re-interview 
a witness in the future. Perhaps the police should report 
"as soon as practicable and in no case later than 3 months, 
after the initiation of a police investigation". 
When the police report to 
"whether the complaint has 
the Authority 
been upheld 
they 
and, 
must 
if 
indicate 
so, what 
action has been taken or is proposed to be taken or is 
proposed to be taken to rectify the matter 11 • 73 The provision 
necessarily requires the insertion of the words "or not" 
after "whether" to be more accurate. 74 There may be an 
occasion where a complaint is not upheld but the 
investigation may reveal the need for remedial action to 
prevent a similar complaint in the future which might be 
upheld. 
The Authority is obliged to be informed if the "complaint has 
b t 1 d b ·1· . " 75 h' . 1 .. een set e y conci iation. T is particu ar provision, 
is unnecessary because it presumes the complaint has been 
deals with that matter). (paragraph (a) upheld and rectified 
The provision also suggests that the 
complaint without prior 
police can resolve a 
approval of the justifiable 
Authority. That seems to be inconsistent with clause 30 
which applies to the procedures which the authority must 
adopt after a police investigation. Perhaps there might be 
an occasion where the police have resolved a matter by 
conciliation under subclause (1) (b) but will be required to 
. f h . . . 76 reopen it or t e investigation. 
Subclause (2) requires the police to supply to the Authority, 
when reporting under this clause, accompanying material 
sufficient to enable the Authority to assess the adequacy of 
the police investigation. In other words the police are 
required to be selective in supplying information to the 
Authority. The volume of accompanying material will depend 
on the nature and complexity of the complaint and its degree 
• 
• 
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of seriousness. There is a presumption that the police will 
also forward potentially damaging material. This ability to 
screen material seems to be contrary to the whole notion of 
oversight. 
The statutory scheme also provides the police (or should that 
be Commissioner) with the ability to consult the Authority on 
their proposals for action on a complaint before officially 
reporting to the Authority. Therefore it is in the police 
interests to learn where the Authority has strong feelings 
and avoid subsequent embarrassment. 
Commissioner to Provide Information and Assistance at Request 
of Authority - Clause 22 
At the request of the Authority the Commissioner shall 
provide it "with all such information and assistance as is 
necessary for the proper performance by the Authority of its 
functions in relation to its investigation of any complaint, 
incident or other matter under this Act 11 • 77 In other words 
the Commissioner is obliged to make the Authority's task as 
easy as possible if it is within the Commissioner's power to 
do so. Subclause ( 2) provides that on the occasions where 
the Authority oversees a police investigation the 
Commissioner shall supply it upon request with any or all 
information in the possession or under the 
1 . h . 1 h 1 · 78 po ice t at 1s re evant to t e comp a1nt, 
h f h 
. . . 79 on t e progress o t e 1nvest1gat1on. 
control of the 
and/or a report 
Power of Police to Investigate Complaints and Other Matters -
Clause 23 
This clauses 
likely to be 
Authority. 
indicates that the majority 
investigated by the police 
Subclause ( 1) preserves the 
and control of 
of complaints are 
rather than by the 
Commissioner's 
the Pol ice. 80 of general administration 
provides that nothing in the Act will "prevent 
duty 
It 
the 
Commissioner from commencing or continuing a Police 
investigation into any complaint, incident, or other matter". 
Pol ice involvement then in the investigation and dee is ion 
" 
" 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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making processes of complaints is diminished only to the 
extent provided by the Bill. The wording of the clause is 
interesting. It refers to the "power" of police to 
investigate complaints. But the Commissioner has more than a 
power, but a "duty", to investigate and the marginal note 
does not accurately record that fact. The duty emanates from 
the constituting provisions of the Police Act describing the 
function of the Commissioner. 
One should not discount the possibility of simultaneous 
investigations occurring if the Authority initiates an 
investigation under Clause 20(b). This clause does not 
address i tse 1 f to the quest ion of par amoun tcy where 
s imu 1 taneous investigations occur. Th is type of situation 
may however be dealt with by the Authority, assuming it 
relates to a complaint, by reference to Clause 20(c). 
Otherwise it may have to be left to the good sense of the 
statutory officers. 
In essence subclause ( 1 ) appears 
of the 
to be little more than a 
Commissioner's duties of 
remove any doubt that the Bill 
categorical reaffirmation 
control over the police and 
might cause . 
The Commissioner may before or after the commencement of a 
police investigation request the Authority to take it over . 
The sort of occasions which merit this type of request might 
include cases of serious corruption, or complaints about a 
senior officer, or other cases reflecting adversely on the 
reputation of the police service. Or, for example, the 
Commissioner might request the Authority to ear ry out such 
investigation if the police investigation has for ins ta nee, 
met with a "wall of silence" from the ranks. The Police 
Administration cannot compel its members to subject 
themselves to an interview but the Authority, using the 
potentially coercive powers under clause 26(1) and (2) can 
compel officers to furnish information on oath or produce 
documents. 
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P£ocedure Where Complaint or Other Matter Appears to be 
Outside the Jurisdiction of Authority - Clause 24 
The l\uthority, when it 
jurisdiction to investigate 
1 
. . . . 81 
comp a1nant 1n wr1t1ng. 
establishes that it has 
a 
In 
complaint, shall notify 
so notifying the Authority 
no 
the 
is 
obliged to advise the complainant that recourse may be had to 
the Ombudsmen Act 1975 82 and if requested to so by the 
complainant, the Authority 
complaint to an Ombudsman. 
83 
is obliged to forward the 
The Bill also provides a procedure whereby the Chief 
Ombudsman is able to confer with the Authority to establish 
within whose jurisdiction a complaint lies. The Authority is 
required to give its opinion 
notify the Chief Ombudsman in 
as soon as practicable and to 
writing. In order to delineate 
as clearly as possible the parameters of the respective 
j ur isd ict ions the Ombudsmen Act is to be amended. 
84 The 
Ombudsmen will specifically retain the ability to investigate 
the terms and conditions of service of any person who is a 
member of police. In these matters the Authority is 
statutorily prohibited from conducting such enquiries.
85 The 
Ombudsmen are also required to investigate every other 
decision, recommendation, act or omission of a member of 
police which the Authority 
Authority's jurisdiction. A 
determines 
transitional 
is outside the 
provision ensures 
that the Ombudsmen complete any investigation 
before the commencement of the Act.
86 
commenced 
Subclause ( 3 ) raises an interesting matter . "The Authority 
may at any time, by notice in writing to the Chief Ombudsman, 
request that any complaint or other matter relating to the 
police be investigated by an Ombudsman". The police have 
successfully resisted for years the intrusion of the 
Ombudsmen's investigations police operational matters. Will 
the Ombudsmen's jurisdiction extend beyond the present narrow 
interpretation of 
d • • • 11 ?87 a m1n1strat1on . 
what 
The 
constitutes 
Bill and the 
a "matter 
amendment to 
of 
the 
Ombudsmen Act do not make this clear. Perhaps this provision 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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has been drafted with the following scener ios in mind. For 
instance, an Ombudsman may be requested to investigate a 
complaint arising out of a Ministry of Transport/Police 
traffic blitz checkpoint or a combined Customs/Police drug 
raid, where the police are providing a support role but the 
complaint is directed against officers of both departments. 
Since the Ombudsmen are not so constrained in dealing with 
operational matters of other government departments and 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the 
Authority might request the Ombudsman to investigate the 
police component in the complaint. 
The most interesting feature of this provision may well be 
the perceived subordinate role that the Chief Ombudsman now 
occupies in relation to the Authority. A stronger and 
revised jurisdiction over the police will be vested in the 
Authority. The Chief Ombudsman in the span of 24 years could 
not achieve such a jurisdiction. Now as a result of 
potentially confusing overlapping jurisdiction, the Chief 
Ombudsman may by notice in writing be requested by the 
Authority to undertake an investigation, the nature of which 
also raises further interesting questions. For instance, 
under which Act will the Ombudsman derive his powers to 
investigate? Since the Bill is basically a very detailed 
scheme, modelled to achieve a balance between all the 
parties, could that delicate balance be upset if a police 
officer, were subject to the Ombudsmen Act? What if the 
Ombudsmen formed an opinion that the subject matter of the 
investigation was wrong 88 and relayed that to the Authority? 
Presumably, the Authority would, since there is no 
d . . . f . h h · · 
89 
correspon 1ng prov1s1on or 1t to reac sue an op1n1on, 
affirm the finding by the most suitable formula provided in 
the Bill. 
An alternative might be for the investigating Ombudsman to 
become a member of the Authority's staff 90 in order to be 
able to utilise the provisions of the Bill. Clearly though 
such subordination would undermine the long established and 
respected office of the Ombudsman . 
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Another alternative, and perhaps the most acceptable, is to 
avoid overlapping 
the Authority has 
matters pertaining 
jurisdiction altogether by providing that 
exclusive jurisdiction in relation to all 
to the police. 
Proceedings of the Authority - Clause 25 
Before proceeding to investigate any matter the Authority is 
obliged to inform the Commissioner and the complainant (if 
any) or any other person alleged to be aggrieved (unless the 
interest of justice otherwise require) of its intention to 
make investigation. 91 The clause does not discuss the an 
manner of notification. There is no apparent requirement for 
the Authority do so in writing nor at the same time give 
reasons for the need of its investigation. One questions 
whether or not this duty is in fact a duplication of clause 
18(l)(a) and (1). 
read in the widest 
other matter". If 
The term "any matter" presumably is to be 
sense to include "complaint, incident or 
that is so one wonders why the drafters 
omitted the words "other matter" from subclause (3)(a). From 
the point of view of consistency the words "complaint, 
incident, or" should be inserted before the word "matter" in 
the second line of the clause. This provision in effect 
replicates the effect of Section 18 ( 1) of the Ombudsmen Act 
1975. 
Every investigation by the Authority shall be conducted in 
private. Hence the subject matter of the investigation and 
the actual investigation will not devolve into a public 
spectacle and media dramatisation distorting an issue will be 
avoided. The provision potentially discourages the creation 
of a critical lack of confidence in the police through 
sensationalist reporting. The external reviewer's position 
preserves the balance of the publics "need to know". 
The Authority may hear or obtain information from such 
persons it thinks fit, including where it considers that 
cultural matters are a factor relevant to a complaint or an 
investigation, information from such oersons as the ~uthority 
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thinks may have knowledge or experience in 92 those matters. 
This particular provision is an example of the Congruent 
fraught with Values Barometer. Policing in the 1980 's is 
testy relationships between some segments of the public 
particularly the ethnic and visible minorities groups in our 
communities. The ability of the Authority to investigate not 
only the complaint at hand but also to extend a wider enquiry 
to peripheral concerns will likely cause the development of 
policies will 
This course of 
avoid a repetition of the original complaint. 
investigation is subject to clause 33 of the 
Bill which relates to adverse comment. Therefore, if the 
Authority, as a result of gleaning information from others, 
forms an adverse opinion or recommendation or is going to 
comment adversely about any person, that person must be given 
a reasonable opportunity to be heard. 
Since there is no judicial production of evidence in the 
customary adversarial model, it is not necessary for the 
Authority to hold a formal hearing. 93 Nor is any person 
entitled as of right to be heard by the Authority. 94 Both 
paragraphs are subject to the adverse comment clause.
95 
Arguably the effect of the provisions may amount to a denial 
of natural justice in that two principals (ie complainant 
and police officer) might feel they have an absolute right to 
appear before the Authority. However, unless either person 
is likely to be subject to adverse criticism that right is 
dispensed with. 
Powers of Authority in Relation to Investigations - Clause 26 
The Authority has a similar powers in this regard to that of 
the Ombudsmen 96 in that if the Authority has an opinion that 
a person is able to give information relating to any matter 
under investigation it may require that person to furnish 
that information. That person may also be required to 
furnish documents or other things in his or her possession or 
control which the Authority considers relevant to the subject 
matter of the enquiry. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
75 
The common law has for centuries held that a per son is not 
bound to answer a question which may 
lt . h f f . 97 pena y, pun1s ment or or e1ture. 
principle wi 11 erode this principle 9 8 
with the proposed legislation. 
render him liable to 
Only a statute create 
and that is the case 
Subclause (2) provides the Authority with the ability to 
summon and examine on oath any person who is able to give 
information relating to the matter under investigation. 
A difficulty arises in subclause (3). There it is provided 
that "every investigation by the Authority shall be deemed to 
be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 108 of 
the Crimes Act 1961 (which relates to perjury)". The 
corresponding provision in the Ombudsmen Act uses the word 
"examination" rather than "investigation". Section 108(1) 
provides that "perjury is an assertion as to a matter of 
fact ..• made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of 
his evidence on oath .... " Whilst the judicial proceeding 
element is reaffirmed in subsection (4) of section 108 the 
critical feature here is that the oath is only administered 
prior examination. Subclause (2) confirms this point "the 
Authority may summon before it and examine on oath". Either 
this error has been a careless transposition or it is 
intended to give the Authority greater powers than the 
Ombudsmen. If that is the case then it is plainly wrong at 
law because it fails to fulfil all the elements of sl08. The 
corollary being that Clause 26(2) only authorises the oath to 
be administered on an examination not on an investigation. 
Protection and Privileges of Witnesses - Clause 27 
This provision is modelled on corresponding provisions in the 
Ombudsmen Act 1975 99 and the Human Rights Commission Act 
1977. lOO Every person required by the Authority to give 
information, answer questions and produce documents and 
things, has the same privileges as witnesses have in Court. 
Thus the Authority has a mandate to ensure the rights of all 
complainants and police officers are scrupulously protected. 
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However, a person cannot use the shield of withholding any 
document or refusal to answer a question on the ground that 
the disclosure of the document or the answering of the 
question would be injurious to the public interest. 1 The 
privilege is also limited by subclause (2) which provides 
that where the Authority requires information or the 
production of any document or thing which would in effect 
breach of obligation of secrecy or non disclosure, 
notwithstanding the earlier commitment the person is required 
to comply with the Authority's requirement.
2 
'I'wo privileges to which the clause refers include the right 
against self incrimination and the right to silence. Should 
a person comply with the requirement of the Authority, that 
person is granted an immunity from prosecution for an offence 
. 3 h against any enactment. No statement, answer or ot er 
evidence arising out of an investigation or proceedings of 
the Authority is admissible in other proceedings except 
perjury or an offence against section 38 of the Act.
4 
Disclosure of certain matters not to be required - Clause 28 
This provision deals with secrecy and privileges relating to 
matters of state. It replicates provisions in the Ombudsmen 
Act 1975 and the Human Rights Commission Act 1977. 
Subclause ( 1 ) relates to certification from the Prime 
Minister, that if the giving of any information or the 
production of any document or thing might prejudice the 
security or defence of New Zealand 5 or a particular interest
6 
the Authority shall not require the giving of any information 
or the production of any document or thing. Similarly the 
Attorney-General can certify that any information or 
production of any document or thing might prejudice the 
prevention, investigation or detection of offences or might 
involve the disclosure of proceedings of cabinet or any 
committee of cabinet relating to matters of secret or 
confidential nature whose disclosure might be injurious to 
the public interest, the Authority shall not require the 
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information to be given or the document or thing to be 
produced. The nature of these non disclosure provisions 
occur in all the comparative overseas legislation. The 
Western Australian legislation 7 in fact, denies the Crown 
privilege in respect of the production of documents or the 
giving of evidence as is allowed by law in legal proceedings. 
The only exception is to safeguard cabinet proceedings. 
The Attorney-General's ability to certify that the disclosure 
of certain information or the production of any document or 
thing might prejudice the prevention, investigation or 
detection of offences, might be the source of some tension. 
The provision hints at an occasion whereby the Attorney-
General acts as an arbitrator between the Commissioner and 
the Authority particularly with regard to offences. Does 
that include all those offences of misconduct listed in 
Regulation 46 of the Police Regulations 1959 or just criminal 
offences? The matter is not clear. 
Procedure After Investigation by the Authority - Clause 29 
The Authority has no power to make a determination which is 
in anyway binding on the Commissioner. It has a duty though 
to recommend a course of action. 
Where the Authority itself untakes an investigation it is 
required to form an opinion on whether or not any decision, 
recommendation, act or omission conduct policy, practice or 
procedure which was the subject matter of the investigation 
was contrary 
undesirable. 
to law, unreasonable, unjustified, unfair or 
The Ombudsman has an additional factor upon 
which to form an opinion and that is if the subject matter 
8 was wrong. 
After forming 
reasons, to 
an opinion the Authority must convey it, 
the Commissioner. It may also make 
with 
such 
recommendations as it thinks fit including a recommendation 
that disciplinary or criminal proceedings be considered 
against a member of police. 
. I 
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This power of the Authority is designed to be subservient to 
that of the Commissioner. To have a greater power, for 
instance, to "decide" disciplinary proceedings be brought or 
"require proceedings be instituted" 9 would result in a 
usurpation of the Commissioner's control of the police. As 
well, it could potentially amount to an erosion of the police 
and the Solicitor General's discretion to prosecute. On the 
other hand the Ombudsmen Act provides an Ombudsman with a 
more effective input into the determination of a complaint. 
It can recommend that proceedings be "taken". 10 The term is 
a great deal stronger and if used in the Bill would not 
necessarily 
extent this 
compromise 
diminutive 
office of the Authority. 
the 
power 
Commissioner's duty. To 
erodes the credibility of 
some 
the 
Since no recommendation of act ion w i 11 be made 1 igh tly the 
Authority will likely advise punitive action only where there 
is a reasonable probability of a successful result. 
Procedure After Investigation by the Police - Clause 30 
Where the police are required to report to the Authority 
pursuant to section 21 they must form an opinion on the 
subject matter using the same formula that the Authority uses 
under Clause 29. 
After considering the police report the Authority is required 
to indicate to the Commissioner whether or not it agrees with 
the decision or proposed decision. 11 It may, if it disagrees 
with the Commissioner, make recommendations supported by 
reasons as it thinks fit. It can include a recommendation 
that disciplinary or criminal proceedings be considered 
against a member of the police. Once again the d iminu it i ve 
word "considered" is used. 
Implementation of Recommendations of Authority - Clause 31 
The Commissioner is required as soon as reasonably 
practicable after receiving a recommendation of the Authority 
under clauses 29 and 30 to notify the Authority of any action 
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that will be taken to give effect to its recommendation
. The 
Commissioner must also give any reasons for departing f
rom or 
. 1 . d . 12 not imp ernentat1ng any recommen at1on. 
This provision varies slightly from the provision 
in the 
In the Bill there is a specific 0 b d At 1975.
13 
m u smen . c 
requirement for the Commissioner to notify the Au
thority 
within a time frame. In this case it is "reas
onably 
practicable". 
Department is 
However, under the Ombudsmen 
requested to notify the Ombudsmen 
Act the 
within a 
specified time frame. 
If, however, within a reasonable time after a recomme
ndation 
has been made no appropriate or adequate action has
 been 
taken, the Authority may, after considering any commen
ts made 
by the Commissioner either: 
(a) Send a copy of its opinion and recommendations 
on the matter with comments of the commissioner 
to the Attorney-General and the Minister of 
Police; and 
(b) Where it considers it appropriate transmit to 
the Attorney-General for tabling in the House of 
Representatives such report on the matter it 
thinks fit.
14 
The Parliamentary Commissioner in Western Australia 
has 
circumstances 
P . 
15 
rem1er. 
except 
The 
similar powers in these 
report directly to the 
Complaints Commissioner avoids to a certain 
it forwards a 
Toronto Public 
extent tens ion 
with the Chief of Police. Under its legislation the Pu
blic 
Complaints Commissioner who, after making a review fo
rms an 
opinion that a police practice or procedure shou
ld be 
altered, reports that opinion and recommendations dire
ct to 
the Metropolitan Board of Commissioners of Police, the
 Chief 
of Police and the Metropolitan Toronto Police Assoc
iation. 
The scheme of report diffusion is continued in the next
 step. 
Within ninety days of receiving such a repor
t the 
I 
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Metropolitan Board of Commissioners is required to forward a 
report accompanied by their own comments and that of the 
Chief of Police and the Metropolitan Toronto Police 
Association, to the Attorney-General, the Solicitor General 
and the Commissioner.
16 
The Australian Federal Police scheme varies slightly. Where 
the Ombudsman forms an opinion after the investigation of a 
1 · 17 h · · . 11 . f h comp aint t e Minister automatica y receives a copy o t e 
t 18 d h c · · 19 Th o b d repor as oes t e ommissioner. e mu sman may 
request
20 the Commissioner within a specified time to 
particularise the action he proposes to take
21 and there is 
statutory duty for the Commissioner to comply. Should the 
Ombudsman 
action has 
obliged to 
be of 
not 
the 
been 
opinion that 
taken within 
adequate or appropriate 
a reasonable time he is 
inform the Prime M
. . . . . 22 
inister in writing. The 
Ombudsmen may also forward the report to the President of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for 
bl . . h . h b 23 ta ing in t e respective cam ers. 
The South 
Police to 
Australian 
resolve a 
legislation 
deadlock 24
 
introduces the Minister of 
and make determinations.
25 
Except where there the case involves an offence or breach of 
discipline, the Minister is required to consult with the 
A G 1 b f k
. d . . 26 
ttorney- enera e ore ma ing a etermination. Similarly 
between the the Victorian Minister of Police arbitrates 
Authority and the Chief Commissioner. 
2 7 In the case of a 
dispute between the Ombudsman and the Commissioner in New 
South Wales
28 which is not resolved within the prescribed 
time 29
 either or both of them may appeal to the Tribunal 
established by the Act. The Tribunal consisting of one 
person (not being the President
30 ) has the power to determine 
31 
the appeal. 
This ty?e of provision then is capable of, according to 
over seas experience, a variety of pe rmu tat ions. Per haps a 
more viable option in the New Zealand context, 
. d h H f R · 
32 · intru e upon t e ouse o epresentatives is 
rather than 
to empower 
either the Attorney-General or the Minister of Police to 
arbitrate between the two statutory officers. 
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Parties to be Informed of Progress and Result of 
Investigation - Clause 32 
Where the Authority investigates a complaint it shall conduct 
the investigation with due expedition. 
3 3 But one might ask 
what that direction has got to do with a provision relating 
to advice to parties of the progress and result of the 
investigation. Perhaps it would be better housed in clause 
25 which relates to the proceedings of the Authority. 
Where, however, it seems appropriate, the Authority may 
inform the complainant and the Commissioner of the progress 
of an investigation it is conducting. 
34 But in every case 
after the conclusion of an investigation, it must inform the 
parties as soon as 
investigation in a 
infer that 
reasonably practicable the result of the 
manner it thinks proper. 
35 Could one 
this clause specifically refers to because 
complaints, that investigations into incidents and other 
matters are not to be regulated by this clause? 
The Authority might chose to telephone one of the parties the 
result of the investigation. There is no guidance on the 
manner of notification. Obviously the Authority has been 
allowed a great deal of flexibility in the means of advising 
parties but this flexibility is inconsistent with other 
provisions in the Bi 11 which con templates a formal writ ten 
procedure. Consider, for instance, clause 24 ( 1) which 
requires the Authority, when it receives a complaint which is 
outside its jurisdiction to "notify the complainant in 
. . d' 1" 36 wr1t1ng accor 1ng y . 
The reference to "result of the investigation" implies 
something less than the complainant or party being fully 
informed as to the Authority's findings and reasons for it's 
decision. It might be considered that "result" is an 
entirely inappropriate response. 
A determination by the Authority would not preclude a person 
taking any other action to pursue a legal remedy that may be 
available, ie false imprisonment or assault. 
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Adverse Comment - Clause 33 
This clause preserves the right of natural justice. The 
Authority is constrained from making, in any opinion or 
recommendation given under clause 29 or section 30, or in any 
report made or published under clause 31 or section 3 6, any 
adverse comment about any person, unless that person has been 
given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. 
Authority and Staff to Maintain Secrecy - Clause 34 
This provision reflects the usual provisions found in the 
Ombudsmen Act 1975 and the Human Rights Commission Act 1977. 
Proceedings Privileged - Clause 35 
The privative clause inserted at subsection (1) (a) provides 
the Authority or staff officer with limited
37 protection from 
criminal or civil proceedings. The Authority and staff 
officers have otherwise complete protect ion apart from the 
exercise or intended exercise of their functions if it is 
shown that they "acted in bad faith". Since under clause 
32(c) the Authority only has to advise the results of an 
investigation, a sufficiently distressed party may as a 
result of the receipt of limited information feel that the 
Authority or staff member acted in "bad faith". 
In order to overcome needless proceedings arising from ill 
informed aggrieved parties perhaps a sub-paragraph is merited 
recording the following: 
"No proceedings shall be brought under subclause 
(l)(a) except with the leave of the High Court. The 
High Court shall not give leave unless it is satisfied 
that there is substantial ground for contention that 
the person to be proceeded against acted in bad 
faith. II 
The Authority and staff officers are precluded from being 
called to give evidence in any court or in any proceedings of 
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a judicial nature, in respect of anything coming to their 
knowledge as a result of the exercise of their functions.
38 
Subclause (3) appears to be an unnecessary duplication of 
clause 27(4)(a). Both provisions deal with the privilege 
relating to information given to the Authority during the 
course of an investigation or a proceeding. Subclause ( 3) 
also refers to the production of a document or thing. There 
is then a slight variation of the conclusion of the sentence 
in both provisions but they, for all intents and purposes 
have the same effect. It is logical that clause 27(4)(a) 
should be amplified to include the production of a document 
or thing, with the result that subclause (3) could be deleted 
altogether. 
Subclause (4) in purporting to protect the Authority from 
defamation provides: 
"For the purposes of clause 5 of the First Schedule to 
the Defamation Act 1954, 
(a) Any report, opinion, or recommendation given by 
the Authority under section 
section 31 of this Act; and" 
29 or section 30 or 
This paragraph should also include reference to clauses 17, 
19(3), 32(b) and 32(c) and it might be better housed on its 
own under a paragraph (c) to subclause (4). Since "manner" 
may include being informed orally of the a result of an 
investigation the Authority might be protected in this 
respect also. 
Subclause (4) continues: 
"(b) Any report published 
Commissioner under section 
by the Authority or 
36 of this Act, shall 
the 
be 
deemed to be an official report made by a person 
holding an inquiry under the authority of the 
Government of New Zealand." 
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The drafters have omitted from this paragraph reference to 
the furnishing of the annual report under clause 37. 
Publication of Reports 
Commissioner - Clause 36 
by the Authority and by the 
The Authority has a general discretion to publish reports in 
the public interest or in the interests of any individual, 
relating to the exercise of its functions generally or in 
. l 39 part1cu ar cases. 
The Commissioner may, after receiving from the Authority any 
opinion or recommendation given under section 29 or section 
30, publish all or any part of the opinion or 
d 
. 40 
recommen at1on. Potentially then the Commissioner can edit 
any op in ion or recommendation. This feature is not bad in 
itself except if the editing detracts from the meaning of the 
original version. But subclause (3) provides that the 
Authority can guide the Commissioner on the des i r abi 1 i ty or 
extent of publication. 
Annual Report - Clause 37 
The Authority is required to furnish each year to the 
Minister of Justice a report of the exercise of its functions 
under the Act. In some respects this is a means of 
certifying Police conduct for the preceeding year. 
Presumably the Authority should also be required to furnish a 
copy to the Minister of Police also. The Minister of Justice 
is obliged to lay a copy before the House of Representatives 
as soon as practicable. 
Offences - Clause 38 
A number of offences are recorded which if committed by any 
person are punishable on summary conviction and the person is 
liable to a fine not exceeding $2,000. They basically deal 
with obstructing, hindering or resisting the Authority
41 non 
1 . . h . t f h A h . 
42 d h comp 1ance wit any requ1remen s o t e ut or1ty an t e 
· 1 d' · f · 
43 
giving of false or m1s ea 1ng 1n ormat1on. 
r 
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It is surmised that the size of the penalty is designed in 
part to dissuade persons making a complaint to the Authority 
which is completely unfounded, made with a desire perhaps to 
influence a prosecution. 
Money to be Appropriated by Parliament for the Purpose of 
this Act - Clause 39 
This is simply a housekeeping clause and it would be more 
appropriately housed in a schedule to the Act with the other 
nominated clauses (ie salaries and allowances, staff and 
superannuation). 
Amendments to Other Acts - Clause 41 
Subc la use ( 1) of clause 41 repea 1 s sect ion 6 0 of the Pol ice 
Act 1958. Presently, section 60 affords a degree of 
protection to police officers in that subsection (1) imposes 
a one year time limit for commencing a civil action. 
For their part the Police Administration have endeavoured to 
resist this proposed repeal. Its representative on the 
Beattie Committee presented a minority viewpoint which was 
subsequently presented in its entirety to the Select 
Committee. The police argument centres upon the statutory 
duties and responsibilities imposed on its officers. In many 
difficult and hostile situations a police officer, it was 
said, must react instantly under pressure without recourse to 
advice. Errors can and do happen which attract suits. The 
one year time 1 imi t, according to the police, ensures there 
is a "cut-off point" so that its officers can continue to 
pursue their duties free of the stress of being involved as a 
defendant in a civil suit. 
The police pointed to sections 124 ( 2) and ( 4) of the Mental 
Health Act 1969 which provides that leave from a High Court 
judge must be sought before bringing proceedings under that 
Act and such an application must be made within six months of 
the act complained of. Section 38 of the Alcoholism and Drug 
Addiction Act 1966 provides that that machinery also applies 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
86 
to the former Act. Therefore, the Police Act provision, it 
was argued, was not unique and is essential. Vulnerability 
to civil actions merits additional protection. As a 
concession the police proposed that the time limit be 
extended to two years and sought the retention of the rest of 
th 
. 44 
e section. 
The majority of 
susceptibility 
considered that 
the Beattie Committee acknowledged 
of police officers 
the feature should 
to 
be 
civil 
weighed 
actions 
against 
the 
but;· 
the 
nature of police work and the extensive powers used by the 
police. Whilst 
the execution of 
the 
the 
subsection refers to persons acting in 
Police /\et, that provision effectively 
covers the Crown as well as individual officers since the 
Crown stands in the place of the individual officer and meets 
any damages awarded. The Committee mindful that the United 
Kingdom had repealed similar protective legislation 
"considered that the ordinary 1 imitation per iod
4 5 and other 
rules for the conduct of litigation should in fairness 
apply".46 
Subsection ( 2) provides that a plaintiff in such an action 
should not recover if a tender of amends or sufficient sum of 
money is paid into the Court by the defendant. This 
police provision affords great protection to the 
particularly when 
a 
it, ( the Crown), pays a sufficient sum 
before or after an action is brought or in respect of costs. 
One of its original purposes was to encourage the settlement 
of legitimate claims without the need for a Court hearing. 
This is borne out in practice with approximately 25% of cases 
1 d 1 . C . 47 sett e ear y prior to ourt action. 
The Beattie Committee on this point indicated the application 
of Rules 347-368 of the new High Court Rules 
payments in to Court. The extensive nature of 
make subsection (2) redundant.
48 
relating the 
these rules 
By way of concluding this section, the Bill does not preclude 
an aggrieved party from pursuing other civil remedies. In 
fact, if a party is not satisfied with the l'\uthority's 
; 
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decision, civil remedies are still available to them. A 
number of the drafting concerns which have been alluded to in 
the body of this paper have been synthesised in Appendix D. 
Perhaps some of the suggestions could have been considered in 
the construction of the Bill. 
XI. ANALYSIS OF BILL 
Having commented in some detail about the infrastructure and 
content of the Bill it is relevant to evaluate a number of 
other points about this particular legislation. For instance 
who are the effective actors/deciders and what are their 
functions? In the case of the deciders, what is the extent 
of the powers conferred upon them? How does the legislation 
treat the competing interests involved? And finally what is 
the nature of the legislation. Does it, for instance, 
exclude recourse to natural justice? 
A Actors/Deciders 
This section will attempt to draw together the various 
functions, duties and powers of the primary actors/deciders 
which are scattered throughout the Bill. 
There are two distinct categories into which the 12 
characters referred to in the Bill fall. It is proposed to 
focus attention on the principal actors/deciders. In this 
process, discussion will centre on the extent of their 
functions, consideration will be given to their duties and an 
exam in at i.on w i 11 be made of the powers confer red upon them. 
The second category which comprises those who maintain 
peripheral roles (but not unimportant roles), for instance, 
the Minister of Police or the Attorney-General, will not be 
discussed at all. 
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( i ) Authority 
Functions 
The Authority is obviously the most cen tr a 1 figure in the 
Bill and it is pertinent to restate its functions which are 
detailed in Clause 13. They include the reception of 
complaints whether alleging any misconduct or neglect of duty 
by any member of the police or complaints concerning any 
practice, policy, or procedure of the police affecting the 
person or body of persons making the complaint in a personal 
capacity. The Authority may also investigate of its own 
motion, where it is satisfied there are reasonable grounds to 
carry out an investigation in the public interest, any 
incident involving death or serious injury notified to the 
Authority by the Commissioner under section 14 of the Act. 
The Authority must also take such action in respect of 
complaints, incidents, and other matters as is contemplated 
by the Act. Finally, the Authority may also carry out any 
investigation at the request of the Commissioner. 
In effect, the Authority will substitute the role of the 
Ombudsmen's office but with an increased jurisdiction over 
the police with regard to the reception, investigation and 
resolution of complaints. With regard to the ability to 
affect policy matters, the Authority will complement the 
Minister of Police's responsibility and it will also likely 
substitute the Justice and Law Reform Committee's and 
Ombudsmen's role in this area. The own motion investigation 
capability into any incident involving death or serious 
injury will replace the system of ad hoe police examiners who 
were appointed f rorn time to t irne to carry out such 
investigation. Finally, the Authority has been designed to 
have such status and competence that it w i 11 1 ike ly make 
redundant the need for the Minister to appoint a person to 
oversee an enquiry pursuant to section 33 of the Police Act. 
It could also undertake the type of enquiries usually 
assigned to Ministerial Committes, Commissions of Inquiry and 
Royal Commissions (See Appendix C). 
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In summary, the Authority is basically an amalgam of the 
functions of various institutional police-monitoring bodies. 
Their functions have been reconstituted into a specialist 
unit with appropriate powers to provide a more effective 
oversight over the police. 
Duties 
The Authority has a number of duties imposed upon it by the 
Bill. For instance it is required to notify the Commissioner 
f 1 · · d b · 49 f h d i·t o every comp aint receive y it ; o t e proce ure 
d · f 1 · 50 d f · proposes to a opt upon receipt o a comp aint an o its 
intention to make an investigation using the procedure laid 
d . h 51 own in t e Act. 
In respect of complainants, the Authority has a duty where it 
decides to take no action or further action on a complaint to 
in form the comp la in t of that dee is ion and the reasons for 
it. 52 The complainant is also to be informed where the 
Authority intends to make an investigation. 53 
Clause 3 2 provides that in every case where the Authority 
undertakes its own investigation it must inform the parties 
concerned as soon as reasonably practicable at the conclusion 
of the investigation the result of the investigation. 
Upon the completion of an investigation undertaken by the 
Authority (which it must conduct with due expedition), it is 
obliged to form an opinion whether the subject matter of the 
investigation was contrary to law, unreasonable, unjustified, 
unfair or undesirable. 54 The Authority is then required to 
convey its opinion with reasons to the Commissioner 
recommendations it thinks fit. 55 In respect of 
with any 
a police 
opinion on the investigation the Authority shall form 
56 police report and then shal 1 i nd ica te 
an 
to the Commissioner 
whether or not it agrees with the Commissioner's decision or 
proposed decision and it may make any recommendations 
supported by reasons it thinks fit if it disagrees with the 
, ' I d ' , 57 Commissioners ecision. 
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The Authority and its staff are also required to maintain 
secrecy 58 and it shall furnish an annual report to the 
Minister of Justice on the exercise of its functions under 
the Act. 59 
These duties are consonant with the functions of a 
superintending body which is required to operate the delicate 
balance between public and police interests. The duties are 
sensible, and are likely to be appealing to most of the 
public as well as the police generally. 
Powers 
(a) 
new 
Complaints: It 
complaints system, 
is essential to the integrity of the 
that the Authority has the ability to 
enforce a reluctant witness to co-ooerate with it. Therefore 
a person who resists or hinders the Authority may be liable 
on summary conviction to a fine of $2, OOO. Others who fail 
or refuse without reasonable excuse, to comply with any 
requirement of the Authority or who knowingly gives a false 
or misleading statement or false or misleading information is 
similarly liable. 
Upon the receipt of complaints the Authority has a vast array 
of powers in relation to how the complaint will be actioned. 
For instance, it may: 
· · · 11 61 h . f 1 . 1n1t1a y - upon t e receipt o a comp a1nt: 
investigate it; 
defer action until receipt of a report of a police 
investigation; 
oversee a police investigation; 
decide in accordance with Section 19 to take no action; 
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subsequently 62 - at any time after the receipt of a 
complaint 
review a police investigation; 
decide to investigate a complaint itself; 
give such directions as it thinks fit where it oversees a 
police investigation; 
direct the police to re-open an investigation and 
thereafter oversee the investigation; 
direct the police to reconsider 
action; 
their proposals for 
decide to take no further action in accordance with 
section 19; 
dee ide no further act ion by the Authority is required on 
the ground that it considers that the outcome of a police 
investigation is satisfactory. 
request the Chief Ombudsman to investigate any complaint 
tt 1 . t th 1. 
63 
or ma er re at1ng o e po ice; 
request any or all information in the possession or under 
the control of the police that is relevant to the 
complaint and request a report on the progress of the 
investigation where it oversees a police investigation;
64 
take up an investigation at the request of the 
. . 65 
Comm1ss1oner; 
The scope of these powers permits considerable control over 
police investigations. In this capacity, the Authority, who 
can "give such directions as it thinks fit" and "direct the 
police to reconsider their proposals for action" has 
] 
] 
] 
] 
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considerable coercive power, if recourse is had to the 
sanctions available in the offence section. A reserve power 
by way of an annual report to Parliament or by way of special 
report is also available to the Authority. The only 
restrictions imposed on the powers arise in clause 13(l)(c) 
where the Authority can only take such action in respect of 
complaints, incidents and other matters as is contemplated by 
the Act. 
(b) Investigations: Where the Authority decides to 
investigate a complaint under clauses 18(l)(a), 20(b) and 
20(d); or investigate an incident under clause 13(l)(b); or 
carry out or take over an investigation into any complaint, 
incident or other matter at the request of the Commissioner 
pursuant to Clause 23 ( 2), it will be required to follow the 
procedure laid down in the Act. 66
 
Under the procedure the Authority has a discretionary power 
to hear or obtain information from any person it thinks fit. 
It also has the power to require a person to furnish 
information relating to any matter under investigation by the 
Authority or produce documents or things in the possession or 
under the control of that person which may be relevant to the 
subject matter of the investigation. 
67 In order to fulfil 
this power the Authority can summon before it and examine on 
oath any person who in the opinion of the Authority can given 
. f . 68 1n ormat1on. 
The scope of these powers appear again to be very extensive. 
The Authority has the ability to get to the truth of a 
matter. The powers are discretionary in that the Authority 
can only exercise them if it has "the opinion" that any 
person can assist. The power is restricted to the extent 
that if the Prime Minister certifies that the disclosure of 
information or production of any document or thing might 
prejudice the security of New Zealand or an interest 
protected by Section 7 of the Official Information Act 
1982; 69 or the Attorney General certifies that disclosure of 
information or the production of any document or thing might 
prejudice the prevention, investigation or detection of 
I 
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offences or might involve proceedings of cabinet; the 
Authority will not require the information to be given or 
document or thing to be produced.
70 
Disobedience of a summons would likely attract not only the 
sanctions imposed by the Summary Proceedings .l\ct 1957 but 
might also liability under clause 38(a) or (b). Any person 
who under oath makes any 
1 iable to be charged with 
false or misleading statement is 
the offence of perjury. If the 
person is not being examined on oath but makes a false or 
misleading statement then that might attract liability under 
Clause 38(c). This particular provision provides that any 
person who makes any statement or gives any information to 
the Authority or any other person exercising powers under 
this Part of the Act commits an offence if that person does 
so knowing that the statement or information is false or 
misleading. 
The Authority has a number of powers in respect of the 
resolution of complaints or investigations, but when compared 
to the powers mentioned earlier, they are quite diluted. For 
instance, clause 18(3) provides that where "any complaint 
appears to the Authority to be capable of resolution by 
conciliation.... it may indicate that view to the 
Commissioner". 71 This softer approach is also reflected in 
other clauses. For instance, when forming an opinion, where 
the investigation was carried out by itself that the 
decision, recommendation, act, omission, conduct, policy, 
practice or procedure which was the subject matter of the 
investigation was contrary to law, unreasonable unjustified, 
unfair or undesirable, the Authority must form an opinion and 
may make recommendations. The recommendations might include 
a recommendation that disciplinary or criminal proceedings be 
considered against a member of police.
72 
In the case of a police investigation the Authority is 
required to form an 
report. It has the 
Commissioner. If 
opinion after considering the police 
ability to agree or disagree with the 
it disagrees with the Commissioner's 
decision or proposed decision, it may make such 
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recommendations, supported by reasons, as it thinks fit, 
including a recommendation that disciplinary or criminal 
proceedings be considered against any member of the police.
73 
In essence, the scope of the Authority's powers are very 
limited in respect of resolving matters. The nature of the 
language, "may indicate" and "recommend ... be considered", is 
weak when compared to the language dealing with the conduct 
of investigations, eg "direct" etc. This diluted ability has 
been intentionally designed so that the Authority's powers do 
not conflict with the Commissioner's stewardship of the 
police nor interfere with the Attorney-General's or the 
police discretion to prosecute. 
The Authority has a reserve power in cases where it seems 
that no adequate and appropriate action has been taken by the 
Commissioner. On these occasions, the Authority may send a 
copy of its opinion and recommendations on the matter, 
together with the comments of the Commissioner to the 
Attorney-General and the Minister of Police. 
74 It may also 
where it considers it appropriate transmit to the Attorney-
Gener al for tabling in the House of Representatives a report 
on any matter it thinks fit. 
75 These reserve powers are 
potentially strong safeguards. The failure by the 
Commissioner to implement a recommendation of the Authority 
would not attract any form of sanction under the offence 
provisions. Clause 38(b) refers to "refusing or failing to 
comply with any requirement of the Authority" this would not 
include refusing or failing to comply with any recommendation 
of the Authority. 
In summary the Authority has a number of powers, some of 
which are potentially coercive. However, those powers are 
only effective in a particular time frame in the existence of 
a complaint. Despite the recommendatory powers being 
somewhat diluted in comparison with the powers of direction, 
they are nevertheless supported by a number of reserve 
powers. What the Authority cannot achieve directly it may do 
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indirectly by taking the dispute to the political masters of 
the Commissioner. Such a deterrent power must ultimately 
enhance the integrity and standing of the Authority in the 
eyes of the public if it is so used. 
(ii) Commissioner of Police 
Function 
The Commissioner is the other central character in the 
complaints procedure. It is important to recall briefly the 
Commissioner's wider functions and duties under the Police 
Act in order to view the Authority/Commissioner relationship 
in perspective. The Commissioner is responsible to the 
Minister for the general administration and control of the 
police which includes causing all members of the police to 
discharge their duties to the Government and the public, 
satisfactorily and efficiently. 
The Bill does not interfere with the Commissioner's duty to 
control the police. 
from 
Nor 
commencing 
shall 
or 
anything prevent the 
Commissioner continuing a police 
investigation in to any complaint, i nc iden t or other matter. 
But the Commissioner will no longer have the final word in 
the investigation and resolution of complaints since all 
police decisions will be reviewed. 
Duties - Complaints 
The Commissioner has a duty to notify the Authority of every 
complaint received by the police.
76 Clause 21 then imposes a 
duty on the Commissioner who sha 11 as soon as practicable, 
and in no case later than 3 months after the completion of a 
police investigation into a complaint, report 
Authority whether the complaint has been upheld. If 
to the 
it has 
been upheld, the Commissioner must specify what action has 
been taken or is proposed to be taken to rectify the matter. 
The 
been 
Commissioner 
settled by 
also has to report whether the matter has 
conciliation.
77 If requested by the 
Authority the Commissioner is obliged to provide information 
1 
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and assistance necessary for the Authority to function 
effectively in its investigation of a complaint.
78 Following 
a review by the Authority, who has formed an opinion and made 
a recommendation, the Commissioner is required to as soon as 
reasonably practicable, 
any) proposed to be 
notify the Authority of action 
taken to qive effect to 
(if 
the 
recommendation. Alternatively, the Commissioner must give 
reasons for any proposed departure from or non implementation 
f h d .
 79 
o any sue recommen at1on. 
The Commissioner can also consult with the Authority on the 
proposals for action before actually reporting to the 
Authority. 80 The Commissioner also has the abi 1 i ty to ask 
the Authority to investigate any particular complaint.
81 The 
Commissioner still has a discretion to resolve any 
1 · 82 a d' t· f t f 11 comp a1nt an a 1scre 10n to re use o o ow a 
d t . f h A h . 
83 h recommen a 10n o t e ut or1ty. Te powers are not 
subjected to any er i ter ia except that the Commissioner must 
take ultimate responsibility for any particular course of 
action. 
Incidents 
In respect of incidents, the Commissioner is compelled to, as 
soon as practicable, give notice to the Authority setting out 
particulars of an incident in which death or serious injury 
has been caused or appears to have been caused by a member of 
police acting in the execution of the member's duty.
84 A 
second duty arises when he is requested by the Authority, he 
must provide all information and assistance necessary for the 
Authority to function effectively in its investigation of an 
. . . 85 1nvest1gat1on. 
threat 
context. 
upon 
Other Matters 
the 
These 
police 
two requirements 
and are quite 
do not 
logical 
impose any 
in their 
Should the Commissioner request the Authority to investigate 
any matter which is not the subject of a complaint or an 
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incident as con temp la ted by the Bi 11 then the request is 
brought within the sphere of clause 13(l)(c). The procedure 
of investigation is the same as that for a complaint. 
(iii) Chief Ombudsman 
The Chief Ombudsman does not have any functions or duties 
prescribed by the Bi 11. However, the Chief Ombudsman can 
request the opinion of the Authority on whether an 
investigation into a complaint or other matter impinges on 
the jurisdiction of the Authority. 86 Secondly, the Chief 
Ombudsman can at the request of the Authority have any 
complaint or other matter relating to police investigated by 
an Ombudsman. 
87 
The difficulty with this latter power is determining under 
which legislation will the Ombudsman operate? Although this 
Bill is modelled on the Ombudsmen Act 1975 and the powers 
conferred upon the Authority are in most respects identical, 
the office of the Authority has been devised with care to 
balance all the interests concerned. An intrusion by the 
Ombudsman might be seen to upset that balance. 
(iv) Complainants 
Under the Bill, the aggrieved parties have no functions 
duties or powers. However the Bill statutorily recognises 
the complainant's right to make a complaint against the 
police. The Bill provides a credible system where complaints 
are received, considered, investigated and resolved 
satisfactorily, although this may not necessarily be to the 
complainant's satisfaction. 
1 . bl k 1 . 1 · 
88 
Comp ainants are a e to ma e an ora or written comp aint 
alleging any misconduct or neglect of duty by any member of 
1 . 89 i·f h 1 · t · ff a · 1 po ice, or, t e comp ainan is a ecte in a persona 
capacity the comp la in t can concern any practice policy or 
d f h 1 · 
90 f h 1 · · d proce ure o t e po ice. I t e comp aint is ma e orally 
it must be reduced to writing. 
91 The Bill provides two 
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additional facilities for complainants to use in making their 
complaints which are not available under the existing system. 
Currently a complainant can make a complaint to any member of 
police
92 
or to an Ombudsman. 93 The new process provides that 
if a complaint is in writing then a Registrar or Deputy 
Registrar of any District Court can receive it and forward it 
94 
on. The second facility is that a complaint can be 
directly to the Authority itself. 95 Since it is anticipated 
that the Authority will likely be domiciled in Wellington 
with a Deputy Authority in Auckland, only residents in those 
cities are likely to have the advantage (unless complainants 
are prepared to travel) of making an oral complaint direct to 
the Authority. 
If a complaint is made to the police, the Commissioner has a 
d t f . f ' . t h A h . 96 U . f u y o not1 y1ng 1 to t e ut or1ty. pon receipt o _ a 
complaint the Authority is required to considered how it 
should be addressea. 97 Whatever procedure the Authority 
adopts the complainant must be advised as soon as 
practicable. 98 It might be that upon an indication from the 
Authority to the Commissioner and with the willing 
participation of the complainant and the subject officer the 
Commissioner will arrange for the matter to be resolved by 
·1 · . 99 conc1 1at1on. 
If the Authority decides to take no further action in 
accordance with Section 19, eg the complainant has had 
knowledge of the subject matter longer than 12 monthslOO or 
the complaint is frivolous
1 or it appears to the Authority 
that, if as a result of a police investigation or a report of 
2 such, no further act ion is necessary or appropriate; the 
Authority shall inform the complainant of that decision and 
f 
. 3 
reasons or 1t. 
If the complainant's grievance is outside the Authority's 
jurisdiction, the complainant will be advised in writing
4 and 
informed that the complainant has a right to make a complaint 
under the Ombudsmen Act 1975. 5 If so requested by the 
complainant the Authority is bound to forward the complaint 
6 
to an Ombudsman. 
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If the Authority elects to investigate any matter itself the 
complainant shall be informed.
7 However , the complainant has 
no right to be heard by the Authority
8 and if the complainant 
is heard it will not be in a public forum .
9 It is likely the 
compla i nant could during the course of an investigation be 
d d . d oath.
10 P h th 1 . t summonse an examine on er aps , e comp a1nan 
may also be required to produce documents or other things 
relevant to the subject matter of the investigation .
11 
Once a complainant is summonsed to give information that 
h h . ·1 . . C 
12 d person as t e same pr1v1 eges as a witness 1n ourt an 
will not be out of pocket for attending an investigation .
13 
Nor will the complainant be the subject of adverse comment 
unless that he or she has been given an opportunity to be 
heard . 14 Any information given to the Authority will not be 
given in evidence in Court or in any inquiry
15 or other 
16 
proceedings and its confidentiality is preserved. 
Throughout the Authority ' s investigation the complainant may 
b · d f · 17 b · 1 h e appraise o its progress ut certain y at t e 
conclusion of the investigation the complainant will be 
advised of the result in an appropriate manner .
18 
Upon the completion of an investigation the Authority is 
required to form an opinion on the subject matter of the 
investigation and make any recommendations it thinks fit . 
Perhaps a recommendation might include some form of monetary 
compensation to the complainant. Whatever the recommendation 
the complaint must rely on the Authority to defend his or her 
· t t 19 If th C . . f . 1 t . 1 t 1n eres s. e omm1ss1oner a1 s o imp emen a 
recommendation the complainant is not restrained from taking 
the complaint to another forum .
20 
If a complainant is dissatisfied with the activities of the 
Authority , the complainant can only get a judicial review of 
the matter if the complaint can show that the Authority acted 
in bad faith . 
.. 
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( V) Subject Police Officers 
Police officers who are the subject of a complaint have no 
functions, duties or powers under the Bill. They do have 
some rights and interests preserved though. 
A great deal depends on the Authority and how the Authority 
wishes to proceed with a complaint, incident or other matter. 
If the Authority elects to investigate a matter itself 
pursuant to Clause 25, the subject officer is not necessarily 
informed by the Authority
21 nor is the officer entitled as of 
right to be heard. 2
2 The subject officer will not be the 
23 
centre of a public spectacle, which is particularly 
important , if the officer is exonerated by the investigation. 
The Officer may be summonsed, examined on oath and required 
to give information or produce documents or things. Clause 
27(1) provides that subject officers have the same privileges 
in relation to the giving of information or the production of 
documents or things, as a witness does in Court. 
Consequently an officer can invoke the right to silence on 
the grounds of self incrimination. But the officer cannot 
refuse to give information or produce any document or thing 
on the ground that compliance would breach an obligation or 
non disclosure imposed upon any enactment. Nor can the 
officer withhold any document or refuse to answer any 
question on the ground that disclosure of the document or the 
answering of the quest ion would be injurious to the public 
interest except if the officer produces a certificate from 
the Prime Minister or Attorney-General. 
Thus in order to establish a free flow dialogue the subjects 
of the investigation are encouraged to divulge information to 
the Authority and to that extent their interests are 
protected by Clause 27 (4). If the subject officer or for 
that matter any other person elects to make a statement or 
give information, that statement or information will not be 
admissible in evidence against the officer or any other 
person in any Court or in any inquiry or other proceeding.
24 
Nor wi 11 the Authority or any per son holding any off ice or 
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appointment under the Authority be called to give evidence in 
any forum in respect of anything corning to their knowledge 
th . f h ' f . 2 S Th h e exercise o t e1r unct1ons. ere are owever 
in 
two 
exceptions when information could be used against an officer. 
They involve cases where a charge of perjury or an offence 
against section 38 of the Act 26 has been laid. 
Whilst a police officer who is the subject of an 
investigation might never receive a progress report on the 
investigation 27 the Authority is obliged to inform the 
officer of the result as soon as reasonably practicable after 
h 1 . f . . . 28 t e cone us1on o 1nvest1gat1on. 
The subject officers interests 
extent that the Authority 
are also protected to 
only has the power 
the 
of 
recommendation, which may not necessarily be accepted by the 
Commissioner. Another important feature of the Bill is that 
rights of natural justice are preserved. The subject officer 
(or any other person) shall not be the subject of adverse 
comment unless that person has been given a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard.
29 
The Bill's emphasis then is to ascertain the true facts of a 
situation. That goal is sought to be achieved in a manner 
that is consonant with the interests of all parties. 
B Competing Interests 
There are three competing principal groups which have a vital 
interest in the design of the proposed complaints system. 
They are: 
(a) 
( b) 
the public whose benefit and protection are the 
primary objectives of the whole process; and 
members of the police who will be the subject of 
the process; and 
I 
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(c) the police profession itself which has a vested 
interest in ensuring the maintenance of high 
standards of professional conduct. 
Has the Bill attained the balance of these interests? In 
other words does the Bill operate in a manner which will be 
fair to all parties? Leigh said that it was important for a 
complaint procedure to: 
"be efficient and administered with integrity; it must 
be fair and just to both the Police and the public. 
It must provide machinery which is theoretically, and 
as far as possible practically, accessible to the 
public at large; it must be structured in such a way 
as to be conducive to public confidence in its 
integrity. This does not mean that it must respond to 
the dictates of some pure form of participatory 
democracy. It does mean that the procedure cannot be 
left wholly in the hands of the Police alone. In 
particular, there is an element of conflict among the 
various interests and, as so often happens, a 
reasonable solution represents a compromise between 
th .. 30 em. 
What aggrieved citizens want from a complaint's process is 
certainty, open and fair justice. But principally their 
basic desires are that their complaints be upheld, offenders 
a re punished and they receive some form of compensation, if 
it is appropriate. And they want the police to act properly 
in the future. The scheme of the Bill is aimed at 
accommodating these desires by providing complainants with an 
impartial scrutiny of their grievance. It is not expected 
that the Authority will make dramatic intrusions into the 
police. That would be counter-productive and perhaps 
diminish police members pride in their profession. From the 
police officers stance, the formal statutory procedures do 
preserve their basic rights. To do more than that would be 
unfair to the other interest groups. 
I 
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The Bi 11 is also fair to the police profess ion in another 
sense since it will no longer be involved in public debate of 
the shortcomings of the complaints system. The intervention 
of the Authority will attract any future criticisms relating 
to this process. Consequently the deflection of criticism 
may permit the police profession to foster a better community 
image. 
The very idea of an extension of democratic control of the 
police has been seen in some quarters amongst other concerns 
as an at tack upon the doctrine and practice of operational 
independence. For instance the New Zealand Pol ice 
Association which represents all police members up to the 
rank of senior sergeant commented in its February 1987 
newsletter that if the Bill is passed into law it will: 
II Usurp the Commissioner's authority over the service 
Remove the civil liberties of the members of the 
service 
- Impede the ability of all members to carry out their 
duties as an exercise of discretion will be under 
the cloud of the possible consequences 
subsequent complaint and will therefore 
dissension and indecision 
of a 
cause 
- Reduce the importance of the Off ice of [Constable] 
in the eyes of the public and will give any 
individual the machinery to threaten and frustrate 
police in the execution of duty
1131 
This highly emotive and alarmist piece of writing is in 
direct contrast to the Police Association's earlier publicly 
reported comment which implied acceptance of the monitor and 
its ability to raise management and policy issues with the 
Police Administration.
32 This attitude by the representative 
body of police officers is incompatible with the balance that 
the Bill seeks to attain. However the tenor of a subsequent 
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news letter 3 3 dealing with the proposed Authority was more 
subdued. A later article dee lar ed that the broad thrust of 
the Association's approach to the Justice and Law Reform 
Select Committee "was not to dismiss the Bill outright as 
this would be unrealistic - overseas experience shows that an 
independent authority at some time is inevitable". The 
submissions to the Select Commit tee were thus focussed on 
ensuring basic rights of Association members were protected 
and limitations were placed on the powers and functions of 
the Authority. In other words, according to the newsletter, 
"the B il 1 is s igni f ican tly lacking in su ff ic ien t safeguards 
for members and has given the Authority almost unlimited 
power". 
"offences" 
Their criticisms in part centre around the 
contained under the heading of "misconduct and 
reglect of duty", the lack of a right to be heard and the 
definition of "serious injury". Despite these criticisms, 
the Police Association seem to accept the concept of the 
Authority overall but some of the details give it cause for 
concern. 
Will the scheme be efficient? This 
still 
is really a matter for 
from conjecture. 
known facts. 
has operated 
However, one can draw conclusions 
The Bill is framed on the Ombudsmen Act which 
successfully for 24 years. That statutory 
office has attracted a great deal of praise for the manner in 
which it operates and there is no reason to doubt that the 
proposed scheme will not be as efficient. It is, after all, 
an appropriate means of judicially collating information and 
assessing evidence and reaching an opinion in an impartial 
manner. 
Will this proposed complaints process be credible in the eyes 
of the users as well as the general public? Any such scheme 
which removes from the dominant control of the police the 
sole investigatory and decision making roles must be seen to 
be legitimate. The openness of the scheme operated by an 
external specialist with a brief, in part, to ensure the 
police is held accountable to the community, must provide the 
complaints system with a great deal of credibility. Police 
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officers who are treated in a judicial matter by an impartial 
monitor cannot ask for anything more. The police have been 
involved in the construction and design of the proposed 
scheme and thus, to the extent of its i nf 1 uence, guarantees 
police acceptability of the new process. The police 
organisation's capacity for effective self regulation too 
must also be enhanced and it has much to gain from the 
favourable testimony of an external monitor. 
In sum, the Bill which is the product of compromise, is 
likely to achieve an appropriate balance to meet the needs of 
the three principal interest groups. 
C Nature of Legislation 
The texture of the legislation specifically retains the 
protection afforded by the principles of natural justice. 
Indeed the legislature has prescribed a set of procedural 
safeguards which guarantee the pr ese rva t ion of the right of 
natural justice. 
Another feature of the legislation is that external control 
has not been substituted for internal control. Control 
remains with the police for reasons apart from the statutory 
responsibilities of the Commissioner. Firstly the police 
know more about what they are doing than an external 
investigator. External supervision could only, at best, be 
superficial because of the ability of officers to conceal 
what they doing. Secondly the police organisation has a more 
extensive, subtle and discriminating set of controls over its 
members which external agencies can not provide. In addition 
to the formal disciplinary punishments invo 1 v ing promotions 
and postings, it can exhort, slight, harangue, praise or 
embarrass. In the third place, internal controls can operate 
more effectively to prevent errors before they occur and then 
can operate to anticipate and avoid mistakes. If left to 
external controls, remedial action would likely be 
implemented after mistakes had been made. Finally, the 
police are a tightly knit community who willingly respond to 
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discipline imposed by the organisation. This response would 
perhaps be less apparent with an external means of control. 
XII. FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
There are a number of features of the proposed system which 
are worthy of comment. Firstly, the Bill institutionalises a 
new police complaints process with independent overseer with 
an array of powers. The legislation not only superimposes on 
the existing system an external oversight mechanism but it 
also considerably amplifies the means of receiving and 
investigating complaints against the police. The legislation 
has implanted a specialised mechanism of control created 
exclusively to deal with the police. This body is 
complemented by the Office of the Ombudsmen (whose 
effectiveness is limited) as well as the Justice and Law 
Reform Committee. The police will now be subject to scrutiny 
by three specialist regulatory agencies. 
The proposed system is a marked departure from the existing 
one. It establishes a review procedure which satisfies the 
demand that justice should not only be done but seen to be 
done. The police will no longer have the dominant control of 
investigation of complaints. Within its jurisdiction the 
Authority will be competent of performing investigations. It 
will also become involved in a complaint almost immediately, 
no matter where the complaint is made, and thus will monitor 
the complaint ab initio. 
Secondly, the Authority is not restricted to investigating 
complaints of misconduct by individual police officers. The 
Bill also introduces and institutionalises a facility whereby 
certain aggrieved citizens can complain about any police 
practice, policy or procedure. Perhaps with the advent of 
this specialist reviewer the Justice and Law Reform Committee 
will be less likely to invoke their powers of scrutinizing 
police policies. 
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Thirdly, the Bill institutionalises a facility whereby the 
permanent monitor can investigate of its own motion any 
incident involving death or serious injury apparently caused 
by a police officer iri the execution of his or her duty. In 
the past various senior legal practitioners have been 
appointed on an ad hoe basis to carry out investigations. 
To other subsidary points can be made. Fourthly, the 
Authority performs a credibility function. It is more than a 
symbolic gesture in this area of concern with the police. 
And finally the flexibility of the proposed legislation 
places an emphasis of co-operation between the principal 
actors which is essential if the new system is to function 
effectively. 
XIII. CONCLUSION 
How to best ensure police accountability has been a simmering 
point within the community for some time. It has developed 
in part from the traditional concerns to limit the powers of 
the state and more particularly those servants of the State 
who exercise wide coercive powers. It has also sprung from 
the need to safeguard the interests and freedom of the 
individual citizen. The police, because they are charged 
with the maintenance of law and order and protecting lives 
and property, are perhaps the most privileged, ( because of 
their exercise of wide discretionary powers) but certainly 
one of the most important, servants of the State. 
Consequently a higher standard of conduct is expected of a 
police off ice r than that of the general public. But the 
existing complaints procedures have failed to attract 
widespread public confidence in its utility and there is no 
guarantee that the police are maintaining the higher standard 
of conduct. It is also the nature of the police profession 
that criticisms will also be directed at the police 
administration itself, rightly or wrongly for actions taken 
by it or the tactics and methods employed to deal with a 
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policing situation. Currently, aggrieved citizens do not 
have an effective facility to satisfy complaints concerning 
wider policy issues or police practices and procedures 
generally. 
In developing the described processes, constitutional changes 
to the police status has been resisted. The operational 
autonomy and independence which has avoided effective 
accountability processes in the past has now been contained 
and will be monitored. In this sense the Bill addresses the 
confused nature of the constitutional status by impliedly 
recognising the ef feet the common law has in supplementing 
the statute law. The proposed legislation seeks to regulate 
it by institutionalising the specialist body to hold the 
police more readily accountable. The strong claim of 
accountability to the law which created the impression the 
police were carrying out a quasi-judicial role is not 
supplanted but refocused. The police who basically exercise 
an executive type function will now be subjected to a more 
rigorous democratic control. 
The Labour Government in developing a competent process for 
handling citizen complaints about police conduct or methods 
has tapped an ever increasing mood in the community which 
asserts that it is reasonable and necessary to have the 
police account more to the public. The Authority will 
provide concerned and aggrieved citizens with an effective 
forum to voice their legitimate misgivings about the police. 
Individual officers will become more identifiably accountable 
since the process w i 11 ensure that violations of the law -
especially abuses of rights are discovered and prevented, in 
a more impartial fashion. 
Since external supervision can never be a substitute for 
effective internal controls the Authority does not displace 
the police organisations disciplinary processes. The police 
themselves must maintain active responsibility for self 
regulation and maintenance of performance standards. However 
the Authority is superimposed upon the existing discipline 
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framework which will be modified to the extent it 
accommodates the Authority and embodies the principles of the 
Act. 
The Police Complaints Authority will be a centralised 
independent body created without the concession of structural 
decentralisation. It is not within the contemplation of the 
framer's of the Bill, that the oversight function be a 
costly, cumbrous and bureaucratic machine whose purpose is to 
undermine police morale, usurp the Commissioner's function 
and disappoint an expectant public. Framed with the 
successful South Australian model in mind the Authority will 
be responsible for exerting a combination of S?ecialised 
political and bureaucratic supervision over the Police. The 
structure of the proposed statutory officer means that it 
will likely operate at an individual level in a very personal 
fashion. 
Upon taking office the Authority will need to grasp the 
com?lexities of the legislation and its administration, 
become aware of the issues which need continuing attention 
and develop systems. Part of the challenging introduction to 
the office will be the employment of staff acceptable to all 
parties, the establishment of a formal structure and 
development of a functional administration. Since the Bill 
has not been designed to be a code the Authority will need to 
develop rules and procedures to be incorporated into 
subordinate legislation to supplement the administration of 
the system in accordance with principles of the Act . 
Whilst the Authority will be operating at two levels eg 
dealing with allegations of individual injustices and 
scrutinizing wider policy issues and processes, one other 
integral part to the Authority's unwritten mandate requires 
discussion. That is the Authority also has an educative 
function. It will need to set in motion and maintain 
programmes that inform both members of the public and the 
police their rights and responsibilities under the Act. At 
the same time the Authority needs to market the new statutory 
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office. It will also need to establish regular channels of 
communication with diverse groups and agencies in the 
community as well as establishing ongoing communication with 
the police management. Therefore, it should be in a position 
at any time to gauge public views on relevant issues. In so 
functioning, the Authority wil 1 need to develop the capacity 
to familiarise both the police and the community with the 
expectations that each may reasonably have of each other. 
Facilitating dialogue in the manner expected will prevent 
situations of misunderstanding and hostility. Overall, the 
Bill provides the opportunity for excellent police/community 
relations. The design of the legislative scheme will 
certainly provide police management with information 
regarding existing discipline problems and community concerns 
which will enable it to take remedial action early. 
New Zealand 
complex rules 
It has also 
legislation is 
and procedures 
the advantage 
free 
of 
of 
Comparatively speaking the 
from much of the overly 
overseas jurisdictions. 
avoiding the tokenism and shortcomings which are evident in 
some of the Commonwealth schemes. 
One of the greatest achievements of the Bill is that a 
consensus has been reached on a matter of considerable 
significance to the administration of justice in the New 
Zealand community. The police are an instrument of the state 
and an agent of the community. It is right that it is 
supervised to ensure it does not become a law unto itself. 
The Government has fulfilled its democratic mandate by 
ensuring that in the final analysis the police are not 
autonomous and the Government is in "control" of the police 
and accountable for it. 
There will always be individuals or groups polarised to the 
police and who regard the police as an anathema. They will 
undoubtedly not be satisfied by the Bill. But all in all the 
Bill goes some way to alleviating existing tensions between 
the community and the police. Mutual aggrandisement will 
likely be achieved and the credibility gap between the 
community and the police will be bridged by the authority. 
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An upgraded image is particularly essential for police 
acceptance in the community. Perhaps the independent 
~uthority can revive the atmosphere of mutual trust, 
confidence and respect which has diminished over the years. 
This statutory proposal then is a necessary bold new reform 
and it a major contribution towards a truly effective system 
of community policing. 
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A BILL INTITULED 
An Act to make beter provision for the inve1tigation and 
resolution of complaints against the Poli« by 
establishing an independent Police Complainu Authority, and to amend the Police Act 1968 5 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New ZeaJ~d as folows: 
I. Short Tide and commentmcnt-(1) This Act may ~ 
cited as the Police Complaints Authority and Mi.sceUanrow 
Amendments Act 1987. 
(2) This Act shaJI come into force on the 28th day after the 10 
date on which it receives the Governor-General's assent. 
PART l 
POLICE COMPLAINTS Al!T1-iORJTY 
2. Interpretation-In this Pl't of this Act, unless the context 
otherwise re9uires, - I 5 "Authonty" means the Police Complaints Authority 
established under NCton 4 of this Act: 
"Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Police 
appointed under the Police Act 1958: 
"Deputy Authority" means the person appointed as the 20 deputy to the Police Complaints Authority under 
section 8 of this Act. 
!. Act to bind the Crown-This Part of this Act shal bind 
the Crown. 
Polia ComplainlJ A uthonty 2 5 
4. Police Complaints Authority-(1) There shal be an 
authority to be known as the Police Complaints Authority. 
l_J 
(7) Tht' Authonty shall br a pnson appointed by thr 
<;ovemor General !JO tht.· recommendation of lht House of 
Rrprrst'nlativ('s . . . 
tJ) No person shall lJ< ' .t1'po111t<·d as thr Authonty unless that 
.S ~rson-(a) Is yuahfi('d as a barn!>t<·r or solicitor of thr High Court; 
and 
(b) Possesses ,;uitahlc lq?,,tl cxpericncc for the task . 
(4) The appointancnt of a .Judge as the Authority shall not 
10 affect the Judge's tenure of judicial office, rank. t11lc, st~tus, 
precedence, salary . ann11al or other ~llowances , or othe~ nghts 
or privileges ,u a J11dgt" (mclu<lmg ,~attcrs rclaung to 
superannuation) ,md. for all purpos~s, service by a Judge as the 
Authority shall be tak<·n to he service as a Judge_. . 
15 (5) No person shall be deemed to be employed m the service 
of the Crown for the purposes of the State Services Act 1962 or_ 
the Govrmment Superannuation Fund Act 1956 by reason ol 
that ~rson's appointment as the Authority. 
5. Tenn of office of Authority-(l) Every person 
20 apPointrd as the Authority shall be appointed for a term o! 
not less thilll 2 yean and not more than 5 years. and may be 
reappointed 
(2) Every person appointed as the ~uth~rity shall. unless 
sooner vacating office by death, res1gnauon, removal, or 
25 failure to be confirmed in officr under section 7 (3) of this Act, 
continue to hold office, notwithstanding the expiry of that 
person's term of appointment, until-
(a) Reappoinunent as the Authority; or 
(b) Appoinuncnt of a ~11cre~sor; or ,o (c) The person is informed in _ writing by the M_inister of 
Justice that the person 1s not to be reappomted and 
1s not to hold office until a successor is appointed. 
(S) The pr.rson appoi~ted as the _Authority~ . . 
(a) May resign the ofl,ce at any time by written nouce gwen 
,5 to the Governor G<"ncral: 
(b) Shall resign the office on auaining the age of 7 2 years. 
6. Power to remove or suspend Authority-The person 
appoum:d as the Authority may be removed or suspended 
from office by the Govemor·General, u_pon an address from 
40 lhe House of Representatives, for disability, bankruptcy, 
neglect of duty, or misconduct . 
l_J L.....J 
7. Filling of vacancy---(!) Where any vacancy occurs in the 
otlice of Authority, th<: vacancy shall, subject to subsection 12) of 
this section, be filled by th<' appointment of a successor by the 
Governor-General on the rr< ornmendation of the House of 
Representatives. 5 
(2) Where-
(al A vacan<"y o<"curs whil<' Parliament is not in session, or 
exists at the close of a session; an<l 
(b) The House of Representatives has not recommended an 
appointment to fill the vacancy. - l 0 
the va,ancy may. at any rime before the commencement of 
the n<"Xt ensuing st"ssion of Parliament, be filled by the 
appointment of a successor by the Governor-General in 
Council . 
(3) Any appointment made under auba_ection (2) of this section 15 
shall lapse and the office shall again become vacant unless. 
before the end of the 24th sitting day of the House of 
Representatives following the date of the appointment, the 
House confirms the appointment. 
8. Deputy Polic~ Complaints Authoriry-( l) There may 20 
from time to time be appointed a deputy to the ~non 
appointed as the Police Complaints Authority, who, subject to 
the control of the Authority, shall have and may exercise all 
the powers, duties, and functions of the Authority under this 
Act. 25 
(2) The Deputy Authority shall be appointed in the same 
manner as the Authority, and section• 4 to 7 of this Act shall 
apply 10 the Deputy Authority in the same manner as they 
apply to the Authority. 
(3) On the occurrence from any cause of a vacancy in the !O 
office of Authority, and in case of the absence from duty of the 
person appointed as the Authority (from whatever cause 
arising), and for so long as any such vacancy or absence 
continues, the Deputy Authority shall have and may exercise 
all the powers, duties, and functions of the Authority . ,5 
(4) The fact that the Deputy Authority exercises any power. 
duty, or function of the Authority shall be conclusive evidence 
of his or her authority to do so. 
9. Oath to be taken by Authoriry and Deputy 
Authority-< I) Before entering up<>n the exercise of duties 40 
under this A<"t, every penon appouued as the Authority, or as 
L.....J '--1 
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Deputy Authority, shJll take an oath that he vr she will 
faithfully and impartially perfonr~ the duties?'. that office . and 
will not, except m accordance with the prov1s1ons of tlus Art. 
divulge any iuformation received uy that pc, son unJ('I I l1i~ 
5 Act. 
(2) The oath !.hall be administered by the Speaker or 1hr 
Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
10. Salaries and allowanccs-(1) Th<"rC shall UC' paid 10 dH' 
Authoricy and the Deputy Authority-
10 (a) A salary at such rate as the Higher Salaries Commi'.:>sion 
from time co time determines; and 
(b) Such allowances as are from time to cime determined by 
the Higher Salaries Commission. 
(2) There shall also be paid to the Authority and the Dcp11ty 
15 Authority, in respect of time spent in travelling in the exercise 
of their functions, travelling allowances and expenses 111 
accordance with the Fees and Travelling Allowances Act 1951 . 
and the provisions of that Act shall apply accordingly as if' the 
Authority or the Deputy Authority were a member ol a 
20 statutory Board and the travelling were in the service of the 
statutory Board . 
11. Staff-( I) Subject tO the prov1s1ons of this section, the 
Authority may appoint such officers and employees as may bt 
necessary for the efficient carrying out of i1s functions, powrrs, 
2.S and duties under this Act. 
(2) The number of pnsom that rnay be appointed 11n<1c1 tlm 
section, whether generally 01 in respect of any spcnllcJ d111ws 
or class of duties, shall from time to time be dctermi11cd by I h<" 
Minister of justice. 
30 (3) Officers a.nd employ<.'es appointed undn subsection 11) nf 
this section shall be employ<"d on such te~rns and rnnd11 iom ol 
employment a.nd shall he parc.l such salanes ;ind allowancn ,1!-. 
the Authority from time to tirnc determines ,n agreement w11 h 
the State Services Commission, or as the Minister of J11'>t1< r 
35 from time to time determines in any case where the Authori ty 
and the Seate Services Commission fail to agree. · 
(1) No person shall be deemed to be employed in the service 
of the Crown for the purposes of the State Services Acr 1962 or 
the Govrmment Superannuation Fund Act 1956 by reason of 
40 that person's appointment under this section . 
~ - . !. -... J..r-····-~· / - L..d 
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12. Superannuation or retiring allowances of Aut~oriry, 
Deputy ·Authority, and staff-for the purpose of prov1din_g a 
sup<"rannuation fund or retiring allowance for the Authority. 
the Deputy Authority, and any onicer or employee _of the 
Authority, sums by way of subsidy rnay from tune to ume be 5 
paid into any scheme under the National Provident Fund Act 
1950 containing provision for employer subsidy or into any 
o~her employer-subsidised sche~<" approvt"d by tl,e Minister of 
Finance for the purposes of 1h1s sec11on . 
FunctionJ of Authority 
IS. Functions of Authority-( I) The functions of the 
Authority shall be-
(a) To receive complaims-
(i) Alleging any misconduct or neglect of duty by 
any member of the Police; or 
lO 
15 
(ii) Concerning any practiu. palicy. or procedure 
of the Police affecting the person or body of penons 
making the complaint in a personal capacity: 
(b) To investigate of its own motion. where i, is satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds to carry out an 20 
investigation in the public interest, any incident 
involving death or serious injury notified to the 
Authority by the Commissioner under NCtion 14 of 
this Act: 
(c) To take such action in respect of complaints. incidenu. 75 
and other matters as is (ont("mplated by this Act 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this S("Ction shall authorise the 
Authority to investigate any matter rrlatin~ to tht" terms and 
conditions of S("1-vice of any p("rson a,; a rn('mb("r of the Police. 
14. Duty of Commissioner to notify Authority of ccnain ,o 
incidents involving death or serious injury-Wher<" a 
member of the Police acting in the execution of the member's 
duty causes, or appears 10 have caused, d<"ath or serious injury 
w any person, the Commissioner shall as soon as practicable 
give to the Authority a wriHen notice setting out particulars of ,~ 
the incident in which the death or serious injury was caused. 
15. Mode of complaint-()) A complaint may ~ made 
either orally or in writing. 
(2) A complaint made orally shall be reduced to writing as 
soon a~ practicable. 40 
5 
10 
l'ullcr Compla111/1 11 uthuril) 1111d 
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(~) A complaint rnay be made 10 the Authority, to any 
member ol th<' Police. 10 an Ornbudslllan, or, where the 
complaint is in writing. to the Registrar or Deputy Registrar of" 
any District Court. 
(4) Any Ombudsman or R<'gistrar or Deputy Registrar to 
whom a complaint is made shall forward it 10 the Authority as 
soon as possible. 
(5) Notwithstanding any p1ov1s1on in any enactrn<'n!, where 
any \euer appearing 10 be written by or on behalf of_- . 
(a) A p<'r~on in : 11-.tody on a charge or after c onv1c11011 of 
any ul1c1H c : or 
(b) A pa11~·n1 of ,111y hospital within the rncani111-1, ol the 
Mental I lc;dtl1 Act 1964,-
is addrcs-;<.'cl 10 11.c t\111hori1y. 1hc pcr~on for the 1i111t· lH'in~ in 
15 charge of 1hc place or in-.titution _v,herc . the person 1s 111 
custody or t'> .1 p.1tic111 ~hall 11nmcd1a1ely lorward th<' kttn. 
unopened, 10 the Authority. 
16. Duly of Commissioner to notify Authority of 
complaints - The Crnn1ni.,sioncr ~hall notify the Authority ol 
20 every cnrnpl,1i,_,, r< ·< ('iv<"d_ by the Police, othcr _than a complaint 
notified to the Co1n1n,.,.,,o,H·r liy the Authority . 
17. Oury of Authority to notify Commissioner of 
complaints-The Authority <,hall notify the Commissioner of 
every complaint recc1,cd by it , other than a complaint notified 
25 lO it by the Co111rrns~1oner. 
18. Action upon receipt of complaint-( I) On rece1v1ng 
or bein!; no11finl of ., c 01npl.1i11t 11ndC"r this Act, 1hc Authority 
may <lo ,1.II LH .my ol the followi1q.!, : 
(a) Investigate the complaint itself. whether or not th<.: Police 
30 have co1nrnenced a Police investigation: 
(b) Defer action until the receipt of a Police report on a 
Polic..c investigation of 1hc complaint : 
(c) Oversee a PoliC<.: investigation of the complaint: 
(d) Decide, in accordance with section 19 of this Act, to take 
35 no action on the complaint. 
(2) The Authority shall, as soon a~ practicable, advise th_e 
Cornmi~sioncr and the complainant of the procedure ll 
proposes lO adopt under subsection (1) of this section. 
(3) Where any complaint appears to the Authority_ lO be 
40 capable of resolution by concili.ation in accordance with any 
,--------, 
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J10L1a Cu111pl,w1t.1 11 utlw11l)' ,.md 
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genei-al instructions issued under section 30 of the Police Act 
1958, it m:ty indicate that view to the Commissioner. 
19. Authority may decide to take no action on 
complaint-(!) The Authority may in its discretion decide to 
take no action, or, as the case may require, no further anion, 5 
on any complaint if-
(a) The complaint relates to a mauer of which the person 
alleged to be aggrieved has had knowledge for more 
than 12 months before the complaint was made; or 
(h) In the opinion of the Authority- 10 
(i) The subjccunatter of th<' complaint is trivial; or 
(ii) The complaint i~ frivolous or vexatious or ,s not 
llladc in huod faith; nr 
(iii) The pcr~on alkgc<l to l>c aggri<.:vcd do<.'S nOl 
desire that action be r a ken 01. as the case may be, 15 
continued; or 
(iv) The identity of the complainant is unknown 
and investigation of the complaint would thereby be 
substantially impeded; or 
(v) There is in all the circumstances an adequate 20 
remedy or right of appeal. other than the rit;,ht to 
petition the House of Represcntativ<.:s, which it 
would be reasonable for the person alleged to be 
aggrieved to exercise . 
(2) The Authority may decide not to take any further action 25 
on a complaint if, in the course of the investigation of the 
complaint by the Authority or the Police, or as a result of the 
Police report on a Police investigation, it appears to the 
Authority that, having regard to all the circumstances of the 
cast:, any further anion is unnecessary or inappropriate. 30 
(3) In any case where the Authority decides to take no 
action, or no further action, on a complaint, it shall inform the 
complainant of that decision and the reasons for it. 
20. Subsequent powers in relation to complaint-The 
Authority may at any time- 35 
(a) Review a Police investigation of a complaint: 
(b) Decide to investigate a complaint itself: 
(c) Wher~ it . oversees a ~olice inve~tigation, give such 
d1rect1ons to the Police concerning the investigation 
as it thinks fit: 40 
(d) Direct the Police to re·open an investigation, and 
thereafter oversee the investigation: 
P.Jlzce Complaml5 A uthorit_-v rind 
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9 
(el Direct ,he Police 10 rcc,msidcr their propo~als for anion 
on a <..omplainr : 
(0 Decide, m accordance with section 19 of this An. to take no 
further anion on the complaint: 
5 (g) Decide ~hat no action by the Authority is required on the 
ground that it considers that the outcome of a Polic<.' 
inves1iga1ion is satisfactory . 
21. Duty of Police to repon to Authority on Police 
investigation of complaint-( I) The Police shall as soon as 
10 practicable, and in no cas(" later than 3 months, after the 
completion of a Police inves1igation of a complaint, report to 
the Authority-
(a) Whether the (ornplair11 has uccn 11phdd and, if so. what 
action has been taken or is proposed to be taken LO 
15 rectify 1he rna11er : 
(bl Whether the complaint has been settled by conciliation. 
(2) When reporting to the Au1hori1y under this section. 1hc 
Police shall supply to the Au1hori1y accompanying material 
sufficien1 10 enable the Al1tl1u11ty 10 a~5c~s the adcqlla,y of 1hc 
20 Police i11ves1ig,Hio11 . 
(3) The Police ,nay to11~1il1 the A111hori1y on their proposals 
for anion on a complaint before rcpon,ng IO the Authority 
under tht~ sec11on . 
22. Commissioner to provide infonnation and 
25 assistance at request of Authority-( I) The Commissioner 
shall, where the Au1hon1y so requests, provide to 1he 
Authority all such inforrna1ion and a~sistance as is necessary 
for the proper perforrnanc e by I he Authority of its functions in 
relation to its investigaiion of any complaint. incident, or other 
30 matler under this Ac!. 
(2) Where tht" Authonty oversees a Police investigation of a 
complaint, the Commissioner shall. where- the Authority so 
requests. provide 10 che Authority-
fa) Any or all information in the possession or under the 
35 control of the Police that is relevant to the complaint : 
(b) A report on the progress of the investigation. 
25. Power of Police to investigate complaints and other 
matten-( I) Nothing in this Act shall prevent the 
Commissioner from commencing or continuing a Police 
investigation into any complaint, incident, or other matter. 
L.....J 
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('.l) II. t'ith<.'r bdore or alte, the co1nmenccment of a Police 
invt'stigation. 1.he Cuinrnissioner forms the view I hat the 
complaint. inci<lcnt, or other matter should be investigated by 
the Authority, the Commissioner may request the Authority to 
do so. 5 
24 . Procedure where complaint or other matter appears 
to be outside jurisdiction of Authority-( I) Wht>rf" a 
complaint has been rcU'iv('(i by or notified to the Authority. 
and it appears 10 the Authority 1hat it has no jurisdiction tO 
investigate the complailll, the Authority shall- I 0 
(a) Notify the cornpl.1inan1 in writing accordingly; and 
(u) lnfor111 the complainant of 1he righ1 to make a complaint 
un<lcr 1hc O,nuu<lsrncn An 1975; and 
(<.) Where the cornplainarll so requests. forward the 
complaint to an Ombudsman. 15 
('.l) The Chief Ombudsman 111.1y. in rc~pect of any complaint 
or other 111a11cr 1cla1ing to the Police. rctp1<'Sl the opinion of 
1he A111hori1y on "'·hc1hcr an irnT'itigat,on into that complaint 
or othn 111.111n i~ within thc j111 ,~Jinion of the Authority. and 
Ill<' A11thonty ~hall. .1" ,0011 ,1, pr ani, able. notify the Chief '.ZO 
0111lmd~111,111 in ,,-ri1i11h ul 11, \I('\\' . 
('.1) The Authority 111ay al any I imc. by notice in writing 10 
the Chief Omuudsrnan . rcquesl 1ha1 any complaint or other 
111a1tcr relating co 1hc Polin· be investigated by an 
Ombudsman. 25 · 
Pruceedmg5 of A uthonly 
25. Proceedings of Authority-( I) Before proceeding tO 
invcstigat<.' any matter under this Act the Authority shall 
inform lhe Commissioner, 1he complainant (if any), and, unless 
the in1ercsts of justice 01herwise require. any person alleged lO 30 
be aggrieved (if not the complainanl) of its intention to make 
the investiga1ion. 
(1) Every invrstigation by the AULhority under this Act shall 
be conducted in private. 
(3) Subject to section 33 of this Act.- 35 
(a) The Authority may hear or obtain information from such 
persons as it chinks fit, including, where it considers 
that cultural matters are a factor relevant to a 
complaint or investigation, information from such 
persons as the Authority thinks have knowledge or 40 
t>xperience in those matters: 
~ '----I ~ '--1 '--1 
J'o/// r <.vmp1a11111 :111111or1I)' 1111a 
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(bl h shall not be ne<T:-~a,-y fo, the ,\u1horny 10 hold anv 
he,u in~: 
le) No person shall be entitled as of right to be ht"ard by the 
Autho1i1y . 
5 26. Powers of Authority in relation to invesrigations-
(1) The Authority may rcquir e any person who in its opinion is 
able to give information relating 10 any matter under 
investigation by the Au1hority to furnish such information. 
and to produce such documents or 1hinp in the possnsion or 
I O under the control of that person, as in the opinion of the 
Authority are relevant 10 the subjcc1 ·mat1er of the 
investigation. 
(2) The Authority may summon before it and oamine on 
oath any person who in i1s opinion is able IO give any 
15 information relating to the matter under investigation, and 
may for the purpost" administn an oath to any person so 
summoned. 
(3) Every investigation by the Authority shall be deemed to 
be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section I 08 of 
20 the Crimes Act 1961 (which relates 10 perjury). 
27. Protection and privileges of witnesses, etc.-
(1) Excep1 as provided in subsection (2) of this section and in 
section 28 (21 of this An, every person shall have the same 
privileges in relation to the giving of information to the 
25 Authority, the answering of c~uestions put by the Authority, 
and the producuon of documents ancJ 1hinr,s to tlw Authority. 
as witnesses have in any Court . 
(2) Where 1he A11Lhorny , e<p.1irc~ any person 10 give any 
information 01· produce any doc 11men1 or 1hing. and 
30 compliance wnh that rcqui, cment would breach an obligation 
of secrecy or non disdoc;111 c imposed on that person by or 
under any enac1ment,-
(al The existencr of 1hc obli!;allon ~hall not constitute a 
ground for refus<1l or tadu, e to give the information 
35 or pruduce the docum<·nt or thing . as the case may 
be; and 
(b) Compliance with any such requirement is not a ?reach of 
the relevant obligation of secrecy or non·d1sclosurc, 
or of the enactment or provision by which that 
40 obligation is imposed. 
(3) No person shall be liable to prosecution for an offence 
against any enactmt'nt, other than aection 38 of this Act, by 
~ rt' <!.,. .. /n111 ~ .fhor~ 1d ~ 
M1.1cellm1t'ou.1 A me11dml'1tlJ 
reason of that person's compliance with any requirement of 
the Authorit} under sectiCin 26 ol" 1h1s Act. 
(4) Except in proceedings for perjury within the meaning of 
1 h(' Crimes Act 1961 in respect of sworn testimony given 
bt'forc the Authority. or for an offenc(' against section 38 of tl1is 5 
Act,-
(a) No statemeni made or answer given by any person in the 
course of any investigation by or proceedings before 
the Authority shall be admissible 111 evidence against 
that or any other person in any Court or in any 10 
inquiry or other proceeding; and 
(b) No evidence in respect of proc("edings before the 
Authority shall be given against any person. 
(5) Where the auendance of any person is required by the 
Authority under section 26 of this Act, the person shall be 15 
entitled to the same fcrs, allowances, and t'xpenses as if the 
person were a witness in a Court and. for the purpose,-
(a) The provisions of any re~ularions in that behalf under the 
Summary Proceedmgs Act 195 7 shall apply 
accordingly: and 20 
(b) The Authority shall have I hr powers of a Court under 
any such regulations to fix or disallow. in whole or in 
part, or to increase, any amounts payable under the 
regulations . 
28. Disclosure of certain matters not to be required- 2.5 
(I) Where-
(a) The Prime Minister certifies that the giving of any 
informalion or the produnion of any document or 
thing might prqudil e-
(i) The security or defence of New Zealand, or the 30 
international rt'larions of the Government of New 
Zealand: or 
(ii) Any inincst pro1encd by section 7 of the 
Official Information Act 1982 (which relates to the 
Cook lslancJs. Niue. Tokelau, and lhe Ross 35 
Dependency); or 
(b) The Attomey·General certifies that the giving of any 
information or the production of any document or 
thing-
(i) Might prt-judice the prevention, invrsLig.1tion, or 40 
detection of offences: or 
(ii) Might involve the disclosure of proceedings of 
Cabinet, or any commi1tee of Cabinet, relating to 
I 
~ ~ L.....J L--J '--I 
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inatten of a sec.ret or confidential nature, and such 
disclosure would l,r lllJUnvus to thr public 
inte1t·st,-
the Authority shall not 1 <'lplir<' th<' i11forrnatio11 to be giv<'n, or, 
5 as the case may be, tht' dowmcnt or thing to be produced . 
(2) Except as pt ovided in subsection (11 of this section, the rule 
of law which authorises or requires the withholding of any 
document, or tht:'. refusal to answer any question, on the 
ground that the disclosure of the docum<"nt or the answering 
I O of the question would be injurious to the public interest, shall 
not apply in respect of any investigation by or proceedings 
before the Authority . 
Procedurr u11 Cumpletw11 uj lrtueJt1gatwn 
29. Procedure after investigation by Authority-
15 (I) Where the Authority itself undertakes an investigation 
under this Act it shall form an opinion on whether or not any 
decision, recommendation, act, omission, conduct, policy, 
practice, or procedure whi(h wa~ the s11bject ·maller of the 
investigation was contrary to law, unreasonablt', unjusrif.n--1 , 
20 unfair, or un<lt"sirable . 
('.Z) The Authority shJll rnnvcy it~ opi11iun, with reasons, to 
the Cornrnissiont-1, and m,1y rnakc ~ulh rccornrnc11dations as it 
thinks fit, including a rero1111ncndation that disciplinary or 
criminal proceedings be comidcrcd against any member of the 
25 Police. 
50. Procedure after investigation by Police-( 1) Where 
the Police report to the Authority, pursuant to section 21 of this 
Act, on a Police investigation of a complaint, the Authority 
shall form an opinion on whether or not any decision, 
30 recommendation, act, omission, conduct, policy, practice, or 
procedure which was the subject ·matter of the investi~ation 
was contrary to law, unreasonable, unjustified, unfair, or 
undesirable. 
(2) After considering the Police report and forming its 
S5 opinion, th(' Authority-
(a) Shall indicate to the Commissioner whether or not it 
agrees with the Commissioner's decision or proposed 
deci~ion in respect of the complaint: 
(b) May, where it disagrees with the Commissioner's decision 
40 or proposed decision, make such recommendations, 
supported Ly rea~om, as it thinks fit, including a 
'--l L-J 
14 
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recommendation that disciplinary or uirrun~I 
proceedings be considered against any member of 
the Police. 
31. Implementation of recommendations of Author-
ity-( I) The Commissioner shall, as soon as reasonably pr.acti · 
cable after receiving any recommendation of the Authority 
under section 29 (2) or section 30 (21 of this Act, -
(a) Notify the Authority of the action (if any) proPosed to~ 
taken lo give effect to th<.. recomrncndauon; and 
5 
(b) Give reasons for any proposal to depart from, or not to JO 
implement, any such recommendation . 
(:Z) If: within a reasonable time alier a recommendation is 
ma<k, 110 action is taken which seems to the Authority to be 
adequate and appropriate, the Authority may. after consider· 
ing any comments made by the Cornmissioner,-
(a) Send a copy of its opinion and r<"commendations on the 
matter, together with the comments of the Comm1s 
sioner, lo the Auorney ·General and the Minister of 
Police; and 
15 
(b) Whne it consider~ it appropriate, transmit to the 20 
Attomey·General for t.thling in the Hou,e of 
Representative~ such rt'p<Jrl on rhe matter as it thinls 
fit. 
(3) The Attom<·y G(·ncral shall, as ~oon as pracucable .after 
receiving a report under subsection (21 (bi of this section, lay the 25 
report before the House of Representatives . 
52. Parties to be informed of progress and result of 
investigation-Where the Autho,-ity investigates a complaint, 
it shall-
(a) Conduct c.he investi~ation with due expedition; and 50 
(b) If it seems appropnate, inform the complainant and the 
Commissioner of the progress of the investig.ation; 
and 
(c) In every case, infonn the parties concerned, as soon .as 
reasonably practicable after the conclusion of the S5 
investigation, and in such manner as it thinu proper. 
of the result of the investigation. 
SS. Advcne comment-The Authority shall nm, in any 
opinion or recommendation given under MCtion 29 or NC1bl 30 
of this Act, or in ~y report made or published Wlder MC1'on 31 40 
or section 36 of this Acr, make any comment that is adverse to 
t......l L.....l '--J L....J 
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any person unless that person has b<'en given a reasonable 
upponunity tu be heard. 
Mucellaneuw ProlllJIOnl 
S4-. Authority and staff to maintain secrecy-( I) The 
5 Authority, and every person holding any office or 
appointment under the Authority, shall maintain secrecy in 
respect of _all mat1crs that wrne to their knowled~e in the 
exercise of ttwir funn1ons, and ~hall not corrnrntnKale any 
suth matt<·r 10 any pn ~t111 <"X<"Cfll frn I lie purpos<· or givin~ 
10 eflect 10 this Part of this Act. 
(2) Every person holding .111y otfit e or appointment under 
the Authority shall. before entering upon any official duty 
under this An. take an oath. to be adminisrered by the 
Authority or Deputy Authority. th,1t that person will not 
15 divulge any information received by that person under this Ace 
except for the purpose of giving effect to this Part of this Act. 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the 
Authority may disclose such matters as in the opinion of the 
Authority ought to be disclosed-
20 (a) For the purroses of carrying out an investigation or other 
duty o the Aurhority under this Acr; or 
(b) In order to establish grounds for the Authority's 
conclusions and recornmendalions, -
other than any matter which is likely to prejudice any of the 
25 interests desn ibe<l in subsection (1 I of section 28 of this Act, 
whether or not any certificate has been given undrr that 
subsection. 
(4) The Authority, and evny pc·rson holding any oflice or 
appointment under the Authoriry, ~hall be dccrncd for the 
30 purposes of sections I 05 and I 05A of the Crimes An 1961 to 
be officials. 
35 
40 
S5. Proceedings privileged-(!) Subject to subsection (21 of 
this section,-
(a) No proceedings. civil or criminal, shall lie against the 
Authority, or against any person holding any office 
or appointment under the Authority, for anything 
done or reported or said by the Authority or person 
in the course of the exercise or intended exercise of 
their functions under this Part of this Act, unless it is 
shown that the Authority or person acted in bad 
faith: 
L-1. 
10 
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-
(b) Nr.ither the Authori•y. nor any person holding a.ny office 
or appointment under the Authodty, shall be a.I.led 
to give evidence in any Court, or in any proceedings 
of a judicial nature, in respect of anythin~ coming to 
their knowledge in the exercise of thetr functions 5 
under this Part of this Act. · 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1 I of this section applies in respect of 
proceedings for-
(a) An offence against section 78 or section 78A (I) or senion 
I 05 or senion I 05A of t h<· Criincs Act 1961; or I 0 
(b) The ollence of conspiring to commit an offence against 
section 7 8 or section 7 8A (I) or section I 05 or section 
I 05A of the Crimes Act 1961; or 
(c) The offence of attempting to commit an offence against 
section 7 8 or section 7 8A (I) or section I 05 or section 15 
I 05A of the Crimes Act I 961; or 
(d) An offence against section 38 of this Act. 
(3) Anything said or any information given or any document 
or thing produced by any person in the course of any 
investigation by or proceedings before the Authority under this 20 
Part of this Act shall be privileged in the same manner as if the 
investigation or proceedings were proceedings in a Court. 
(4) for the purposes of clause 5 of the First Schedule to the 
Defamation Act 1954,-
{a) Any report, opinion, or recommendation given by the 25 
Authority under section 29 or MCtion 30 or NC1ion 31 of 
this Act; and 
(b) Any report published by the Authority or the 
Commissioner under section 38 of this Act, -
shall be deemed to be an official report made by a person ,o 
holding an inquiry under the authority of the Government of 
New Zealand. 
S6. Publication of rcporu by Authority and by 
Commissioner-(1) The Authority may from time to time, in 
the public interest or in the interests of any person, pubfuh ,s 
reports relating to-
(a) The general exercise of its functions under this Act; or 
(b) Any particular case or cases in relation to which it has 
exercised its functions under this Act, -
whether or not the matters dealt with in the report have bttn 40 
the subject of a report to the Attomey·Genera.1 and the 
'r C, 11111 ho111 d 
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Minister of Police, or to the House of Representatives, un<frr 
HC1ion 31 of this Act. 
(2) The Commissioner may. after receiving from the 
Authority any opinion or recommendation given under 
.S Ndiaft 29 or section 30 of this Acl, publish all or any parl of the 
opinion or rt'commendation. 
(3) In detennining the desirability or extent of publication 
under subsection (21 of this section, the Commissioner shall take 
into accounr an)' refommendation of 1he Au1horit)' concerning 
10 publication . 
(4) Neither the Authori1y nor 1he Commissioner shall. in any 
repon published under this section, disclose any mauer which 
is likdy to prejudice any of th!' interests described in 
aubsectt0nl1) of section28 of ,hi<; Art, whether or not any 
I.S ct"nificate has bC"<'ll given 1111<lt·1 ,hat ,11li,;;cction 
57. Annual report-( I ) Without !uniting the right of the 
Authority lO repon al any time under section 31 or section 36 of 
this Act. the Authority shall 1n each year furnish to the 
Minister of Justi ce a report on the exercise of its functions 
20 under 1h1s Ac!. 
(2) A copy of n ery s11< Ii I cpo1 t shall be laid before the 
House of Represe11tjtives a~ soon as practicable after the date 
on which it ,s furn,slwd to the Minister. 
58. OfTences-l: very person commits an offence under this 
2.S Act and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not 
exceeding S2,000 who, -
(a) Without reasonable excuse, obstructs, hinders, or resists 
the Authority or any other person in the exercise of 
their powers under this Part of this Act: 
30 (b) Without reasonal.>~e excuse, refuses or _fails to comply 
with any requ1remenl of lhe Authon1y or any other 
person under thi1 P1rt of this Act : 
(c) Makes any slalemenl or gives any informalion to the 
Authority, or to any other person exercising powers 
under this P1rt of this Act, knowing that the statement 
or information is false or misleading. 
19. Money to be appropriated by Parliament for 
purpoeca of this Act-All salaries, allowances, and other 
expenditure payable or incurred under or in the 
administration of thia Part of this Act shall be payable out of 
money to be appropriated by Parliament for the purpose. 
40. Amendment of Ombudsmen Act 1975, and saving-
( I) Section 13 (7) of the Ombudsmen Act 197 ~ is hereby 
amended by, repealing paragraph (d), and substituting the 
following para~raph: 
"(d) Any decision, recommendation, act, or omission of any 5 
member of the Police other than-
"(i) Any matter relating to the terms and 
conditions of service of any person as a member of 
1 he Police; or 
"(ii) Any complaint or matter in respect of which I 0 
t.he Police Complaints Authority has, in accordance 
with section 24 of t.he Police Complaints Authority and 
Miscellaneous Amendments Act 1987, determined that it 
has no jurisdiction, or requested t.hat an 
investigation be undertaken by an Ombudsman." 15 
('.l) Not withstanding aubsection (1) of I his section, nothing in 
this Part of this Act shall apply 10 any matter which an 
Ombudsman has commenced to investigate before t.he 
commencement of this Act, and the Ombudsman may 
continue and complete the investigation of any such matter as 20 
if this Act had not been passed. 
41. Amendments to other Acts-( I) The Police Act 1958 is 
hereby amended by repealing section 60. 
(2) The Higher Salaries Commission Act 197 7 is hereby 
amended by inserting in the Fourth Schedule (as substituted by 25 
sec tion 3 of the Higher Salaries Commission Amendment Act 
1980), after the item 'The Commissioner of Police and the 
Deputy Commissioner of Police" , the following item: 
"The Police Complaints Au1hority and the Deputy Police 
Complaints Authority ." 30 
(3) The Official Information Act 1982 is hereby amended by 
inserting, in the First Schedule, in iu, appropriate alphabetical 
order, the following item: 
"Police Complaints Authority" . 
... 
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Appendix B 
SYK>PSIS OF SERIOOS CCMPIAINTS AGl\INST IDLICE 
(Information obtained from Annual Reports of the New Zealand Police to 
Parliament) 
Calender Number of Justified ie Criminal Discipline 
Year Serious act complained Charges Charges 
Complaints of did occur S33 Police Act 
and constituted 
a breach of 
statute law or 
misconduct under 
the provisions of 
the regulations 
1982/1983 246 42 ( 17. 8%) 13 38 
21 charges 
related 
to internal 
discipline 
1983/1984 376 42 (11.17%) 9 11 
(3 convicted 7 found guilty 
6 acquited) 
1984/1985 357 34 (10.5%) 17 11 
(10 convicted r found guilty 0 
7 acquited) 
1985/1986 310 30 (10%) 10 17 
(2 convicted 
4 acquited) 
4 results not 
indicated 
1986/1987 401 43 8 14 
(6 convicted (9 convicted 
2 acquited) 3 acquited 
2 disengaged on 
medical grounds 
causing 
discontinuance) 
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Appendix C 
Commissions, Committees of Inquiry and Ad Hoe Examiners 
A 
1897 
1898 
1905 
1909 
1980 
B 
1952 
1954/ 
1955 
1955 
1976 
1977 
1983 
Royal Commissions 
Royal Commission on Charges against Inspector John 
Emerson. Commissioner H Eyre-Kenny 
Royal Commission on the Police Force of New Zealand. 
Commissioner A Pitt 
Royal Commission on the Police Force of New Zealand. 
Commissioner H W Bishop 
Royal Commission on the Police Force of New Zealand. 
Commissioner H W Bishop 
Royal Commission to Inquire into the circumstances of 
the convictions of Arthur Allan Thomas for the murders 
of David Harvey Crewe and Janette Lenore Crewe. 
Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry 
Act 1908 
Commission of Inquiry into the Circumstances of the 
Prosecution of Daniella Sylvia Weir. Mr H W Bundle 
appointed Commissioner. 
Commission of Inquiry to Inquire into Certain Matters 
relating to the conduct of members of the Police 
Force. Commissioner Sir Robert Kennedy. (Two interim 
reports produced in 1954 and the third and final 
report produced in 1955). 
Commission to Inquire into the Prosecution by the 
Police of Donald James Ruka and Murdoch Campbell 
Harris. Mr W H Carson SM appointed Commissioner. 
Commission of Inquiry into an Alleged breach of 
confidentiality of the police file on the Honourable 
Colin James Moyle MP. Commissioner Sir Alfred North. 
Commission of Inquiry into the case of a Niuean boy. 
Commissioner W J Mitchell. 
Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances of the 
Release of Ian David Donaldson from a Psychiatric 
Hospital and His Subsequent Arrest and Release on 
Bail. Mr PB Temm appointed Chairman. 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
C 
1977 
1977 
1978 
1985 
1986 
D 
1984 
1987 
E 
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Inquiries under Particular Statutes 
Inquiry into Unauthorised Retrieval and Disclosure of 
Information from the Wanganui Computer Centre. Mr GR 
Laking investigated. 
Committee of Inquiry into the circumstances of an 
incident involving a former cabinet Minister (Minister 
of Overseas Trade, Mr Joe Walding) a Detective Senior 
Sergeant and a transvestite at an Auckland nightclub. 
This inquiry was instituted under Section 56 Police 
Act 1958 where the Minister has the ability to appoint 
a District Court Judge and one or more members of the 
Police for the purpose of investigating and reporting 
to the Commissioner on any selected matter connected 
with the Police. 
Wanganui Computer Centre Privacy Commissioner 
(RA McGechan) Inquiry into Unauthorised Retrieval and 
Disclosure of Information by a Police Constable. 
Report to the Commissioner of Police concerning the 
Dunedin Sex Ring Scandal. Mr JA L Gibson appointed 
to review the police investigation. 
Inquiry into Reported Allegations of Police Misuse of 
the Wanganui Computer Report of the Wanganui Computer 
Centre Privacy Commissioner pursuant to sections 9 and 
13 of the Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976. 
Committees of Inquiry 
Committee of Inquiry into the Riot at Auckland on 
7 December 1984. Chairman, the Honourable Mr P Mahon. 
Committee of Inquiry into the Ammunittion Currently on 
the issue to the Police and Matters Incidental 
Thereto, Reviewer was the Hon Sir Cliton Roper. 
Ad hoe Appointees Reports 
Report for the Honourable MB R Couch M P ~inister of 
Police re Paul Chase Shooting. 
Appointment by the Attorney General of Mr Nicholsen QC 
to investigate. He recommended the appointment of an 
independent person to investigate Police shootings, in 
every case it occurred. (See pll6 of his report). 
Report into the Shooting of Kevin David Fox and Donna 
Teresa Fox at Gore on 6 June 1985. Mr Penlington QC 
appointed independent examiner (via the powers and 
authorities vested in the Commissioner of Police S3{1) 
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1981 
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3 
of the Police Act 1958). He recommended changes to 
General Instructions (Para 650) changes to training 
(Para 651). He also recommended statutory changes to 
put independent examiners on a proper footing (Para 
647). 
Report re Shooting of Benjamin Wharerau at Dargavtlle 
on 14 March 1986. 
Mr R Fisher QC appointed independent examiner. 
Recommended changes to clarify General Instructions 
(17.1.1), to Firearms Refresher Training (17.1.1.4) 
etc. 
Wider Inquiries Impinging on the Police Formulated 
Policies 
Committee on Gangs. Chairman K Comber 
Committee of Inquiry into Violence. Chairman Sir 
Clinton Roper. 
I Appendix D 
PROPOSED DRAFTING MODIFICATIONS TO THE BILL 
This appendix outlines some of the stylistic, technical and 
textual legislative modifications which the author believes 
are necessary to fine-tune the proposed law. 
1 Long Title (discussion page 28) 
"An Act to make provision for the establishment of a 
Police Complaints Authority, and to amend the Police 
Act 1958" 
2 Purpose Clause (discussion page 28) to be inserted in 
vacinity of clause 3 
The purposes of this Act are: 
(a) to ensure that all complaints made about the 
activities of the Police members and Police 
policies, procedures and practices are 
investigated in a quick and thorough manner; 
(b) to act as a determinent to illegal, improper and 
inappropriate conduct by members of the Police; 
(c) to facilitate improvements in the complaints 
procedures and practices of the Police; 
(d) to promote public trust and confidence in the 
Police; 
(e) to provide for police accountability to the 
community; 
(f) to make consequential amendments to the Police 
Act 1958. 
3 Clause 5. Fix the Authority's tenure to 5 years. 
(discussion pages 31-33) 
4 Removal of all housekeeping constitutional clauses to 
a schedule to the Bill/Act. (discussion page 33) 
5 Redraft clause 8(2) as follows: 
"(2) Sections 4 to 7 of this Act shall apply to the 
Deputy Authority in the same manner as they apply to 
the Authority." 
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2 
Redraft clause 13(l)(a)(i) (discussion pages 37-38) 
"(i) about the conduct of a member of the police or 
police department. 
Insert into the definition section conduct means; 
(a) an act or decision of a member of the police; 
(b) failure or refusal by a member of the police to 
act or make a decision the exercise, performance or 
discharge, whether within or outside the state of a 
power function or duty, that he has or by virtue of 
being a member of Police". 
7 Redraft clause 13(l)(a)(ii) (discussion page 38) 
8 
9 
10 
11 
"(ii) concerning any practice, policy or proceudure of 
the Police affecting the body of persons making the 
complaint". 
Insert in clause 13(a) subclause (c) (discussion 
page 43) 
"to carry out an investigation into any complaint 
incident or other matter at the request of the 
commissioner in accordance with Section 23(2)". 
Relegate the current clause 13(c) to subclause (2) and 
subclause (2) should become subclause (3). 
Insert in clause 14 after the word "acting" (and 
delete in the execution of a members duty) 
"or purporting to act in the exercise of or in 
connection with or incident to the exercise of that 
members powers functions or duties as a member of 
Police causes ... " 
Clause 18(a) and (b) delete the second "Police" where 
it occurs. 
12 Clause 19(a) (discussion page 53) 
"the Authority may in its discretion decide to take no 
action if 
(a) the complaint relates to a matter which the 
aggrieved person has had knowledge for more than six 
months before the complaint was made, unless there are 
good reasons to investigate or continue action". 
I 
I 
J 
3 
13 Insert in Clause 21 (discussion page 58) the words "or 
so" after the word "whether". 
14 Delete clause 21 (discussion page 58). 
15 Clause 23 (discussion page 60) ought to refer in the 
marginal note to "duty" rather than "power". 
16 Clause 25 (discussion page 63) insert "complaint 
incident" or before "other matter". 
17 Clause 26(1) delete the words "the subjec~ matter of 
the". 
18 
19 
20 
Clause 26(3) (discussion page 64) substitute 
"examination" for "investigation". 
Amend Clause 35 (discussion page 72) by inserting 
"No proceedings shall be brought under subclause 
(l)(a) except with the leave of the High Court. The 
High Court shall not give leave unless it is satisfied 
that there is substantial ground for contention that 
the person to be proceeded against acted in bad 
faith". 
Insert into Clause 35(4)(b) after "section 36" in the 
second line or the annual report made under section 
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